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Preface 
 
Prior to the commencement of this thesis I worked with fisheries 
economics as a research analyst at the Danish Research Institute of Food 
Economics (FOI) in Copenhagen in 1998-2001. The main field of work 
was market models for fish products. Before that I worked for the 
Greenland Home Rule in 1993-95 with practical fisheries management. 
This background has driven my interest in the field of fisheries 
economics.  
 
 In 2001 I embarked upon the Ph.D. programme at the University of 
Southern Denmark, while continuing my employment at FOI. The thesis 
was written during the period 2001-2004. This set-up has been possible 
due to the granting of financial support from both the Danish 
Agricultural and Veterinary Research Council via the Centre for 
Fisheries and Aquaculture Management and Economics (FAME) and 
FOI, which is gratefully acknowledged.  
 
 As a part of this thesis I visited the Fisheries Division at the 
Directorate of Food, Agriculture and Fisheries in the OECD in Paris for 
a 6-month period during the winter 2001-02. I participated in the project 
“Liberalising fisheries markets – scope and effects”, undertaken by the 
OECD Committee of Fisheries in the 2001-02 work programme. 
 
 Over the past three years I have had the privilege to work with a lot 
of people, which I am indebted to. I would like to take this opportunity 
to thank some of them here. At the Department of Environmental and 
Business Economics at the University of Southern Denmark in Esbjerg, 
Henning Jorgensen has been my supervisor. He has shown an interest in 
my work and always been available for support and good advice. He has 
also read numerous preliminary drafts. Two of the papers in this 
dissemination (chapters 6 and 7) were written together with Frank 
Jensen and Eva Roth, who I thank for good cooperation and support.  
 
Also thanks to the evaluation committee for valuable comments on my 
thesis, namely Niels Vestergaard from the University of Southern 
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Denmark, Frank Asche from Stavanger University Collage and Peder 
Andersen from the Danish Economic Council.  
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the subject of international seafood trade. I also thank for financial 
support to the visit in the World Trade Organisation in Geneva, January 
2002.  
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express my gratitude to the members of the division of fisheries 
economics and management. In particular I would like to thank Jorgen 
Lokkegaard in his capacity as research director for making it possible 
for me to participate in projects of relevance for my thesis during my 6 
years of employment, for his commitment in the project and for 
inspiration and support underway. I also owe a great deal of thanks to 
Erik Lindebo, who checked almost all parts of this thesis for the 
language, to Hans Frost for inspiration and providing assistance and 
guidance on subjects related to bio-economics, and to Ayoe Hoff for 
mathematical support. Philip Rodgers has also in his external affiliation 
to FOI provided support and comments on several of the papers 
included in the thesis.  
 
 A number of people have provided comments and suggestions in 
relation to individual papers, and they have been noted and thanked in 
the relevant papers.  
 
 Last, but most important, my gratitude goes to my fiancée Dorte, for 
support and patience, particularly during periods where this thesis take 
up all my time.  
 
Copenhagen, October 2004 
Max Nielsen 
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Dansk resume 
 
Denne afhandling behandler en række problemstillinger, som man 
møder når man analyserer liberalisering af handel med fisk og 
fiskeprodukter. Afhandlingen er baseret på en række særskilte papirer 
hvorfra hovedresultater gennemgås nedenstående.  
 
Et litteraturstudium af handel med fisk og fiskeprodukter  
Det første papir er en gennemgang af den eksisterende neoklassiske 
økonomisk-teoretiske litteratur der er relevant for denne afhandling om 
hvordan den internationale handel med fisk og fiskeprodukter 
modelleres. Formålet er at skabe en ”state of the art” som kan fungere 
som en referenceramme for de efterfølgende analyser, som hver især går 
mere i dybden. Områder i litteraturen hvor viden er mangelfuld 
identificeres og politik anbefalinger gives på grundlag af eksisterende 
litteratur hvor det er muligt. Metoder til afgrænsning af de internationale 
markeder for fisk og fiskeprodukter og til analyse af efterspørgsel, 
udbud og udenrigshandel med fisk og fiskeprodukter er gennemgået. 
Co-integrationsanalyse af non-stationære prisserier anvendes ofte i 
litteraturen for at afgrænse markederne og forskellige økonometriske 
metoder har været anvendt til at estimere efterspørgselsfunktioner. 
Udbudsmodeller er estimerede, samt kalibrerede på basis af 
aldersstrukturerede bio-økonomiske modeller. Grundlæggende 
handelsteori er endvidere udviklet i forbindelse med generelle 
ligevægtsmodeller og kombineret med økonomien i gendannelige 
ressourcer med fri adgang. I papiret gennemgås udviklingen af en partiel 
ligevægtsmodel for liberalisering af handel, baseret på en bestand med 
fri adgang. Anvendt forskning indenfor området er gennemgået og det 
er vist hvordan papirerne til denne afhandling udbygger forståelsen af 
forbindelserne mellem markederne for fisk og fiskeprodukter, 
fiskeriforvaltningen og handelsliberalisering. 
 
Anvendelsen af toldpolitiske instrumenter på fisk og fiskeprodukter i 
OECD lande 
Det andet papir præsenterer en oversigt over information indsamlet for 
OECD’s Fiskerikomite vedrørende handelsliberalisering af fisk og 
fiskeprodukter. Omfanget af toldinstrumenterne for fisk og 
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fiskeprodukter er vurderet og de vigtigste problemstillinger som opstår 
vedrørende anvendelsen af disse instrumenter er identificeret. Det 
fremgår af denne analyse, at det handelsvægtede toldgennemsnit for fisk 
og fiskeprodukter importeret til alle OECD lande var 3,1% og det 
simple gennemsnit af de bundne satser 7,0%. Dvs., der anvendes for 
adskillige fisk og fiskeprodukter toldsatser væsentligt lavere end de 
bundne satser. Det fremgår også at forskellen mellem arterne er lille, 
men at toldsatserne for forarbejdede varer er højere end for 
uforarbejdede. Yderligere påvises at toldsatserne for fisk og 
fiskeprodukter er små sammenlignet med andre produkter og især 
sammenlignet med andre fødevarer. Endelig findes at effekten af en 
reduktion i EU’s bunde satser ville være beskeden, eftersom størstedelen 
af EU’s import foregår til satser væsentligt under de bundne satser. I 
USA er de bindende satser små og i Japan forbliver et stort antal 
toldsatser ubundne. Det handelsvægtede toldgennemsnit i Japan er på 
samme niveau som i EU, men i modsætning til i EU er toldsatserne 
nogenlunde ens. 
 Udgivet i OECD (2003), Liberalising Fisheries Markets – Scope and 
effects, Paris, pp. 80-92. en tidligere version blev præsenteret på den 
89ende session i OECD’s Fiskerikomite i Paris, Frankrig, 18-20. marts 
2002.  
 
Prisdannelse og markedsintegration på det europæiske 
førstehåndsmarked for torskefisk 
Totalt tilladte fangster for torskefisk i EU’s farvande er blevet reduceret 
hvert år i de sidste fem år, hvorved flådernes omsætning reduceres. 
Gennem samme periode er priserne dog steget og reduktionen i 
indkomst er derved delvist udlignet. Imidlertid afhænger 
prisændringerne af strukturen på de markeder indenfor hvilke priserne 
dannes. Derfor er strukturen på de europæiske førstehåndsmarkeder er 
for torskefisk undersøgt i det tredje papir. En vektor auto regressiv 
model med fejlkorrektion er anvendt til analyse af landingspriserne 
blandt de vigtigste fiskerinationer, idet co-integrationsanalyse og test for 
”loven om én pris” er anvendt til at bestemme graden af 
markedsintegration. Et delvist integreret europæisk førstehåndsmarked 
for torskefisk er identificeret og som del af dette et geografisk perfekt 
integreret marked for torsk. Eksistensen af dette forholdsvis løst 
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integrerede marked forklares af stivheder på udbudssiden. 
Konsekvenserne diskuteres i relation til reduktioner i kvoter på 
torskefisk og i relation til den gældende markedspolitik. 
 
 Optaget til snarlig udgivelse i Marine Resource Economics. En 
tidligere version blev præsenteret på den fjortende årlige konference i 
den europæiske forening af fiskeriøkonomer i Faro, Portugal, 25-27. 
march 2002.  
 
International markedsintegration og efterspørgsel: det norske og danske 
marked for sild 
Det fjerde papir gennemgår en metode hvor tests for international 
integration anvendes til at identificere markedsstrukturer før estimation 
af efterspørgselssystemer. Metoden anvendes til analyse af det 
europæiske marked for produkter af sild. En vektor autoregressiv model 
med fejlkorrektion anvendes til at identificere co-integrationsvektorer 
mellem prisserier samt, baseret på dette, til at teste ”loven om én pris”. 
Eftersom denne er i kraft mellem de to største globale udbydere, Norge 
og Danmark, estimeres en samlet invers efterspørgselsfunktion for de to 
lande. Resultaterne er anvendt i fortolkningen af stigningen i priserne på 
sild på det danske førstehåndsmarked i 2001, givet stabilt udbud samt 
stabile priser på afsætningsmarkederne for forarbejdede produkter af 
sild. Implikationen er at på trods af at Danmark ikke eksporterede til de 
vigtigste norske eksportmarkeder i det tidligere Sovjetunionen og i 
Østeuropa blev de danske landingspriser påvirket af situationen der.  
 Publiceret i Food Economics, 1 (3), 175-84, 2004. En tidligere 
version blev præsenteret på den femtende årlige konference i den 
europæiske forening af fiskeriøkonomer i Brest, Frankrig, 14-16. maj 
2003. 
 
Anvendelse af IAIDS (Inverse Almost Ideal Demand System) til 
velfærdsanalyse 
Det femte papir præsenterer de teoretiske egenskaber af IAIDS systemet 
og anvender det på tidsseriedata for torsk, sild og rødspætter i Danmark 
(1986-2001). Endvidere gennemgås begrænsninger i anvendelsen af 
systemet til velfærdsanalyse. Som følge af at efterspørgsels-systemet er 
en anden ordens approksimation af det sande system, er det ikke 
generelt anvendeligt til velfærdsanalyser. Det opfylder ikke 
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betingelserne for beregning af forbrugeroverskud (negativ hældning og 
positiv skæring med prisaksen). Den teoretiske pointe er illustreret ved 
et empirisk eksempel af det danske fiskemarked. Der er anvendt en 
vektor autoregressiv model i fejlkorrektions form for at løse problemet 
med non-stationaritet af data og systemet er estimeret. For torsk er 
skæringen negativ og for sild og rødspætter er hældningen af 
efterspørgselsfunktionen positiv i det undersøgte interval. Systemet kan 
således ikke anvendes til velfærdsanalyser. 
 Fremsendt til bedømmelse til Marine Resource Economics. En 
tidligere version blev præsenteret på den femtende årlige konference i 
den europæiske forening af fiskeriøkonomer i Brest, Frankrig, 14-16. 
maj 2003. 
 
En cost-benefit analyse af en offentlig mærkningsordning for kvalitet af 
fisk 
Formålet med det sjette papir er at introducere en ny metode der kan 
identificere velfærd af kvalitetssorterede fisk, under anvendelse af en 
hedonisk prisfastsættelsesmetode for rødspætter i Danmark. I dag 
eksisterer der ikke noget mærkningssystem rettet mod slutforbrugere for 
forskellige kvaliteter af fisk. En mærkningsordning forefindes kun for  
fisk i første omsætningsled. Ud fra dette udvikles en generel teoretisk og 
empirisk metode til at sammenligne omkostninger og fordele ved det 
hypotetiske valg mellem fuldstændigt fravær af en offentlig 
mærkningsordning med indførelsen af et offentligt mærkningssystem, 
som fuldt ud informerer forbrugerne om kvalitet og samtidig tillader 
producenterne at differentiere priser mellem kvalitetssorteringer. Det 
påvises, at den økonomiske velfærd forbundet med et offentligt 
mærkningssystem er minimum 263.000 Euro. En følsomhedsanalyse 
viser at dette resultat er robust. Den politiske konsekvens er at en 
offentlig mærkningsordning ikke bør indføres af økonomiske grunde. 
Årsagen er at efterspørgsels- og omkostningsfunktionerne har lave 
elasticiteter. 
 Fremsendt til bedømmelse til Environmental and Resource 
Economics. En forkortet version vil blive præsenteret på den sekstende 
årlige konference i den europæiske forening af fiskeriøkonomer i Rom, 
Italien, 5-7. april 2004 og en tidligere version er udgivet som 
arbejdspapir 53/2004 fra institut for miljø og erhvervsøkonomi på 
Syddansk Universitet.  
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Velfærdseffekter af udvidelsen af EU i relation til torsk fra den østlige 
Østersø. 
I den nyere forskning er der advaret mod at liberalisering af handelen 
med produkter fra vildt levende fisk, givet utilstrækkelig 
fiskeriforvaltning, kan medføre yderligere overudnyttelse, formindske 
fiskebestandene og derved reducere den bæredygtig velfærd. Det sidste 
papir vurderer og kvalificerer denne advarsel for torsk fra den østlige 
Østersø ved at udvikle en aldersstruktureret bio-økonomisk model, 
kombineret med en partiel ligevægtsmodel for handel mellem to lande. 
Velfærdseffekterne af handelsliberalisering identificeres og kvoter, 
input begrænsninger, maskevidderegulering samt delt ejerskab af 
bestandene tages i betragtning. Det vises, at selv om liberalisering af 
handelen med disse varer kan medføre velfærdsreduktioner i 
producentlandene, vil velfærdsforringelserne være små sammenlignet 
med velfærdsgevinsterne fra en hypotetisk ændring mod optimal 
forvaltning. Derfor er forbedringer i fiskeriforvaltningen meget vigtigere 
end at forsøge at modvirke de negative konsekvenser af 
handelsliberalisering, eftersom selv små forbedringer af 
fiskeriforvaltningen kan opveje negative konsekvenser af 
handelsliberaliseringen. 
 Fremsendt til bedømmelse til Ecological Economics. En tidligere 
version blev præsenteret på den ellevte konference i det internationale 
institut for fiskeriøkonomi og handel i Wellington, New Zealand, 19-22. 
august 2002 og en anden tidligere version blev præsenteret på 
workshoppen ”nye politikker og muligheder i fiskeriforvaltning i 
Esbjerg, 26-28. januar 2004. 
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CHAPTER 1  
 
Introduction 
 
1.1 Background 
The main purpose of this thesis has been to develop integrated models, 
which can be applied to study the linkages between seafood markets, 
fisheries management and trade liberalisation. On traditional non-
seafood markets the development of integrated models focus on linking 
markets and trade liberalisation, with resource implications being of 
secondary importance. In seafood markets, however, models should take 
into account that fisheries management plays a key role. The reason 
includes the presence of externalities. In addition to the presence of 
externalities, products are perishable and there is a high level of 
international trade (relative to production) in seafood products. Hence, 
fisheries economic analysis demands to a certain extent models that are 
different from other sector analyses, although analyses in e.g. 
environmental and resource economics can also enrich fisheries 
economics analysis. This thesis studies the linkages between seafood 
markets, fisheries management and trade liberalisation, emphasising the 
distinctive features of seafood compared to the modelling of trade in 
other products.  
 
Key factors of seafood markets 
Seafood markets are particular in many ways. The main distinctive 
feature of seafood trade and the cause of present concerns is that there 
are externalities in the production process, i.e. at the harvesting level. 
These appear since the harvest of a single fishermen affect the future 
catch possibilities in a potentially negative way. Individual fishermen do 
not own the factors of production, since common property resources are 
included. Thus, the free market will not secure that the social optimum 
is reached, implying that fisheries management is necessary. That this is 
important for the fisheries sector have been evidenced by many 
authorities, in particular the Food and Agriculture Organisation of the 
                                                                      
The author wishes to thank Henning Jorgensen, Carl-Christian Schmidt, Jørgen 
Løkkegaard and Erik Lindebo for comments on preliminary versions of this 
chapter. 
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United Nations (2001) who assess that the majority of the global fish 
stocks today are overexploited. The implication of this has, however, 
also been that fisheries management has become a necessary alternative 
to open access.  
 Several different fisheries management schemes exist. They range 
from regulated open access via regulated restricted access to optimal 
management, i.e. a continuum of possibilities. The implication of the 
presence of externalities combined with improper management is that 
the supply of fish does not increase globally with prices (average costs), 
as for most other products. In an open access fishery  the supply from a 
fish stock will rise until the maximum sustainable yield is reached and 
fall subsequently, as the take from the stock exceeds reproduction. 
Consequently, open access long run seafood supplies must be analysed 
in backward bending supply models. This feature of the supply regime 
in fisheries was raised for the first time by Copes (1970), but the basic 
framework for such an analysis can be dated back to the article “On rent 
of fishing grounds” written in 1911 by the Danish economist Jens 
Warming (Andersen 1983). The shape of the supply model of a 
managed fish stock will depend on the management system in place.  
 Due to quantity limitations in fisheries the causality in the price 
formation process goes from changing demand to price on first-hand 
markets. It is not the other way around as for most other products, where 
it is possible to change quantities to respond to changing price. One 
reason for this is that short and medium run quantities are determined by 
circumstances such as bio-economy, weather, fishery management, etc. 
In the long run the externalities, the fisheries management and the 
natural factors determine the quantity.  
 Concurrently, seafood is a perishable product not easily stored. 
Therefore, demand for seafood at first-hand markets should be analysed 
in inverse demand models, where the causality goes from changing 
demand to price, given exogenous short run quantities.  
 A third distinctive feature is that trade in seafood products is 
relatively important compared to landings. Although differences remain 
for different species and product forms, almost all seafood markets are 
international, implying that prices follow each other over time in 
different countries. There are several reasons for seafood markets being 
international. The most important is, as for all other goods, that all 
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countries win, since they can specialise in what they are best at, i.e. in 
productions where they possess comparative advantages. However, 
seafood trade is distinct as countries are very differently endowed with 
fish stocks. Some countries are land-locked and do therefore not have 
any production of seafood (except for freshwater species). Others, with 
large populations and high income cannot fully meet their own demand, 
whereas some countries with large coastal zones and rich fish stocks 
may not be able to  consume their production.  
 The present fisheries situation is the result of  many years of history 
of the fishing industry. The first milestone for the sector was the 
introduction of the 200 nautical mile exclusive economic zones in 1977, 
codified in the United Nation (1982) Convention on the Law of the Sea 
(UNCLOS). With UNCLOS, property rights of fish stocks within the 
zones were given to the coastal states. Hence, traditional fishing nations 
with large distant water fleets, which were also the large seafood 
consumer countries, were excluded from their traditional fishing 
grounds. This implied that new fishing nations replaced them and built 
their own fleets. The result was that international trade in seafood 
products increased. Simultaneously, however, it became common 
practice of some countries including the European Union (EU) to 
negotiate access to markets for the new fishing nations in return for 
access to fishing in their waters. This development would have limited 
the increase in international trade.  
 In the EU, UNCLOS was followed by the introduction of the 
common fisheries policy in 1983. According to Holden (1996), this 
policy includes four elements; conservation, structural adjustment, 
markets and external fisheries. The structural adjustment and the market 
policies are similar to the common agricultural policy in that it includes 
a subsidy and a minimum price element. The difference is, however, 
that in fisheries the subsidies have been directed for measures such as 
modernisation and decommissioning, where in agriculture subsidies 
have mainly, until recently, been connected to production. Today, it is 
decoupled and connected to land. Minimum price schemes are applied 
in both areas, but in fisheries as opposed to agriculture the subsidy 
element of this scheme is small. One reason is that minimum prices are 
relative lower in fisheries, since the EU is a net importer of seafood 
products.  
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 Another important reason for the high level of international trade in 
seafood products is that over the last two decades several rounds of 
multilateral trade negotiations as well as the formation of free trade 
areas have reduced trade barriers on industrial products, including 
seafood. Today, therefore, tariffs on seafood products are relatively 
small compared to other food products. It is noted that seafood products 
in the multilateral trade negotiations have been treated as an industrial 
product and not an agricultural product. Due to the use of anti-dumping 
measures, however, countervailing duties still exist on a higher level in 
a few countries. The Norwegian salmon export to the United States is an 
example. Seafood also remains a part of the World Trade Organisations 
agreement on the application of sanitary and phytosanitary measures 
(SPS), motivated in food security requirements, and of the agreement on 
technical barriers to trade (TBT).  
 Fisheries have become an important issue in international trade 
negotiations after the Doha Ministerial Meeting in November 2001. At 
the Ministerial Meeting fisheries subsidies, but also tariffs on seafood 
products, were placed on the agenda for the on-going multilateral round 
of trade negotiations. In recent years, the Committee for Trade and 
Environment under the World Trade Organisation was also formed to 
address environmental issues (including fisheries) in order to meet 
potential negative consequences of trade liberalisation. This body has, 
inter alia, addressed the US ban on imports of non-dolphin friendly tuna 
(i.e. tuna caught without preventing by-catches of dolphins).  
 
Key issues in seafood market analysis 
The subject of international seafood trade modelling is important seen in 
the light of the simultaneous developments in the fisheries and seafood 
trade sector. Overexploitation is gradually forcing the introduction of 
better fisheries management while trade barriers are gradually relaxed. 
These two developments are closely related to the two policy areas, 
fisheries management and trade policy, which have different objectives. 
Where the main objective of fisheries management is to correct for the 
market failure in the form of the externality, the main objective of the 
trade policy is to secure supplies of seafood as a food product and the 
protection of the domestic industry. However, important cross effects 
remain. The trade policy affects the fish stock through the prices and 
serves as an indirect tax in an exporter country and an indirect subsidy 
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in an importer country. Thereby, the trade policy serves indirectly as a 
fisheries management tool. Similarly, fisheries management does affect 
trade through the supplies. Hence, in order to reach the Pareto optimal 
situation, coordination of changes in the two policy areas is necessary. 
Furthermore, the externality in the fisheries is not only a national issue, 
it becomes an international issue with the emergence of trade; this 
implies that one country cannot secure the optimal situation alone. For 
example, it is necessary for an exporting country to coordinate its 
fisheries management with the trade policies in the countries of their 
market outlets. It is also necessary for an importing country to base its 
trade policy on the fisheries management in its supplier countries.  
 With the internationalisation of seafood markets the distribution 
chains have become long and often include two or more countries. 
Hence, markets might consist of many sub-markets and signals might 
therefore not be transferred perfectly between these markets. Therefore, 
the price formation process is complex and a more detailed 
understanding of the price formation process at the international markets 
is needed. This includes knowledge of the sizes and boundaries of 
international markets, a better understanding of substitutability between 
species and knowledge of the demand and supplies on the markets. Only 
through such detailed knowledge is it possible to analyse the effects of 
changes in some parts of the distribution chain on other parts. This is 
important since only through such an understanding is it possible to 
coordinate fisheries management and the trade policy.  
 Coordination of trade and management polices are important when 
consumers shift preferences. An example of a preference shift in recent 
years is consumers increasing interest in environmental concerns. For 
seafood products this means that they demand seafood caught from 
sustainably managed fisheries. This environmental requirement stems 
from the final consumers but has effects throughout the distribution 
chain i.e. supermarket chains will demand fish caught from sustainably 
managed fisheries from their sub-contractors, which again will require 
the same further down the chain. Now, provided that the optimal 
coordinated policy is to be reached after the preference shift, the 
fisheries management and the trade policy should be changed 
correspondingly. That such a shift in preferences actually appeared in 
the mid-nineties is underlined by the fact that an international 
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certification organisation for sustainable fisheries, the Marine 
Stewardship Council, was formed in 1996.  
 Furthermore, the ongoing internationalisation is important for 
seafood market analysis, since analysis of single countries in several and 
presumably most cases will be misleading. Seafood markets are 
international and cannot be analysed consistently ignoring the 
international dimension. 
 Finally, the subject is of relevance for other sectors with negative 
externalities in the production, such as forestry and production sectors 
with pollution emissions. As fisheries, forestry is based on renewable 
resources, which might be subject to open access in some countries, e.g. 
tropical timber in some developing countries. Although long run in 
forestry is considerably longer than in fisheries, since the growth of 
forests is slower than most fish stocks, the theoretical analysis of this 
paper also applies to assessing the welfare effects of liberalising trade in 
timber products. The theoretical analysis also holds for production 
sectors with pollution emissions, since trade liberalisation might imply 
increased production and thereby pollution.  
 
1.2 Issues 
This thesis is built around the development of integrated models, 
applicable to studying the linkages between seafood markets, fisheries 
management and trade liberalisation, as shown by the double arrows in 
Figure 1.1.  
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FIGURE 1.1 Integrated analysis of seafood markets. 
Seafood markets
Market structure
 International market
integration 
 Supply 
 Demand
Fisheries management
Mesh size regulation
 Open access
 Regulated open and restricted access
 Optimal management
Trade liberalisation
 Reducing tariff barriers
Multilateral
 Unilateral
 
Integrated models of traditional non-seafood markets focus on the 
linkage between markets and trade liberalisation. The structure of 
markets is decisive for the outcome of a trade liberalisation and a trade 
liberalisation implies e.g. that new markets appear. The analysis of 
seafood markets is, however, not that simple. The reason is that fisheries 
management affects the market through supplies as well as being 
decisive for the effects of trade liberalisation. Proper fisheries 
management implies that steady state supplies are maintained at a high 
and sustainable level, where insufficient fisheries management in the 
extreme can cause extinction.  
 This thesis focuses on seafood markets, fisheries management and 
trade liberalisation both individually and on the linkages between them. 
Emphasis is on subjects where seafood products face distinctive features 
compared to other goods. Hence, the focus is on the linkages between 1) 
fisheries management and seafood markets and 2) fisheries management 
and trade liberalisation. The papers in the dissertation discuss these 
subjects and the linkages. Chapter 2 is a literature review covering the 
whole area, chapter 3 relates only to trade liberalisation and chapter 6 
only relates to seafood markets. Chapters 4, 5 and 7 discuss linkages 
between seafood markets and fisheries management and chapter 8 
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concentrates on the linkage between fisheries management and trade 
liberalisation.  
 
1.3 Methodology 
On the demand and market side, the theoretical basis is traditional 
microeconomics with emphasis on consumers. A market is defined as 
“the area within which the price is determined, allowances being made 
for transportation costs” (Stigler 1969). Hence, the size and boundaries 
of markets in relation to both geographical area and product coverage 
are identified on the basis of whether prices move together over time. 
Provided that prices move together over time, the products are sold on 
the same market and can be modelled as one product. If this is not the 
case, products are sold on different markets, which have nothing to do 
with each other. Demand is identified by maximising utility given 
income and analysed in the first hand market where the behaviour of the 
intermediate buyers also reflects the behaviour of the final consumers. 
Thus, the analyses are of derived demand. Inverse demand systems 
where quantities determine prices are applied, since supplies can be 
considered exogenous, due to the widespread use of quotas and input 
limitations in fisheries management. Demand and market analyses have 
been applied in four of the papers (chapters 4, 5, 6 and 7).  
 Valuation of non-market goods has been applied in chapter 7. The 
basis is valuation of public goods, although the method is used to 
evaluate the private characteristic quality of fish. Actual behaviour of 
consumers is revealed indirectly on the basis of existing data, as 
opposed to asking consumers directly, since data have been readily 
available.  
 The estimation methodology applied is co-integration analysis, which 
has been used to determine integration, sizes and boundaries of markets 
and to estimate demand systems. In market integration tests, co-
integration is applied instead of traditional econometrics such as 
seemingly unrelated regression, since time series of prices in most cases 
are non-stationary. That is, they follow a trend over time. Hence, 
provided that price series are not properly differenced, seemingly 
unrelated regression is invalid. Co-integration then forms a more 
structured framework for analysis. In the estimation of demand systems, 
both co-integration and seemingly unrelated regression can be used, 
  
1-9 
dependent on the structure of the data. Where time series of prices in 
most cases are non-stationary, time series of quantities might or might 
not be non-stationary. Using co-integration, however, claims that time 
series of both prices and quantities are non-stationary. Therefore, co-
integration is only used in this thesis to estimate demand systems where 
time series of both prices and quantities are non-stationary. Co-
integration has been applied as the main tool in four of the subsequent 
papers (chapters 4, 5, 6 and 7).  
 On the supply side, the theoretical basis is welfare economics with 
emphasis on bio-economic production theory. Thereby, included in the 
analyses is that the renewable resource is not priced and that 
externalities in the production exist. The main methodology applied is 
an age-structured bio-economic model, which is chosen instead of an 
aggregated bio-economic production model (a Schaefer model), since 
the fishing mortalities of different years differ, and since constant 
recruitment is more realistic in most fisheries than an assumed 
dependency between harvesting and stock size. The age-structured bio-
economic model has been applied in two of the papers in this thesis 
(chapters 2 and 8).  
 The theoretical basis for the trade analysis is the Neo-Classical 
direction of international economics, including the recent developments 
related to renewable resources. The main methodology applied is an 
integrated bio-economic supply and trade model (a partial equilibrium 
model). This model is applied instead of traditional trade theory since it 
is capable of taking the externality into account. The model is applied 
instead of a general equilibrium model of trade in a renewable resource, 
since it is capable of taking factors such as fisheries management, mesh 
size regulations and shared ownership of fish stocks into account in a 
more realistic manner. This is important since the inclusion of these 
factors might be decisive for the results. The choice of model is made 
since focus is on the seafood market. Provided that emphasis should be 
given to interactions of the fisheries sector with other sectors of the 
economy, general equilibrium models might be a better choice.  
 To support the developments of these methodologies a range of 
courses were followed. These include “advanced econometrics” at the 
University of Copenhagen in the spring 2001, “dynamic analysis and 
applications in resource and environmental economics” arranged by the 
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Centre for Fisheries and Aquaculture Management and Economics 
(FAME) in November 2001, “applied general equilibrium theory” 
arranged by the University of Southern Denmark in the spring 2002 and 
“international trade, resources and environment” arranged by FAME in 
March 2003.  
 
1.4 Summary of the papers included in the thesis 
 
A literature review of studies of international seafood trade 
The first paper is a literature review of existing Neo-classical economic-
theoretic literature on how international seafood trade and markets are 
modelled, which is relevant for this thesis. The purpose is to create a 
“state of the art” which serves as a frame of reference for the subsequent 
in-depth analyses. Shortages in the knowledge provided by the literature 
are identified and policy recommendations are drawn on the basis of 
existent literature, where possible. Methods for delimiting international 
seafood markets and analysing international seafood demand, supply 
and trade are reviewed. Co-integration analysis of non-stationary price 
series is used in the literature to delimitate markets, where different 
econometric methods are used to estimate demand functions. Supply 
models are both estimated and calibrated on the basis of age-structured 
bio-economic models. Basic trade theory is further developed in general 
equilibrium models in the literature and combined with the economics 
of open access renewable resources. In the paper a bio-economic supply 
model combined with basic trade theory is also developed to analyse the 
effects of liberalising trade in an open access fish stock. Applied 
research within the area is reviewed and it is demonstrated how the 
papers contained in this thesis improves our understanding of the links 
between seafood markets, fisheries management and trade liberalisation.  
 
The use of tariff measures on seafood products in OECD countries 
The second paper present an overview of the information gathered for 
the OECD Committee of Fisheries' Study on Market Liberalisation. The 
extent of the use of tariff measures on seafood products in OECD 
countries are assessed and key issues arising from the use of these 
measures identified. It is found that the applied trade weighted tariff 
average for imports of seafood products to all OECD countries was 
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3.1% and the simple average of the bound rate 7.0%. Hence, several 
seafood products are traded at tariff rates lower than the WTO bound 
(most favoured nation) rate. It is also found that the difference between 
seafood species is small, but that tariffs on processed products are larger 
than on unprocessed. Furthermore, it is found that tariffs on seafood 
products are low compared to other products and particular compared to 
other food products. Finally it is found that in the EU a reduction in the 
WTO bound tariff rates would have small effect on the level of 
protection, since the majority of the EU import is on applied rates below 
bound rates. In the USA the bound rates are small and in Japan a large 
number of tariff rates on seafood products remain unbound. The trade 
weighted tariff average in Japan is on the same level as in the EU, but in 
opposition to in the EU, tariff rates on most seafood products are of the 
same size.  
 Published in OECD (2003), Liberalising Fisheries Markets – Scope 
and effects, Paris, pp. 80-92. An earlier version was presented at 89th 
session of the OECD Committee for Fisheries in the study “Liberalising 
Fisheries Markets: Scope and effects”, Paris, France, 18-20 March 2002. 
 
Price formation and market integration on the European first-hand 
market for whitefish 
Total Allowable Catches (TACs) for whitefish in European Union (EU) 
waters have been reduced each year for the past five years, thereby 
reducing fleet revenue. During the same period prices increased, partly 
offsetting the reductions in income. However, price changes depend on 
the structure of the market within which they are formed and, therefore, 
the third paper examines the structure of the European first-hand market 
for whitefish. A Vector Auto Regressive model in Error Correction form 
is used to analyse landing prices among the main fishing nations, using 
co-integration tests and tests for the Law of One Price to determine the 
degree of market integration. A partially integrated European first-hand 
market for whitefish is identified and as a part of this a perfectly 
spatially integrated cod market. The existence of this relatively loose 
market integration is explained by the presence of rigidities on the 
supply side. The implications are discussed in relation to reductions in 
the EU whitefish total allowable catches and quotas and to the market 
policies applied.  
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  Forthcoming in Marine Resource Economics. An earlier version was 
presented at the XIVth Annual Conference at the European Association 
of Fisheries Economists in Faro, Portugal, 25-27 March 2002.  
 
International market integration and demand: analysis of the 
Norwegian and Danish herring market 
The fourth paper provides a method where pre-tests for international 
market integration are used to identify market structures before 
estimating demand systems. The method is applied to the analysis of the 
European herring market. A Vector Auto Regressive model in Error 
Correction form is used to identify co-integration vectors between price 
series and, based on this, allowing test for the Law of One Price. The 
Law of One Price is in force between the landing markets for herring in 
the two largest global supplier countries, Norway and Denmark. 
Therefore, an inverse demand function is estimated for the combined 
Norwegian and Danish market. The results are used in the interpretation 
of the increase in the prices of herring on the Danish ex-vessel market in 
2001, given the stability of the Danish market. The implication is that 
even though Denmark did not export to the main Norwegian export 
markets in the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, the Danish 
landing price is influenced by the situation there. 
 Published in Food Economics, 1 (3), 175-84, 2004. An earlier version 
was presented at the XVth Annual Conference of the European 
Association of Fisheries Economists in Brest, France, 14-16 May 2003. 
 
Application of the inverse almost ideal demand system to welfare 
analysis  
The fifth paper presents the theoretical properties of the Inverse Almost 
Ideal Demand System and applies the system on time series data for 
cod, herring and plaice in Denmark (1986 to 2001). Furthermore, the 
shortcoming of the Inverse Almost Ideal Demand System when applied 
to welfare analysis is discussed. The properties of the demand system 
show that - since the demand system is a second-order approximation to 
the true system - it does not have global applicability for welfare 
measurement. It may, therefore, not satisfy the conditions for calculation 
of consumer surplus (negative slope and positive point of intersection 
with the price-axis). The theoretical point is illustrated by an empirical 
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example of the Danish fish market. Using a vector auto regressive 
model in error correction form to overcome the problem of non-
stationarity of data, the Inverse Almost Ideal Demand System is 
estimated. For cod the intercept is negative and for herring and plaice 
the slope of the demand function is positive in the data interval 
investigated. Thus, the estimated demand system is not suitable for 
welfare analysis. 
 Submitted to Marine Resource Economics. An earlier version was 
presented at the XVth Annual Conference at the European Association 
of Fisheries Economists in Brest, France, 14-16 May 2003 and another 
earlier version was published in Working Paper 43/2003 from the 
Department of Environmental and Business Economics, University of 
Southern Denmark. 
 
A Cost-Benefit Analysis of a Public Labelling Scheme of Fish Quality 
The purpose of the sixth paper is to introduce a new method capable of 
evaluating the economic welfare for quality graded fish products using 
the hedonic price method for plaice in Denmark. Today no labelling 
scheme exists for the final consumers of different qualities of fish. A 
scheme does only exist at the first hand market. On this basis, a general 
applicable theoretical and empirical method is developed to compare the 
costs and benefits of the hypothetical choice between the total absence 
of labelling and the presence of a public labelling scheme, which fully 
inform consumers on the quality and simultaneously allow the 
producers to differentiate prices between quality grades. It is shown that 
the economic welfare associated with a public labelling scheme is at 
minimum 263,000 euro. Sensitivity analysis shows that this result is 
robust. The policy implication is that a public labelling scheme should 
not be implemented as the demand and cost functions have low 
elasticities, implying that the welfare gain is low. 
 Submitted to Environmental and Resource Economics. An earlier 
version will be presented at the XVIth Annual Conference at the 
European Association of Fisheries Economists in Rome, Italy, 5-7 April 
2004 and another earlier version was published in Working Paper 
53/2004 from the Department of Environmental and Business 
Economics, University of Southern Denmark 
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Welfare implications of the EU enlargement: the case of East Baltic cod 
Recent research has warned that liberalising trade in capture fish 
products originating from inefficient managed fisheries might cause 
over-exploitation, reduced fish stocks and thereby reduced steady state 
welfare. The final paper qualifies the warning in a case study of the East 
Baltic cod market by developing an age-structured bio-economic model 
combined with a basic theory of trade between two countries. Welfare 
effects of trade liberalisation are identified taking fishing quotas, input 
limitations, mesh size regulations and shared ownership of stocks into 
account. It is shown that even though liberalising trade in products 
supplied by such a fishery might cause steady state welfare reductions in 
the supplier countries, these welfare reductions are small compared to 
the welfare gains from a hypothetical change to optimal management. 
Hence, the introduction of better fisheries management is much more 
important than trying to meet potential negative consequences of trade 
liberalisation, since even small improvements in fisheries management 
may offset the negative effects of trade liberalisation. The consequence 
is that the argument against trade liberalisation in certain situations 
gains less validity and conventional wisdom from the Neo-classical 
theoretical tradition regains validity at several and probably most fish 
markets globally. 
 Submitted to Ecological Economics. An earlier version was presented 
at the XIth Bi-annual Conference at the International Institute of 
Fisheries Economics and Trade in Wellington, New Zeeland, 19-22 
August 2002 and another earlier version was presented at a workshop 
entitled “New Policies and Options in Fisheries Management”, 
Roskilde, Denmark, 26-28 January 2004. 
 
1.5 Conclusions 
This section summarises the main findings and policy implications of 
the work in the thesis and discusses them in a broader perspective. The 
general finding of chapter 3 is that even though tariff barriers on seafood 
products are small compared to other products, they still remain and 
could be further reduced. Furthermore, with new non-tariff barriers 
emerging motivated by, inter alia, food security and environmental 
concerns, there is still some way to go to a fully liberalised world 
seafood market. Hence, potential effects of trade liberalisations remain.  
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 On this basis, the lessons to be learned from this thesis are discussed 
for the three types of linkages introduced above as well as for 
methodological issues and in relation to future research.  
 
Issue 1: Linkages between  fisheries management and seafood markets 
Five papers (chapters 2, 4, 5, 7 and 8) have shown aspects of how 
fisheries management and seafood markets interact. Fisheries 
management affect seafood markets through determining steady state 
supplies and seafood markets affect fisheries management through 
demand and prices.  
 The general finding in the literature is that fisheries management is a 
decisive determinant for the sustainable supplies from fish stocks. Open 
access may in the extreme case result in the extinction of a 
commercially exploited stock, where optimal management, for example 
in the form of individual transferable quotas, results in welfare 
surpluses.  
 In chapters 2 and 8 supplies under regulated open and restricted 
access are analysed. Furthermore, the wide use of compulsory mesh size 
regulations is included. Taking such measures into account implies that 
the supply curves are approximately vertical in the relevant range, a 
situation which may be relevant in several and probably most 
commercially important fisheries globally that are under some form of 
management. The implication is that the risk of extinction is largely 
non-existent for most fish stocks. Hence, overexploitation becomes an 
economic problem of larger than necessary costs of fishing, more than a 
biological problem. The risk of extinction, however, remains in 
countries with inefficient or no fisheries management; this is in 
particular the case in developing countries.  
 An implication of the exogenously determined supply is that 
increased demand results mainly in increased prices. Thus, provided that 
an integrated world market where prices move together over time exists, 
the effects of increased demand in parts of the world will increase the 
prices throughout the whole market. Increased global demand of 
seafood might not be unrealistic in the near future, since the purchasing 
power of several developing countries is on the increase. This may in 
particular be important for seafood products, which may be considered a 
luxury good in many of these countries. The condition is, however, that 
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markets are integrated internationally and in chapter 4 it is shown that a 
perfectly integrated European first-hand cod market, albeit imperfectly 
integrated with markets for other whitefish, exists. In chapter 5 it is 
shown that an international herring market exists, including markets for 
direct landings in Denmark and Norway, and the Norwegian export 
markets in the former Soviet Union. Hence, increased demand in e.g. 
Russia helps to pressure first-hand prices upwards, internationally and 
thereby also in Denmark. Therefore, and despite export of herring 
products from Denmark to Russia being largely non-existent, increased 
demand in Russia will increase first-hand prices in Denmark. The 
herring market can therefore not be analysed consistently ignoring the 
international dimension of the market.  
 In chapter 4 it is further shown that, provided that an internationally 
coordinated quota reduction is undertaken and that markets are 
integrated internationally, studying demand and price formation in 
single countries yields invalid results. Since the EU Commission fixes 
the quotas in the EU and as European cod markets are found to be 
integrated between countries, analysis of the European cod markets 
must be international. Hence, the present literature, wherein most 
studies are made for single countries, tends to underestimate the effects 
of prices resulting from international coordinated quota reductions.  
 In chapter 5 it is found that herring prices would be more sensitive to 
changes in quantities when individual transferable quotas are 
introduced. The reason is that such a scheme leaves more flexibility for 
the fishermen in choosing when they want to fish. Hence, they can fish 
when the price is high. This is in itself Pareto-improving. A likely effect 
of the introduction of individual transferable quotas is a change from 
traditionally being supply-driven to become partly demand-driven in the 
long run. Such an outcome of the introduction of the scheme in the 
Danish herring fishery is unrealistic, however, since Denmark only 
supplies a limited share of the international market. Norway should also, 
as the main herring producer nation, join such a scheme.  
 In chapter 7 the subject of meeting consumer requirements is 
analysed. The introduction of a public labelling scheme of fish quality, 
allowing consumers to choose the desired quality and giving an 
incentive for the fishermen to catch and land higher quality fish, is 
studied. For plaice in Denmark the benefit of such an introduction is so 
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modest that there is no economic justification for introducing the 
scheme.  
 
Issue 2: Linkages between fisheries management and trade 
liberalisation 
The analysis of the linkage between fisheries management and trade 
liberalisation is studied in chapters 2 and 8. It is clear that provided that 
the two policies are not coordinated only sub-optimal solutions can be 
achieved. The optimal integrated policy is to regulate fisheries, for 
example by individual transferable quotas, and simultaneously fully 
liberalise seafood markets. 
 The main finding in chapter 8 confirms the result in the literature, 
warning that liberalising trade in seafood products originating from 
inefficiently managed fisheries might cause reduced steady state welfare 
in exporter countries. It is, however, found only to be the case under 
certain conditions that are unrealistic in several fisheries. In the case 
study of the east Baltic cod fishery under the assumption of open access, 
the result was confirmed. If, however, the price increase (caused by the 
trade liberalisation) in the exporter country had been sufficiently large, 
welfare gains would have resulted. The reasons are that the cod stock is 
shared, subject to mesh size regulation, and exploited at such a high 
level, so the supply curve becomes almost vertical. Therefore, the 
exporting country increases its share of the total fishing effort, with the 
total supply being almost unchanged.  
 When assuming the presence of either regulated open or restricted 
access, it is found that the steady state welfare effects is small and 
accounts for less than 7% of the landing value both in the importer and 
exporter countries. Under the assumption of open access the welfare 
effect of liberalising trade also accounts for less than 7%. Hence, no 
matter which of the three management systems is applied the welfare 
effect of liberalising seafood trade is small.  
 Furthermore, if optimal fisheries management resulted from the 
enlargement, welfare gains would have been twenty times larger than 
the welfare effects of trade liberalisation. Hence, the introduction of 
better fisheries management is much more important than trying to meet 
potential negative consequences of trade liberalisation, since even small 
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improvements in fisheries management may more than offset the 
negative effects of trade liberalisation. 
 Since the situation of the east Baltic cod fishery is similar to several 
other fisheries, the result that welfare effects of trade liberalisation are 
small might also hold for these fisheries. This implies that the 
conclusion of Brander and Taylor (1998) that “while we are convinced 
that none of our results is sufficient reason to abandon ongoing trade 
liberalisation around the world, we are equally convinced that trade 
liberalisation is a two-edged sword for a country with a comparative 
advantage in renewable resources and weak property rights in these 
sectors” should be modified for seafood trade. Along the same line, the 
conclusion of Emami and Johnston (2000) that “the World Trade 
Organisation should not always insist on free trade, rather they must pay 
careful attention to the particular relationships between trade conditions 
and natural resource policies among trading nations” should also be 
modified for seafood trade. The reason is that even though the 
conclusions are not strictly incorrect, they are less valid, since the most 
commonly used fisheries management systems globally are regulated 
open and restricted management, subject to mesh size regulations and 
overexploited stocks (Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United 
Nations 2001). Hence, the argument that warns against trade 
liberalisation in certain situations is less valid and conventional wisdom 
from the Neo-classical theoretical tradition seem more appropriate in 
several and probably most fisheries globally. Findings by Brander and 
Taylor (1998) and Emami and Johnston (2000) are not sufficient reasons 
to abandon the ongoing trade liberalisation.  
 
Issue 3: Linkages between seafood markets and trade liberalisation 
The linkage between seafood market integration and trade liberalisation 
is important for unilateral trade liberalisation, as opposed to multilateral. 
This is due to the fact that if an exporter country forms a small part of an 
integrated world market, the only effect of trade liberalisation of a 
specific country would be that the country forces others out of the 
market. In the case where a single country is subjected to a 
countervailing duty, the effect is that the country is forced out itself. 
Hence, since a European market for cod was identified in chapter 4, the 
only effect of liberalising trade for a single exporter country is that it 
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forces other out. Further, as the only effect of a country being subjected 
to a countervailing duty is that the country is forced out by others.  
 Furthermore, provided that the international trade in herring products 
was fully liberalised, i.e. the main markets in the former Soviet Union 
countries removed all trade barriers, traditional theory would predict 
that Denmark as a herring exporter country would start to sell to these 
countries. This would, however, not necessarily be the case, since most 
of the Danish export is in processed forms at higher prices than these 
markets are prepared to pay. Hence, the Danish export might due to the 
market structure being unaffected by the trade liberalisation.  
 
Methodological issues 
The main methodological lessons to be learned from this thesis relate to 
the analysis of demand and to the use of the integrated model of bio-
economic supply and basic trade theory.  
 In chapter 5 a new method, where pre-tests for international market 
integration are used to identify market structures before estimating 
demand systems, is suggested. In the use of the procedure on the 
European herring market it is shown that if knowledge of international 
market integration were not taken into account, the model would have 
predicted relatively stable conditions on the ex-vessel herring market in 
Denmark in 2001. The prices actually increased by 80%, due to 
changing supply and demand on another part of the integrated 
international market. Hence, demand systems can only be estimated 
consistently based on the knowledge of international market integration 
obtained from the market integration tests.  
 Another issue of demand is raised in chapter 6 where it is shown that 
the commonly applied Inverse Almost Ideal Demand System is not 
suitable for welfare measurement. The reason is that it may not globally 
have negative slopes and positive points of intersection with the price-
axis. In a case study of the Danish fish market it is shown that none of 
three fish species (cod, plaice and herring) included in the estimation of 
the system fulfil the conditions for being suitable for welfare analysis. 
The implication is that welfare analysis must be based on the estimation 
of simpler demand systems, where a specific form of the utility function 
is postulated. This conclusion remains equally valid for ordinary Almost 
Ideal Demand Systems.  
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 In chapters 2 and 8 an applied age-structured bio-economic model is 
developed and combined with basic theory of trade between two 
countries. The model is developed to identify welfare effects of trade 
liberalisation, taking detailed information on fishing quotas, input 
limitations, mesh size regulations and shared ownership of fish stocks 
into account. The model is developed as an alternative to a computable 
general equilibrium model. This is due to the general equilibrium model 
not being well suited for taking the detailed factors into account and 
with the detailed factors being decisive for whether welfare gains or 
losses result from trade liberalisations. Therefore, reliable empirical 
analysis of trade liberalisation of seafood markets cannot be based on a 
computable general equilibrium model. A model explicitly focussing on 
the detailed factors, such as the model developed in chapters 2 and 8, is 
required.  
 
Future research 
On the basis of the results obtained in this thesis, there are several future 
research opportunities. These relate to market and trade analyses.  
 With the development of co-integration tests around 1990, the market 
integration tests evolved and it became possible to undertake analysis 
based on detailed knowledge of market structure and integration. 
Although the literature on delimiting seafood markets has increased 
since, only a fraction of the structure and integration of different 
international seafood markets have been subject to analysis to date. This 
literature is expected to develop. The purpose of such a development 
may allow us to study the effects of changes in one part of the 
distribution chain on other parts of the chain. This will only be possible 
if further delimitation studies are performed between countries and 
seafood species. Only through such studies can a microeconomic basis 
for economic models be obtained. The international dimension is of 
decisive importance for the opportunity of creating reliable analysis, 
since the distribution chain of seafood product in most cases covers 
more than one country. The increased focus on food security and 
environmental concerns among consumers also demands increased 
knowledge of the market structure and integration, as well as of trade 
patterns.  
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 The analysis of trade liberalisation performed in this thesis, based on 
the bio-economic supply model combined with basic theory of trade 
between two countries, focuses on the seafood market and treats other 
sectors of the economy as exogenous. Thereby, the model is not capable 
of analysing the effects of the liberalisation of e.g. all other foodstuffs in 
relation to seafood. Emphasising the interactions between different 
sectors of the economy, the development of a computable general 
equilibrium model is therefore needed. If the analysis, however, is to be 
reliable for the included seafood products, the model should not be 
introduced at the expense of the details offered by the integrated bio-
economic supply and trade model. Hence, the challenge is to integrate 
the two models.  
 The integrated bio-economic supply and trade model could also be 
applied to identify the welfare effects of reducing fisheries subsidies, 
which according to World Trade Organisation (2001) is the problem of 
the fisheries sector with highest global priority. The model can easily be 
expanded to identify the welfare effects of reducing subsidies.  
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CHAPTER 2 
 
A literature review of studies of international seafood trade  
 
Max Nielsen 
 
Abstract. The first paper is a literature review of existing Neo-classical 
economic-theoretic literature on how international seafood trade and 
markets are modelled, which is relevant for this thesis. The purpose is to 
create a “state of the art” which serves as a frame of reference for the 
subsequent in-depth analyses. Shortages in the knowledge provided by 
the literature are identified and policy recommendations are drawn on 
the basis of existent literature where possible. Methods for delimiting 
international seafood markets and for analysing international seafood 
demand, supply and trade are reviewed. Co-integration analysis of non-
stationary price series is used in the literature to delimitate markets, 
where different econometric methods are used to estimate demand 
functions. Supply models are both estimated and calibrated on the basis 
of age-structured bio-economic models. Basic trade theory is further 
developed in general equilibrium models in the literature and combined 
with the economics of open access renewable resources. In the paper a 
partial equilibrium model of liberalising trade in an open access fish 
stock is also developed. Applied research within the area is reviewed 
and it is demonstrated how the papers contained in this thesis improves 
our understanding of the links between seafood markets, fisheries 
management and trade liberalisation.  
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of the present chapter is to review the existing Neo-
classical economic-theoretic literature on how international seafood 
trade and markets are modelled, which are relevant for this thesis. 
Creating a general “state of the art” serves as a frame of reference for 
the further in-depth analyses in the papers in chapters 3-8. Shortages in 
the knowledge provided by the literature are identified, motivating the 
relevance of analysing the issues in the remaining chapters. There is an 
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analytical angle where policy recommendations are drawn on the basis 
of existent literature, where possible. Furthermore, the purpose is to 
explain the innovative value of the detailed subsequent chapters in 
coherence with existing literature. This is done through the description 
and assessment of methods applied for: 
 
• The co-integration estimation methodology. 
• Defining and delimiting international seafood markets. 
• Analysing international seafood demand. 
• Analysing international seafood supply.  
• Analysing international seafood trade. 
 
The paper is separated into five sections after this introduction. In 
section two the co-integration estimation methodology is reviewed and 
in section three the literature on market delineation studies is examined. 
In section four and five, demand and supply models are examined. 
Finally, in section six general and partial equilibrium models of trade 
are reviewed and a synthesis on the effects of international seafood trade 
liberalisation is given.  
 
2. THE CO-INTEGRATION ESTIMATION METHODOLOGY 
The co-integration estimation methodology is used in the literature to 
test for market integration and to estimate demand systems. Other 
estimation methods, such as Ordinary Least Square (OLS) and 
Seemingly Unrelated Regression (SUR), are also used in the literature to 
estimate demand. In the present section, however, only the co-
integration estimation methodology is reviewed, since it is the core 
methodology adopted in this thesis.  
 The co-integration estimation methodology is used when data series 
are non-stationary. Data series are stationary when they move randomly 
around a constant mean over time and the mean and variance are 
independent of time, and non-stationary if they follow a trend. Data 
series shall be integrated of the same order (a data series is said to be 
integrated of order one, I(1), if the differenced data series are 
stationary), since otherwise spurious correlation might result. The co-
integration methodology is used when data are non-stationary and SUR 
methods when data are stationary. Provided that data are properly 
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differenced, SUR methods can also be used for non-stationary data. The 
co-integration methodology is, however, superior to SUR models in that 
it is based on a pre-defined structure where all variables are endogenous 
and explained by their own lagged variables. The disadvantage of the 
co-integration estimation methodology is that it can only be undertaken 
with relatively few variables.  
 The first step is to determine the integration order and thereby 
whether data are non-stationary by testing for unit roots. The null 
hypothesis H0 of non-stationarity of the data series (Xt) is tested against 
the stationary alternative. The regression equation is given in equation 1.   
 
tktXktXctXtX εγγπ ++−∆−++−∆++−=∆ 11...111  (1) 
 
Firstly, the regression in equation 1 is made unrestricted and afterwards 
the restrictions in H0: 0=π  and c=0 are imposed. In terms of equation 1 
the alternative hypothesis is that π , 1γ , …, 1−kγ  is in the stationary 
range and c is unrestricted. Based on these regressions, the Dickey-
Fuller F-test and the Likelihood-Ratio test statistics are given in 
equations 2 and 3.  
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where RSS is the residual sum of squares for the restricted and 
unrestricted regressions, respectively, T is the number of effective 
observations (number of observations – number of lags) and k* is the 
number of exogenous variables in the unrestricted model. The 
regressions are made for the highest lag significantly different from 
zero. The regressions exclude the possibility of deterministic trends a 
priory, but such trends can easily be included. Critical values for the 
tests are given in Kongsted (2001). 
 Provided that the data series are integrated of order one, multivariate 
Johansen tests can be used to determine the co-integration rank. A 
Vector Auto Regressive (VAR) model in Error Correcting (ECM) form 
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is introduced following e.g. Asche, Bremnes and Wessels (1999), 
according to equation (4): 
 
ttXktXktXtX εµ ++∏ −++−∆−Γ++−∆Γ=∆ 111...11  (4) 
 
where ∏ is the long run solution to the VAR model, which contains the 
co-integrating relations (or are zero). The rank of the ∏ matrix 
determines the number of stationary linear combinations of tX . The 
trace test can be used to test the null hypothesis that there are up to a 
given number of co-integrating vectors, whereas the alternative 
hypothesis is that exactly one more co-integrating vector exists. The 
constant term µ  is in the present case restricted to the co-integration 
space, but a trend term can also easily be included in the regression.  
 Based on this framework, market integration can be tested with all 
data series being price series. Provided that the rank is the number of 
variables, all price series are I(0) and if the rank is 0, none of the price 
series are stationary. If the rank is between the two extremes, ∏= 'αβ , 
where β  contains the co-integrating vectors. In that case, a rank less 
than the number of variables minus one implies that some of the price 
series might be formed on separate markets, where a rank of exactly the 
number of variables minus one implies that a common integrating factor 
exists and the price series forms part of an integrated marked. Based on 
a rank of the number of variables minus one, the Law of One Price 
(LOP) can be tested in order to determine whether the price series forms 
part of a perfect or partial integrated market. This can be done using 
Likelihood Ratio tests on β . In a bi-variate set-up, tX  contains two price 
series and if these price series co-integrate, the rank is one and a test of 
]'1,1[' −=β  is the test of the LOP. In a multivariate set-up, a test of the LOP 
is a test of whether the column in the β  matrix sums to zero, implying 
that the price series are pair wise co-integrated and thereby follow a 
common trend. In the multivariate test the β  matrix is shown in 
equation 5, for a model with four variables.  
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Testing whether the LOP holds is now a test of whether imposing the 
restriction on 'β  makes tX'β  stationary. The tests of the LOP are 
performed without any identification problems in all cases in this thesis, 
due to that the rank condition of Johansen and Juselius (1994) is 
fulfilled.  
 Based on the framework in equation 4, demand systems in different 
forms can also be estimated, with Xt now being price and quantity 
series, all integrated of order one. A simple demand system based on a 
Cobb-Douglas utility function, with only one price and one quantity 
series included and with the quantity exogenous, can be estimated using 
equation 6.  
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where P is price and Q is quantity. Given the absence of 
misspecification problems, the rank being one and normalising around 
the price series, the parameter obtained expresses the percentage price 
change following from an increase in quantity by one percent, since the 
data series are logarithmic. This estimation procedure can easily be 
extended to estimate more advanced forms of demand systems.  
 
3. DEFINING AND DELIMITING INTERNATIONAL SEAFOOD 
MARKETS 
To correctly assess the effect of changes in market arrangements and 
trade policy and to be able to understand the implications of changes in 
the fisheries policy on markets a proper method for delimiting the 
relevant market is needed, particularly since the sea food markets most 
often are internationally integrated and over time increasingly so. Such a 
method is also needed to correctly understand the development in 
markets and separate the effect of exogenous changes from the effect of 
policy. Further the distributional impact of such changes on different 
groups among consumers and fishing fleets can only be assessed if the 
market structure is correctly understood. 
 A market, according to Stigler (1969), is defined as “the area within 
which the price is determined, allowances being made for transport 
costs”. Similar definitions of a market are provided by Cournot (1971) 
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and Marshall (1947), who stated the LOP, but the modelling of prices in 
competing markets dates back to at least Hotelling (1929). Furthermore, 
these definitions are based on work from the 1800’s. The LOP states 
that if prices of goods move together over time they are formed within 
the same market. Hence, the delimitation of a market is closely related 
to a study of prices, where if prices affect each other, goods must to 
some degree be formed within the same market. This degree can, 
according to Stigler and Sherwin (1985), “show every level of 
interdependence from absolute homogeneity to complete independence 
– the continuity of the conventional criteria of cross-elasticities of 
demand and supply are enough to suggest that”. Thus, a market can 
either be one where all prices move perfectly together over time, or 
consist of several sub-markets where prices affect each other without 
moving perfectly together. If prices do not affect each other they are 
formed on separate and distinct markets.  
 Based on such an understanding of the meaning of a market, the 
theoretical framework for the determination of market sizes and 
boundaries in empirical testing is described in the present section. The 
most important results obtained by using the method on the European 
seafood markets are also presented.  
 The LOP in the basic simple bivariate form is, according to Stigler 
(1969), tested by estimating ( ) ( ) ttt pABp ε++= ,1,1 lnln , where the price of 
good one ( tp ,1 ) and the price of good two ( tp ,2 ) are of two different 
products. A=1 implies that the LOP is in force. This simple bivariate 
form of the LOP can easily be extended to a multivariate form by 
adding extra goods, e.g. ( )tpC ,3ln , and then testing jointly whether 
1=+CA . However, the regression is only valid for stationary price 
series. A price series is stationary if it demonstrates a random walk 
around some constant value, i.e. if it oscillates around a constant value 
over time.  
 For non-stationary price series, the co-integration analysis of the last 
section must be used. The point of departure is the Johansen co-
integration rank procedure, which is based on a VAR in ECM form, 
following e.g. Asche Bremnes and Wessells (1999). Based on that 
model, co-integration and the LOP can be tested for non-stationary price 
series. Furthermore, long run exclusion of price series can be tested. 
Finally, testing for weak exogeneity of the individual price series can 
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identify market leaders. Based on the results of these tests, market 
structure and integration can be determined. Given that the tests for co-
integration identify a single integrating factor common to all the price 
series, and given that the test of the LOP shows that the LOP is in force, 
the goods analysed are homogeneous, relative prices are constant and 
markets are perfectly integrated. Thereby, prices can fluctuate according 
to random shocks in the short run, but will be brought together again 
after an adjustment process. When the co-integration test identifies a 
single common integrating factor and the LOP is rejected, markets are 
partially integrated and consist of sub-markets. This is also the case 
when long run exclusion is rejected. When the co-integration test cannot 
identify one common integrating factor and when long run exclusion is 
accepted, some of the goods might be heterogeneous and their markets 
independent. 
 The implication of the LOP being in force is, according to Asche, 
Bremnes and Wessells (1999), that the Generalised Composite 
Commodity Theorem of Lewbel (1996) holds, and that commodities can 
be aggregated. Thus, in consistent analyses of supply, demand and trade, 
the markets should be defined using the above method. Thereby, market 
integration tests serve as a pre-test to determine the level of aggregation, 
before undertaking further analyses.  
 Miljkovic and Paul (2001), however, criticise Asche, Bremnes and 
Wessells (1999) in their application of the market integration techniques 
on geographical distinct locations by arguing that they do not address 
the notion of tradability, implying that market integration is not defined 
in such a precise manner that it is reasonable to draw policy 
conclusions. Formulated otherwise and using Gonzáles-Rivera and 
Helfand (2001), a market consisting of geographically distinct locations 
will be considered integrated only if there is physical flow of goods 
between the locations, either directly or indirectly, and if prices in the 
different locations move together over time. Hence, according to 
Miljkovic and Paul (2001), Asche, Bremnes and Wessells (1999) do not 
take into account that it should be possible to trade the good between the 
different locations. And that is not always the case. The consequence is 
that the test of the LOP becomes a test for efficiency of the international 
market instead of a test for market integration. The reason is that 
transaction costs, albeit large for a perishable product such as fish, are 
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not accounted for explicitly. Asche, Bremnes and Wessells (1999) 
respond that although non-stationary transaction costs pose a limitation 
of the methodology, this is not problem on international seafood 
markets since transactions costs are small. Furthermore, the Gonzáles-
Rivera and Helfand (2001) condition for the presence of an integrated 
market, that there should be a direct or indirect flow of goods between 
locations, is pointed out by an example in chapter 5. An example of the 
condition of indirect flow of goods is given, since the LOP is found in 
force between two countries which do not trade with one another, but 
which share a third country as a common trade partner. 
 The market integration methodology is applied on the European 
seafood markets in a number of studies. Some studies focus on the 
international integration of seafood markets between countries (Gordon 
and Hannesson (1996) and Asche, Bremnes and Wessells (1999)), 
where others test the integration of markets for different fish species and 
products in single countries in Europe (Gordon, Salvanes and Atkins 
(1993), Asche, Salvanes and Steen (1997) and Jaffry et al (2000)). 
Finally, the Asche et al (2002) study focuses on the integration of 
markets at different levels of the distribution chain. Common for these 
articles is that the identified market integration in the early studies is 
only co-integration and long run exclusion, where later on market 
integration is also that the LOP is in force.  
 Gordon and Hannesson (1996) study the integration of fresh and 
frozen cod markets between the main European cod consumer countries 
and the US. It is found that that the markets for frozen cod fillets in 
France, Germany, the UK and the US are integrated since one common 
integrating factor is identified. The LOP is, however, not tested and it 
remains unclear whether markets are perfectly or partially integrated. 
Furthermore, one integrated market is identified for fresh cod between 
the three European countries, but this market does not include the US. 
Thus, the frozen cod market remains more closely integrated than the 
fresh cod market, which is in accordance with a priori expectations 
taking the perishability of fresh cod into account.  
 In chapter 4 the LOP is also found in force on the first hand market 
for cod between the largest supplier countries in Europe. One 
implication is that the part of the potential income of the EU fishermen 
appearing from the price, rise with the gradual worsening of the North 
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Sea cod stock. However, due to the integration of the international 
markets there is an upper limit for the price rise, since imports to the EU 
rise with the price. Asche, Bremnes and Wessells (1999) examine the 
international integration between wild caught salmon from the US and 
farm raised salmon from Norway. The LOP is found in force and 
salmon from these locations form one integrated international market. 
Furthermore, the Norwegian salmon price is identified as the market 
leader. The implication is that consistent supply, demand and trade 
analyses of the salmon market must depart from a salmon product 
aggregated from all these locations. An interesting policy implication 
following from their analysis is that the appearance and fast 
development of Norwegian salmon farms over the last two decades, has 
implied that the income potential of American salmon fishers has been 
pushed downwards to a considerably lower level.  
 The tests of market integration between fish species include Gordon, 
Salvanes and Atkins (1993) who test for market integration in the form 
of identifying one common integrating factor between salmon, cod and 
turbot on the Paris wholesale market. They find weak evidence of the 
existence of one common integrating factor between cod and turbot, 
implying that one market might exist for those two species. They do, 
however, also find that salmon can be excluded from this market. A 
policy implication is that markets for wild caught and farmed fish are 
not integrated, provided that the wild caught fish are not the same 
species as the farmed. Jaffry et al (2000) confirm this conclusion in the 
analysis of the price interactions between salmon and wild caught 
species on the Spanish market, since the results suggest that “salmon is 
at best only a weak substitute for tuna, hake and whiting”. Finally, 
Asche, Salvanes and Steen (1997) study the integration between EU 
imports of fresh and frozen salmon and crustaceans, by undertaking 
long run exclusion tests. None of the products can be excluded and it is 
concluded that evidence for the existence of one market is present. This 
is, however, only the weakest form of integration.  
 The tests of market integration between different levels in the supply 
chain include the Asche et al (2002) study. The LOP is tested and 
provided that it is in force, prices at different levels in the chain move 
proportionally to each other over time. The reason is that there is only 
one variable factor in the intermediaries’ production technology. The 
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implication is that consumer demand can be modelled using derived 
demand. A proportional relationship is found between the ex-vessel 
price and the domestic fresh and dried salted cod prices, implying that 
the domestic demand for fresh and dried salted cod can be modelled as 
derived demand from the landing market.  
 In chapter 5 the integration of markets at different levels in the 
supply chain is also tested, with first hand herring markets in Denmark 
and Norway on the one hand and the two countries export markets for 
different product forms on the other. The LOP is found to be in force 
between the first hand markets in the two countries and the Norwegian 
export market for frozen herring in the former Soviet Union and Eastern 
Europe. The policy implication is that the doubling of the landing price 
in Denmark in 2001 can, given the stability of the supply and demand in 
Denmark, be explained by supply and demand on the international 
market. Hence, the market for the recently introduced individual 
transferable quotas in the Danish herring fishery will be affected by the 
volatility of the international herring market.  
 
4. DEMAND 
Empirical studies of demand dates back many centuries and it can be 
argued that empirical demand analysis is the main motivation for the 
subject of economics. The first known empirical analysis of demand is 
by the Frenchman Devenant from 1699. Stone (1954) provided an 
important modern contribution and empirical studies of seafood demand 
started with Bell (1968) and Nash and Bell (1969). The basis of these 
studies is traditional neo-classical commodity market analysis where the 
demand functions are deduced from the maximisation of the consumer 
utility subject to the budget restriction, assuming well-behaved 
preferences. Using a Lagrange optimisation, the utility is maximised and 
the demand function is identified for the rational consumers. The effect 
of changing demand can then be decomposed into a substitution effect 
and an income effect, as stated by the Slutsky equation (Slutsky 1915).  
 In 1980 this approach was criticised for being based on arbitrary 
preference rankings, as revealed by the choice of the utility function. 
Therefore, Deaton and Muellbauer (1980a) introduced an alternative. 
Instead of postulating a specific form of the utility function, they 
introduce an alternative, which “permits exact aggregation over 
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consumers and represent market demand as if they were outcome of 
decisions by a rational representative consumer”. In this approach cost 
is minimised given utility, instead of utility being maximised given the 
budget. These are referred to as Hicksian and Marshallian demand, 
respectively, and as a whole as “the dual approach”. The dual approach 
is presented in full for final goods in Figure 2.1. Conditional factor 
demand is also represented, since demand for fish species at the first 
hand market level on several occasions is derived demand from 
companies which purchase for further processing. This is for example 
important in Denmark where the major part of seafood caught or raised 
on fish farms is used for processing.  
 
FIGURE 2.1 The dual approach for final goods and factors of production. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  a. Final goods 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  b. Factors of production/raw material input 
 
 
Source: Varian (1994); Deaton and Muellbauer (1980a).  
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Where p is the price of final goods, pF is factor price, q is quantity, X is 
expenditure, U is utility and Y is production. For final goods, the 
Marshallian demand function appears after profit maximisation, and 
substituting the demand function into the utility function gives the 
indirect utility function. On the basis of the indirect utility function, 
Marshallian demand can be found using Roy’s identity. The Hicksian 
demand function appears by cost minimisation and substituting the 
demand function into the cost minimisation problem yields the 
expenditure function. On the basis of the expenditure function, Hicksian 
demand can be found using Shephards lemma. Furthermore, the indirect 
utility function and the expenditure function can then be found by 
inversion of each other. The indirect utility function can also be 
substituted into the Hicksian demand function thereby obtaining the 
Marshallian demand function. Further, the expenditure function can be 
substituted into the Marshallian demand function giving the Hicksian 
demand function.  
 For factors of production the minimisation of costs gives the 
conditional factor demand, and substituting this into the cost 
minimisation problem yields the cost function. This corresponds to cost 
minimisation for final goods, as shown on the right side of Figure 2.1a. 
The left side of Figure 2.1a is not reproduced for factors of production, 
since high production is not an objective in itself for processors, as 
utility is for the final consumers.  
 The Hicksian approach departs from a specific form of the 
expenditure function, which can be tested for theoretical consistency. 
The demand function is approximated around the optimal point for the 
true preference structure and the approach rests on the testable adding 
up, homogeneity and symmetry assumptions. Provided that these 
assumptions are not rejected in empirical testing, the Hicksian model is 
theoretically consistent and not, as the Marshallian model, based on an 
arbitrary preference ranking. Another difference is that the Marshallian 
as opposed to the Hicksian demand model has global validity (valid for 
all quantities), implying that they can be used to global welfare analysis.  
 In empirical modelling two types of demand models have evolved. 
Ordinary demand models are built on the assumption that causality in 
the price formation goes from prices to quantities, i.e. prices are 
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exogenous. Inverse demand models start from the opposite assumption 
where quantities determine prices, given exogenous supply.  
 The inverse demand model developed from Anderson (1980), who 
established some theoretical properties of the inverse version of the 
Marshallian demand model, followed by Barten and Bettendorf (1989) 
introducing a Hicksian demand model in inverse form, the Rotterdam 
model. Eales and Unnevehr (1994) outlined another inverse Hicksian 
demand model, the Almost Ideal Demand System (AIDS). Eales, 
Durham and Wessels (1997) generalised these models with the 
introduction of nesting parameters and Jaffry, Pascoe and Robinson 
(1999) estimated an inverse Marshallian demand system of fish products 
using co-integration methods of non-stationary variables. Park and 
Thurman (1999) and Beach and Holt (2001) gave special emphasis to 
the scale flexibility.  
 The ordinary demand model can be dated back to Stone (1954) and 
has been applied on fish products in a number of studies. Recent studies 
include the Wellman (1992) estimation of the AIDS on US seafood 
demand, the Burton and Young (1992) use of a dynamic AIDS 
incorporating systematic demand shifters, and the Asche (1996) 
estimation of an AIDS for salmon in the EU using differential equations. 
Furthermore, Moschini (1995) and Asche and Wessels (1997) discuss 
the price indexes used in the AIDS, Eales, Durham and Wessels (1997) 
generalise the Hicksian demand systems using nesting parameters, and 
Eales and Wessels (1999) use this approach to test for separability of 
meat and fish in Japan. Kaabia and Gil (2001) introduce the use of co-
integration to estimate an AIDS with non-stationary data. Definitions of 
flexibilities and elasticities are shown in Table 2.1.  
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TABLE 2.1 Definitions of flexibilities and elasticities. 
Inverse demand Ordinary demand 
Price flexibility is “the percentage change in 
the price of a good, as demand increases by 
one percent”. Own and cross price flexibilities 
exist. Provided that the own price flexibility is 
larger than –1, the price is inflexible and if it 
is less, the price is flexible. Provided that the 
cross price flexibility is negative the goods 
are substitutes, and if it is positive the goods 
are complements. Price flexibilities might 
include 1) both the direct quantity induced 
price effect and the indirect effect caused by 
changes in purchasing power (uncompensated 
demand) and 2) the quantity induced price 
effect (compensated demand). 
 
Price elasticity is “the percentage change in 
the demand for a good, as the price increases 
by one percent”. Own and cross price 
elasticities exist. Provided that the own price 
elasticity is less than –1 the price is elastic 
and if it is larger than –1 the price is inelastic. 
Provided that the cross price elasticity is 
positive the goods are substitutes and if it is 
negative the goods are complements. Price 
elasticities might include 1) both the direct 
quantity induced price effect and the indirect 
effect caused by changes in purchasing power 
(uncompensated demand) and 2) the quantity 
induced price effect (compensated demand). 
Scale flexibility is “the percentage change in 
the normalised price of a good, whose buyers’ 
aggregate consumption of goods increases by 
one percent”. Provided that the flexibility is 
larger than –1 the good is a luxury, and 
provided that it is less, the good is a necessity. 
Income elasticity is “the percentage change 
in the demand for a good, as the buyers´ 
income increase one percent”. If the income 
elasticity is larger than 1 the good is a luxury, 
if it is between o and 1 it is a necessity, and if 
it is less than 0 it is inferior.  
 
Mean size fish price flexibility is “the 
percentage change in the price of fish on the 
ex-vessel market, when the average size of 
landed fish increases by one percent” (Gates 
(1974)). This flexibility is used to assess 
economic consequences of changing age 
composition of the stock, e.g. following 
changing mesh size regulation.  
 
Allais coefficient measures the degree of 
interaction between two goods in relation to a 
reference pair of goods and forms an 
alternative to cross price flexibilities (Barten 
and Bettendorf (1989)).  
 
 
 
Flexibilities and elasticities can be calculated on the basis of parameters 
estimated from different functional forms of demand systems using 
econometric methods. In the early studies Ordinary Least Squares 
(OLS) were generally applied, but today only Vector Auto Regression 
(VAR) and Seemingly Unrelated Regression (SUR) are applied. VAR is 
used when data are non-stationary and SUR in the presence of 
stationarity. Provided that data can be properly differenced, SUR can 
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also be used on non-stationary data. Four examples of commonly used 
functional forms are presented in Table 2.2 for both inverse and 
ordinary demand systems and written as simple, static models for closed 
economies. 
 
TABLE 2.2 Functional forms of the demand models.  
Model Inverse Ordinary 
Marshallian demand  
   
Linear ∑+=
+ j jijii qmp ααα 0  
 
∑++= j jijii pIq βββ 0  
 
Logarithmic ( ) ( ) ( )jj ijii qmp lnlnln 0 ∑+= + ααα  
 
( ) ( ) ( )jj ijii pIq lnlnln 0 ∑++= βββ  
 
Hicksian demand  
   
Rotterdam 
( ) ( )jj ijiii qQm
pw lnlnln 0 ∑+=





+
ααα  
 
 Adding up 0=∑i ijα , 1−=∑i iα  
 Homogeneity 0=∑ j ijα  
 Symmetry jiij αα =  
( )
( )( ) ( )jj jijiij
iii
pww
P
Xww
ln
ln0
∑ −++






−+=
δβ
ββ
 
 Adding up 0=∑i ijβ , 1=∑i iβ  
 Homogeneity 0=∑ j ijβ  
 Symmetry jiij ββ =  
 
AIDS ( ) ( )jj ijii qQw lnln0 ∑++= ααα  
 
 Adding up 0=∑i ijα , 0=∑i iα  
 Homogeneity 0=∑ j ijα  
 Symmetry jiij αα =  
( )jj ijii pP
Xw lnln0 ∑+





+= βββ  
 Adding up 0=∑i ijβ , 0=∑i iβ  
 Homogeneity 0=∑ j ijβ  
 Symmetry jiij ββ =  
 
Where 
 
 
 
ip  = Price of good i. 
iq  = Quantity of good j. 
m  = Revenue. 
iw  = m
qp ii = Market share of good 
i. 
( )Qln  = ( )jj j qw ln∑  = Quantity index.
oα  =  Intercept. 
iα  =  Coefficient of scale effect. 
ijα  =  Coefficient of quantity 
effect. 
X  = Expenditures. 
P  = ( )ii i pw ln∑  = Price index.  
0β  = Intercept. 
iβ  = Coefficient of income effect. 
ijβ  = Coefficient of price effect.  
ijδ  = Kroneckers delta.   
 
 
The functional forms of the inverse and ordinary models, respectively, 
are written in rank of increasing complexity. In the inverse models the 
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prices are determined by quantities and income and in the ordinary 
models the quantities depend on prices and scale of consumption. The 
two first equations are the simplest forms, where variables are given in 
linear and logarithmic terms. The two other forms are extended with 
expressions in market shares.  
 The Marshallian models include the linear form with constant slopes 
and the logarithmic forms with constant flexibilities and elasticities. 
Flexibilities and elasticities in the logarithmic model are constants, since 
they are deduced from a Cobb-Douglas utility function. The model is 
the most frequently used on seafood markets. The Hicksian models 
include the Rotterdam and AIDS forms, both with the testable 
theoretical adding-up, homogeneity and symmetry restrictions. In the 
inverse Hicksian model, the total quantity of all goods can be computed 
by use of different quantity indices and can, in a model without savings, 
be replaced by income. In the ordinary Hicksian model expenditures of 
all goods in the system divided by a price index represent the scale of 
consumption in the system. All the functional forms are presented for 
static models and for closed economies, but can easily be extended to 
include dynamics and open economy relations.  
 The choice of functional form in the analysis of specific markets 
must be based on theoretical consistency and statistical fit. Theoretical 
consistency can be tested in the Hicksian models, as opposed to the 
Marshallian models where a specific form of the utility function is 
postulated. Statistical fit, such as explanation power, relevance of 
included variables and expected signs, also determine the functional 
form. 
 The choice of inverse or ordinary model depends on the market 
analysed. Wilen (2000) concludes “on fish markets quantity is 
predetermined at the market level due to the widespread use of quantity 
regulation in fisheries management”. That is, quantities are determined 
by factors such bio-economy, weather and fisheries management, no 
matter what the prices are, implying that the inverse model should be 
chosen. The price flexibilities obtained from the estimation can then be 
used to assess the effect of changing fishing quotas on prices. In other 
parts of the supply chain than on the first hand market, however, the 
ordinary model might possess more explanatory power than the inverse. 
The reason is that markets for fish products are international, with a 
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considerable share of the consumption in many countries imported from 
several different places. Hence the assumption of exogenous supply in 
the inverse demand models is not reliable.  
 Systems of seafood demand in Europe have been estimated in more 
than thirty studies over the last three decades. The simple average of 
results of studies summarised in Nielsen (1999) is shown in Table 2.31.  
 
TABLE 2.3 Average of estimated flexibilities and elasticities.  
 Inverse demand1 Ordinary demand1
Average of 75 own price flexibilities -0.30 [-1.00; 0.00] . 
Average of 66 own price elasticities (inverted) . -0.942 [-4.76; -0.05]
Average of 28 scale flexibilities -0.90 [-1.79; 0.89] . 
Average of 13 income elasticities (salmon 
excluded) 
. 0.80 [-5.21; 3.12] 
Note:  1. Maximum and minimum values given in [].  
 2. This number is inverted to be comparable to the average flexibility. The 
  average was –1.06 before inversion 
Source:  Nielsen (1999).  
 
According to the estimations of the inverse demand systems, prices are 
inflexible. According to the estimated ordinary demand systems, prices 
are almost unit-elastic. The variance is, however, larger in the ordinary 
model than in the inverse. Furthermore, according to the inverse model, 
preferences for fish are almost homothetic (between luxuries and 
necessities), and according to the ordinary model and excluding salmon, 
fish are necessary goods. Salmon was until around 1995 generally found 
to be a luxury good, although the result of Asche, Salvanes and Steen 
(1997) indicate that this might not be the case any more. The reason for 
the possible change of salmon from a luxury to a necessary good might 
be the intensive development of salmon farming. Other fish are 
generally found necessary, although Young (1984) find that smoked 
mackerel in the UK is inferior. The prices and sales of luxury goods 
follow the economic peaks and lows to a larger degree than necessary 
goods.  
 It appears that the average reciprocal own price elasticity is more 
than three times larger than the average own price flexibility, even 
though the reciprocal own price elasticity theoretically should equal the 
                                                                      
1 It is ignored that the average may depend on several different factors, including 
e.g. the data period. 
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own price flexibility. Houck (1966), however, obtained the same result 
by estimating the two types of models on the same data, and explained it 
by that the reciprocal value “depends upon the strength of the cross 
effects of substitution and complementarity”. Huang (1994) also 
obtained this result and further concluded “by using inverted elasticities 
to represent flexibilities or vice versa, sizeable measurement errors may 
be committed”. Therefore, it is important to choose the correct model in 
practical analyses. The main explanation of the difference is the 
different degree of substitutability with respect to other goods included 
in the two models. In the ordinary models the exogenous prices are 
influenced by several substitutes, which are therefore indirectly included 
in the models. In the inverse models only sector specific relations 
influence the exogenous quantities and substitutes are therefore not 
included in the models.  
 Another explanation of the differences might be that inverse demand 
systems generally are estimated on first hand markets, where ordinary 
demand systems are estimated on import, wholesale and retail markets.  
 A third explanation of the difference between the own price 
flexibility and the reciprocal own price elasticity is that several of the 
above studies are undertaken without including specific knowledge of 
market structure and integration. The reason is that the market 
delineation techniques of non-stationary price series developed as late as 
1990 and became common practice only some years after. Hence, only 
in the recent literature it has been possible to depart from specific 
knowledge of market structures. The consequence is that most of the 
studies are performed for a few fish species and products in a single 
country. Thereby, it is not taken into account that markets are integrated, 
both internationally and between species. 
 Several economic studies on international trade are based on the 
Armington (1969) assumption of product heterogeneity. In the presence 
of market integration, however, products are not heterogenous and the 
implication is, according to Asche, Bremnes and Wessells (1999) that 
the Generalised Composite Commodity Theorem of Lewbel (1996) 
holds, and that commodities as a consequence should be aggregated. 
This is important, since the aggregation level affect the results. Price 
flexibilities estimated on smaller parts of larger internationally or inter-
species integrated markets will theoretically be smaller than on the 
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whole integrated market. This issue is discussed in chapter 4, where a 
price flexibility of –0.30 in the presence of international and inter-
species integration of the European cod markets would predict a too low 
price increase following from a potential international coordinated quota 
reduction. This point is validated on seafood markets internationally or 
inter-species integrated and are subject to international coordinated 
quota settings. Even though this is a common situation, the point has 
according to the author not been raised in the literature before.  
 The results of the estimated demand systems can further be used as 
input to welfare analyses, by calculating consumer surplus in 
Marshallian demand models and compensating variation in Hicksian 
models. Teisl, Roe and Hicks (2002) analyse whether the dolphin-safe 
label altered consumer purchases of tuna by estimating an AIDS and 
identify compensating variations as a partial measure of society’s 
willingness to pay to avoid personal contribution to dolphin mortality in 
tuna fishing. The point that such a welfare measure may be 
inappropriate in practical estimations of AIDS systems is raised in 
chapter 6. The reason is that the AIDS is not suitable for welfare 
analysis, since it is an approximation around the point of the true 
preference structure. Thus, the AIDS cannot be used for global welfare 
analyses. The welfare measure is only partial.  
 Furthermore, it is argued in chapter 6 that if it should be meaningful 
to identify consumer surplus or compensating variation, the slope of the 
demand curve must necessarily be globally negative and the intercept 
positive. This might not be the situation in several practical estimations 
of AIDS systems and it is shown not to be the situation in a case study 
of the Danish seafood market. To the knowledge of the author this issue 
has not been raised in the literature before.  
 The implication of the result in chapter 6 is that welfare analyses in 
general must rely on global negatively sloped demand systems as well 
as they must have positive intercepts. These requirements are normally 
fulfilled in linear and logarithmic demand systems. Therefore, the 
notion that global valid welfare analysis must rely on simple functional 
forms of the demand system is raised in chapter 6. To the knowledge of 
the author this notion has not been presented anywhere else in the 
literature. Based on this a simple linear demand system is estimated for 
different quality grades of plaice in Denmark in chapter 7 and welfare 
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effects of introducing quality labelling for the final consumers are 
identified. Based on a hedonic price method, a general applicable 
theoretical and empirical method is developed to compare the costs and 
benefits of the hypothetical choice between the total absence of labelling 
and the presence of a public labelling scheme, which fully informs 
consumers of the quality and simultaneously allow the producers to 
differentiate prices between quality grades. It is found that such a 
labelling scheme should not be introduced for economic reasons. To the 
knowledge of the author, a method which identifies the total welfare in 
the form of both producer and consumer surplus on a public labelling 
scheme of fish quality has not been presented in the literature before.  
 
5. SUPPLY 
Studies of supply of fish products have foundations in the theory of 
exploitation of renewable resources, based on negative externalities in 
the production. Supply of wild caught fish are distinct from the supply 
of other goods, where it is possible to react to favourable market 
conditions by increasing the production. This is not an option in most 
fisheries, since overexploitation may result. The approach undertaken 
here focuses on steady state equilibriums, since the fish stocks need time 
to adjust. Hence, the focus is on the long run with the short run analysis 
differing considerably. The reason is that the stock is not significantly 
reduced in the short run. Even though fishermen may be able to switch 
their fishing to target particular species, the total fishing capacity limits 
the supply in the short run in most situations. In the extreme, however, it 
may be possible to catch the total of the stock in the short run, thereby 
obtaining a high level of supply. Hence, the short run supply curve will 
be globally increasing and concave, until the supply equals the whole 
stock. In particular if the stock has schooling nature.  
 The reason for focusing on the long run is that the fishing industry 
differs from other industries mainly in the long run. In the short run 
supply curves in fisheries are globally increasing and similar to other 
industries. In the long run, over-exploitation may result in lower future 
production possibilities, as opposed to other industries.  
 In the following it is implicitly assumed that the discount rate is zero. 
The reason is that if it were positive, the long run discounted supply 
  
2-21 
curves for all types of supply regimes would, according to Clark (1990), 
be backward bending at sufficiently high rates.  
 The studies are based on traditional fisheries economics and in 
particular the Copes (1970) introduction of the backward bending 
supply curve of an open access fish stock. This curve is deduced as the 
average cost curve on the basis of a Schaefer production function. 
Supply increase until the Maximum Sustainable Yield (MSY), decreases 
afterwards and approaches zero at infinitive high prices. According to 
chapter 8 the supply curve might also be deduced on the basis of an age-
structured approach based on Beverton and Holt (1957), assuming 
constant recruitment and taking different fishing mortalities of different 
year classes into account. The deductions and assumptions are presented 
in chapter 8 in detail and the supply curve is deduced from the yield per 
recruit curve assuming that the total cost curve is linear.  
 According to Clark (1990), the shape of the yield per recruit curve 
depends on the fishing mortalities and the selectivity appearing from the 
use of e.g. mesh size regulation. At sufficiently small mesh sizes and 
large fisheries, the yield per recruit curve is similar to the Schaefer 
based supply curve. That is, the Schaefer model is a special case of the 
age-structured approach. At sufficiently large mesh sizes the yield per 
recruit curve will be increasing in the relevant range. Between the two 
extremes, the yield per recruit curve remains backward bending, but will 
approach a positive yield, since the stock cannot be depleted. In chapter 
8 it is found that these patterns depend on several factors, but remains 
valid also for the supply curve of the East Baltic cod fishery. For the 
East Baltic cod fishery, the shape of the supply curve follows the shape 
of the yield per recruit curve. Using the East Baltic cod fishery as an 
example, the shapes of the supply curve under three alternative 
assumptions on the selectivity is presented in Figure 2.2.  
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FIGURE 2.2 Shapes of the supply (average cost) curves 
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QMSY Quantity Q
 
a. Small mesh sizes 
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PMSY
QMSY Quantity Q
b. Medium mesh sizes
Price P
Quantity Q
c. Large mesh sizes 
 
For sufficiently small mesh sizes and at large fishing mortalities, the 
supply curve bends backwards and approaches zero at infinitive high 
prices, where for larger mesh sizes it approaches a positive quantity. For 
sufficiently large mesh sizes (mesh sizes constructed to catch fish older 
than 6 years) the supply curve is increasing in the relevant range. 
Fishing effort increases with prices and the position of the curves can be 
shifted with changes in key parameters. If, for example, the recruitment 
falls or the natural mortality rises the curve will shift inwards, thereby 
reducing supply at given prices.  
 It appears that the shape of the supply curve depends on the 
selectivity and since mesh size regulation is used in most fisheries, the 
supply curve of the medium mesh size situation might be the most 
common one. Furthermore, since fishing in several fisheries is on a level 
causing overexploitation, the common situation is also that fishing is 
well above the MSY. This implies that even with open access, the 
supply curve is approximately vertical for high prices. This point is to 
the knowledge of the author not raised in the literature.  
 Although the situation with medium mesh sizes may apply in most 
fisheries, the situations with small and large mesh sizes also apply in 
some fisheries. In the following, however, focus is on the medium mesh 
size situation and supply curves in the presence of management are 
identified. Input and output management is analysed in three alternative 
schemes; regulated open access, regulated restricted access and optimal 
management (e.g. individual transferable quotas). Supply curves are 
shown in Figure 2.3. 
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FIGURE 2.3 Supply curves in the presence of fisheries management in the 
medium mesh size situation  
Price P
PMSY
QMSY Quantity Q
AC
a. Regulated open and restricted access
Price P
Quantity Q
MC
b. Optimal management 
 
It appears that the supply curves in regulated open and restricted access 
are similar. The supply curves follow the open access supply curve until 
a certain level above MSY and is then given by the quota. The economic 
optimal way to fix the quota under such a management scheme is to 
limit the fishing to the Maximum Economic Yield (MEY), which can be 
shown to be below MSY. Traditionally, however, quota schemes are 
implemented only after problems in the fishery have been discovered, 
implying that fishing is well above MSY. The manager can then shift 
the vertical part of the supply curve to the right by reducing quotas in 
the short run, thereby giving space for quota increases in the long run. 
Recovery plans are examples of such a policy.  
 Hannesson (2001) studies a supply regime for a management scheme 
between open access and optimal management, referred to as “catch 
control”. A vertical supply curve under such a management scheme is 
introduced.  
 The supply curve in optimal management is given by the marginal 
cost curve and optimal management implies both that the output is 
maximised subject to the stock constraint and the costs are minimised. 
The supply curve is globally increasing and will approach a finite 
positive quantity. Hence, under optimal management the stock cannot 
be biologically overfished.  
 All the different types of supply curves have the ability to explain the 
supply from different fisheries. Selective gears exist in most fisheries. In 
most developed countries restrictive gears are compulsory, where this 
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may not be the case in some developing countries. Furthermore, all 
types of management schemes are used. Open access may be the 
situation in some developing countries, whereas optimal management 
exists in the form of individual transferable quotas in e.g. the 
Netherlands, Iceland and New Zealand. Therefore, the supply regime 
differs between fisheries, but since the majority of the world’s fish 
stocks according to the Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United 
Nations (2001) are either fully utilised or overexploited, the relevant 
area of the supply curve for open access fisheries with medium mesh 
sizes is the vertical part. Regulated open access and regulated restricted 
access is, however, the situation in most fisheries. In the presence of 
these management schemes the relevant area is also the vertical part. 
But the supply curves are deduced for capture fish stocks without 
interactions with other fish species, for fish stocks owned by a single 
country and sold in only one product form. In the following, the 
relaxation of these assumptions is shown to affect the supply curves.  
 The above supply curves are deduced for a fish stock owned by a 
single country and do not take into account that several stocks are 
shared among two or more countries. Provided that no long-term 
management agreement is in place between the owners, the supply 
curves must be adjusted, since the fishery of each country make up a 
negative externality for the others. In chapter 8 (see Figure 8.3), the 
supply curve of two countries fishing a shared open access fish stock 
with medium mesh size regulation is deduced for a situation where 
changes can only happen in one of the two countries (country one). The 
deduction is made in three steps assuming that the fishery initially is 
well above the MSY. Firstly, the initial supply curve of country one is 
identified assuming that fishing changes proportionally in both 
countries. Thereafter, it is alternatively assumed that fishing only 
changes in country two, given unchanged fishing in country one. 
Finally, the terminal supply curve in country one is found, given the 
new level of this fishing in country two. Provided that fishing in country 
two rises, the terminal supply curve in country one appears as an inward 
shift of the initial supply curve. 
 The initial and terminal supply curves in country one is backward 
bending. Since initial fishing in the case study of the East Baltic cod 
fishery is well above the MSY, i.e. the initial supply is placed on the 
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part of the supply curve approaching vertical, the supply curve in 
country two is increasing for all realistic situations. The reason is that 
the effect following from the rise in the country’s share of the catch 
exceeds the effect following from the fall in the total catch. The 
consequence is that even under open access, the supply curve of one 
country can under special conditions be increasing in the relevant range, 
implying that the country cannot overexploit the stock by their actions 
alone.  
 The above supply curves are deduced for a single fish stock, and 
neither take into account that some fish are predators and some are 
preys, nor that some species compete for the same feed. Changes in a 
prey stock affect the supply of a predator stock, since the feed base is 
changed. For example, increased fisheries on a prey stock result in 
starvation of the predators. Hence, increased fisheries on a prey imply 
that the supply curve of the predator stock is shifted inwards. 
Furthermore, changes in a predator stock affects the prey stock, since 
the number of prey fish eaten by the predators change. For example, 
increased fishing on the predator stock results in the survival of more 
fish and the supply curve shifts outwards. Finally, if two fish species 
compete for the same feed, a fall in one of the stocks will result in the 
rise of the other.  
 The above supply curves are deduced for a capture fish stock. Today, 
however, a considerable share of the global supply of fish is raised on 
fish farms. Under such a production regime the supply curve of fish 
products may still be backward bending. According to Hannesson 
(2003), the condition is that fish feed is a scarce production factor. Fish 
feed may form a scarce production factor in fish farming due to 
overexploitation of industrial fish stocks. The reason is that for most 
farmed fish species it has only been possible to develop farming 
techniques using fishmeal as feed. In such a situation, the supply curve 
will depend on the management of the industrial fish stocks.  
 Asche and Tveteraas (2000), however, find that international markets 
for fishmeal are integrated among countries and forms part of a large 
global oil-meal market. It is further found that fishmeal is a close 
substitute for soy meal, that fishmeal forms only 4% of the oil-meal 
market and that aquaculture use 35% of the global supply of fishmeal. 
Hence, in the short run limitations in supplies of farmed fish is not 
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expected, since substitution away from fishmeal in livestock sectors is 
possible. This leaves a larger share of fishmeal to aquaculture, probably 
at higher prices. In the long run when a larger share of the total global 
supply of fishmeal is used for aquaculture, fishmeal may be a scarce 
factor for aquaculture, implying that the long run supply curve for 
farmed fish may depend on the management system in place in the 
industrial fisheries. Provided that it to a larger extent than today 
becomes possible to use herbivore feed in aquaculture, feed would not 
be a scarce factor of production and the long run supply curve of farmed 
fish would be globally increasing.  
 The above supply curves are also deduced only for raw materials of 
fish and do not take into account that the raw material is used for 
different purposes. One part of the catch may be supplied for fresh 
consumption where other parts may be supplied in processed form. The 
supply curves of the fresh and processed forms of a single fish species is 
presented in Figure 2.4 following Hannesson (2001), assuming that all 
the raw material of the species is used for these two product forms, and 
that the total supply of the species remain constant.  
 
FIGURE 2.4 Supply of fresh and processed fish, given a constant level of raw 
material 
Price Pprocessed
Share S   /%
Price Pfresh
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On the first axis, the shares of raw materials of the two product forms 
are given and sum to 1 (Sprocessed+Sfresh=1). The share of fresh fish 
increases when moving to the left and the share of processed fish rises 
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when moving to the right.  Both supply curves are increasing until all 
the raw materials of the species is used for that product form and are 
vertical afterwards. When the share of raw materials used for one of the 
product forms rises, the share of the other falls, since the total supply of 
raw material remains constant. Therefore, where the supply curves of 
raw material of fish on most occasions are approximately vertical, the 
supply curves of different product forms might well be increasing. This 
implies that changes in the price of one product form also affect the 
supplies of the other product forms. On this basis, Asche and Hannesson 
(2002) conclude that “the processing sector and the allocation of fish 
between product forms seem to be substantially more price responsive 
than the total supply”. The reason is that the total supply is limited by 
nature, where processors and traders compete for the same raw material.  
 Systems of supply are identified empirically for fish products in only 
very few studies. One direction focuses on the steady state supply of 
raw material of fish species (Frost and Michelsen (2001); Nostbakken 
and Bjorndal (2002)), a second on the supply from different fleet 
segments (Squires (1987); Kirkley and Strand (1988); Squires and 
Kirkley (1991)), and a third on the supply of different product forms 
(Asche and Hannesson (2002)).  
 Within the first direction, Frost and Michelsen (2001) calibrate 
steady state supply curves for cod in the Baltic Sea using an age-
structured bio-economic model. The basis is biological data from the 
International Council for Exploration of the Sea and economic data from 
landing and account statistics. The supply model is applied for the study 
on the effects of the introduction of certification for sustainability. 
Nostbakken and Bjorndal (2002) estimate supply functions for North 
Sea herring, based on a Schaefer production function. The model is used 
to discuss the effect of different management schemes on the supply of 
herring. Furthermore, in chapter 8, the steady state supply curve is 
calibrated for the East Baltic cod stock using an age-structured bio-
economic model. This is done for a shared stock with focus on 
alternative management schemes. The supply curve is identified as in 
the medium mesh size situation in Figure 2.2 and is approximately 
vertical in the relevant region. This implies that the stock with the 
existing mesh sizes cannot be more biologically overfished, but 
economic overfishing will still result from increased fishing. The reason 
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is that costs increase with the fishing. Thus, the stock cannot be depleted 
by increased fishing; supply will remain constant. This point has to the 
knowledge of the author not been raised in the literature. This result 
follows from the assumption of constant recruitment in the Beverton-
Holt model. The assumption is assessed top be realistic in most 
situations, since there is normally a considerable overproduction of 
eggs, of which only a small fraction survives. In the severe overuse 
case, however, recruitment may fall with increased fishing, implying 
that a stock can be depleted.  
 Within the second direction, Squires (1987) estimates a multi-product 
profit function for the New England otter trawl fishery. This is used to 
identify supply elasticities and roundfish are found to be supply elastic, 
where flatfish and others are inelastic. Kirkley and Strand (1988) 
estimate a revenue function for different fleet segments and find that 32 
of 42 supply elasticities were inelastic and 19 of these between –0.5 and 
0.5. Squires and Kirkley (1991) estimate a revenue function of the US 
Pacific coast trawl fishery on sablefish, thornyheads, flatfish and 
rockfish and find the supply elasticities between –0.15 and 0.01. Based 
on these studies, Asche and Hannesson (2002) note that “most supply 
elasticities reported for fishermen seem to be low and often very low”. 
Hence, this direction does not reject the observation that the supply 
curves are close to vertical, although detailed estimations, which do not 
include fishing on the whole of a stock, provide limited evidence. Full 
support for the observation claims that supply elasticities are identified 
for all vessels fishing on a particular stock, so that stock effects are 
modelled explicitly.  
 Within the third direction, Asche and Hannesson (2002) estimate 
short run supply equations derived from a translog revenue function for 
different product forms of cod in Canada, Iceland and Norway. It is 
found that “relative prices are important since they dictate the product 
form marketed” and that “since cross price elasticities are relatively 
high, processing industries are competitive”.  
 The results of the identified supply curves can further be used as 
input in welfare analyses by calculating producer surplus (inframarginal 
rent) and resource rent, following Copes (1972). The definition of these 
concepts is presented graphically in Figure 2.5.  
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FIGURE 2.5 Welfare measures.  
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In open access E represents the equilibrium where the demand and the 
supply (average cost) curves intersect. A positive producer surplus 
exists when fishing vessels are heterogeneous in their economic 
performance. Thereby, only the “best” vessels, in terms of low use of 
inputs in relation to output contribute to the producer surplus. The 
producer surplus is given by the difference between the average cost and 
the average social cost curves, with the vertical difference between the 
two given by the remuneration of all other factors than the resource, i.e. 
capital and labour. Hence, the average social cost curve appears by 
subtracting the remuneration of all other factors than the resource from 
the average cost curve.  
 For fishing at very high levels the average cost and the average social 
cost curves approach each other and the producer surplus approaches 
zero. This will also be the case in situations where the alternative value 
of capital and labour is zero. This might sometimes be the case since the 
capital base in fisheries is the vessel, which normally cannot be used for 
anything else. Fishing vessels cost a certain amount to build, but even 
short time after the value may fall to the salvage value at a mush lower 
level. Hence, there is a sunk cost. This sunk cost may e.g. in situations 
with severe overcapacity be close to the new value, implying that the 
salvage value is close to zero. The alternative value of labour might also 
sometimes be close to zero, if the labour force is immobile between 
sectors and areas. This might in particular be the case where fisheries 
are located in remote areas with few alternative employment 
opportunities. In the very long run, however, when fleets have to be 
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renewed and when new generations should take over, the alternative 
value of capital and labour is positive. The resource rent in open access 
is zero, since increased earning is used for inefficient investments.  
 In optimal management, the marginal cost curve represents the 
supply curve and M represents the equilibrium. The producer surplus is 
defined equivalently, but due to that fishing is below MSY, the 
difference between the two are found on the increasing part of the two 
curves. The resource rent is defined as the difference between marginal 
and average cost at the increasing part of the curve. Hence, in optimal 
management welfare consists of both producer surplus and resource rent 
where only the producer surplus exists under open access. 
 Based on this approach, an empirical supply model is calibrated in 
chapter 8 for East Baltic cod based on an age-structured bio-economic 
model. This model is used to identify the steady state welfare effects of 
liberalising trade. To the knowledge of the author, neither has such an 
empirical model been developed in the literature before based on an 
age-structured bio-economic model, nor has it been used for welfare 
analysis. Furthermore, no models are known to identify the steady state 
welfare effects on sectors in the economy.   
 
6. TRADE 
The Neoclassical theoretical tradition applied to international economics 
is developed on the basis of a traditional understanding of trade as inter-
industrial, in which the exchange of excess goods occurs between 
different industries. Today, according to the European Commission 
(1999) and discussed by the Danish Economic Council (2001), however, 
the majority of all trade is intra-industrial, in which trade with relatively 
similar goods occurs due to increasing returns to scale and product 
differentiation. The presence of this situation form challenges in the 
analysis of trade liberalisation, since traditional theory, which predicts 
trade based on differences in resource endowment, is therefore 
inadequate. This situation render attention in general, but may also 
render attention for seafood trade, due to increasing returns to scale in 
parts of the distribution chain. Increasing returns to scale are in 
particular present in processing companies, which might partly be 
explained by the presence of large international supermarket chains 
demanding large lots in their purchase. Furthermore, product 
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differentiation is present in seafood trade, due to the existence of the 
many fish species and product forms on the world market. Hence, intra-
industrial trade theory is clearly relevant in explaining trade in fish 
products. On the other hand, trade in fish products is a classical example 
of the inter-industrial type, since countries are very differently endowed 
with fish resources. In the following, therefore, focus is chosen to be 
only on inter-industrial trade theory, since the interaction between trade 
policies, sustainability and fisheries management is the central concern.  
 Studies of trade liberalisation of international seafood markets are 
based on the literature on traditional international economics. In this 
literature, trade liberalisation is analysed given that all markets in the 
economy are in equilibrium. Hence, the basis is the general equilibrium 
model. This model is reviewed below followed by the introduction of a 
partial equilibrium model inspired by resource economics, which to the 
knowledge of the author is presented in the literature for the first time. 
Subsequently, a synthesis of the effects of trade liberalisation is drawn 
and empirical studies reviewed. Based on the two models, the 
theoretical basis for identifying welfare effects of liberalising 
international seafood trade is presented in Figure 2.6.  
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FIGURE 2.6 The contribution of international trade theory and resource 
 economics in explaining welfare effects of liberalising 
 international seafood trade.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The different versions of the models are reviewed below. The focus is 
on the analysis of trade liberalisation modelled as the removal of tariffs, 
but the analysis also applies for reductions in other trade measures that 
opens up or increases trade. These include for example import quotas, 
countervailing duties, price mechanisms and sanitary and hygiene 
requirements.  
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The general equilibrium model  
The economic literature that treats trade policies and liberalisation has 
developed over time. Traditionally, liberalisation of international trade 
is analysed on the basis of the Ricardian theoretical tradition applied to 
international economics. Within this tradition, fish is regarded as a 
conventional good and the presence of international trade is explained 
by differences in technology. Everybody can specialise in productions 
where they possess a comparative advantage.  
The Heckscher-Ohlin theory (Heckscher (1919); Ohlin (1933)) 
followed, explaining the appearance of comparative advantages due to 
differences in factor endowment and use, not due to differences in 
technology. Based on the premises that goods differ in their factor 
requirement (described by the factor intensity) and countries differ in 
their factor endowment (described by the factor abundance), the simple 
idea is that “a country has a comparative advantage in those goods that 
use its abundant factors intensively”. It follows that a country with large 
fish stocks has a comparative advantage in the sale of fish products, as 
fish products are produced intensively on the basis of fish resources.  
 It further follows that at least two goods, two production factors and 
two countries necessarily must be included in the model in order to 
allow analysis. Sometimes, however, analysis is made for one country 
taking other countries into account only indirectly. Including the rest of 
the world through the international price relationship, which typically is 
exogenously given, does that. On this basis, a general equilibrium model 
where all markets are in equilibrium at the same time is needed. Such a 
model consists of several parts. The interactions of factor and good 
markets can be built on the Stolper-Samuelson theorem focusing on 
prices and on the Rybczynski theorem focusing on quantities. 
Substitution relations can be built on knowledge obtained from demand, 
supply and market integration studies, thereby giving the model a 
microeconomic foundation. Substitution relations must, however, also 
fulfil the elasticity rules of Marshall (1920).  
 The Stolper-Samuelson theorem describes how changes in final good 
prices affect factor reward. It states “an increase in the relative price of a 
good raises the real reward of the factor used intensively in the 
production of the good and reduces the real reward of the other factor” 
(Stolper and Samuelson 1941). The relevance of this theorem lies in that 
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it can explain how some groups or sectors gain from the opening of 
trade. Workers have, for example, an incentive to seek protection from 
imports of labour intensive goods, since otherwise domestic wages will 
fall.  
 The Rybczynski theorem describes how changes in factor 
endowment affect production. It states that “when the coefficients of 
production are given and factor supplies are fully employed, an 
expansion of the endowment of one factor of production raises the 
output of the good that uses the expanded factor intensively and reduces 
the output of the other good” (Rybczynski 1955). The relevance of this 
theorem lies in that it can explain why some countries’ level of trade is 
high, where others’ are low. The reason is that differences in factor 
endowment drive trade. That is, the larger the difference in factor 
endowments is between two countries, the more will the two countries 
trade with one another.  
 The elasticity rules of Marschall (1920) describe what determine the 
elasticity of factor demand. Following Layard and Walters (1978), 
which cite Marschall (1920), state that: “within an industry, the 
elasticity of demand for a factor varies directly with” 1) the elasticity of 
demand for the product the factor produces, 2) the share of the factor in 
the cost of production, 3) the elasticity of supply for the other factor and 
4) the elasticity of substitution between the factor in question and the 
other factor. Rules 1-2 state that the elasticity of factor demand 
increases both with the elasticity of the good it produces and with the 
share of the factor in the cost of production. However, it only increases 
with the share of the factor in the cost of production when the price 
elasticity of demand for the product the factor produces, is larger than 
the elasticity of substitution between the two factors. Rule 3 describes 
the relationship between demand of a factor and the supply of the other, 
and rule 4 considers substitution relations between factors. 
 Using the above framework, trade liberalisation can be analysed in 
the Heckscher-Ohlin model. It is clear that a global social optimum can 
only be reached in the case of free trade. Small countries, which are 
price takers on the world market, also face a situation where the social 
optimum can only be reached in the case of free trade. Large countries, 
however, can affect their terms of trade and thereby reach a social 
optimum only through the active use of trade policies, provided that 
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there is no retaliation from other countries.  These results are referred to 
as the conventional opinion.  
From the conventional opinion a direction has evolved which links 
trade theory and the exploitation of renewable resources. This direction 
originates in Bhagwati (1958) who finds that economic growth can 
cause reduced welfare under certain conditions. One recent example 
relates to renewable resources, where continued growth and rising 
incomes globally tend to increase purchasing power, causing pressure 
on the renewable resources. This phenomenon, which is referred to as 
immiserising growth, is related to international economics in that 
“economic expansion increases output which, however, might lead to a 
sufficient deterioration in the terms of trade to offset the beneficial 
effect of expansion and reduce the real income of the growing 
economy”.  
Along the same direction, Chichilnisky (1993, 1994) explains trade 
between two otherwise identical countries on the basis of differences in 
property rights of renewable and non-renewable resources. The 
exporting country may not necessarily be abundant in the resource, but 
since it has weak property rights it possesses an “apparent comparative 
advantage” and sell cheaper than the importing country with strong 
property rights. The reason is that they do not account for replacement 
costs of the resource. This implies that the price does not reveal the full 
cost of extraction and the producers will over-exploit the resource. If 
alternatively the price reveals the real value of both production and 
replacement costs, over-exploitation will not result.  
Within the same theoretical basis, one direction studies the link 
between tropical deforestation and timber trade. The focus is on the 
potential use of trade policies of timber to limit tropical deforestation. 
Barbier and Rauscher (1994) use a dynamic model of a renewable 
resource, where timber is extracted for purposes of export and domestic 
consumption. It is found that “trade interventions that seek to affect the 
terms of trade against the export of tropical timber products are in the 
long run a second best policy option for influencing the deforestation 
process”. Furthermore, Barbier and Schulz (1997) emphasise the role of 
trade in relation to biodiversity and habitat conversion using a bio-
economic model of wild-resource exploitation. It is found that “the 
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inclusion of habitat conversion and biodiversity value yields 
significantly different outcomes than a basic bio-economic model”. 
Brander and Taylor (1997ab, 1998) show in three seminal papers that 
advantages with free trade in renewable resources, that are not managed 
optimally, exist only under certain conditions and for certain types of 
countries. Brander and Taylor (1997a) study the effect of the 
introduction of trade in a small diversified exporter country of fish with 
an open access fish stock. A model with two goods, produced with 
constant returns to scale on the basis of two production factors is used. 
The two goods are a fish product and a numeraire representing all other 
products, and the two production factors are a fish stock and labour, 
with the fish stock being a specific factor for the fish product and labour 
a factor, which is mobile between the two sectors. Welfare is measured 
as “steady state utility” on the basis of a Cobb-Douglas utility function 
and with steady state amounting to the long run bionomic equilibrium. 
Utility is maximised subject to the production possibility frontier (PPF) 
for a steady state stock where natural growth equals harvest. In the small 
diversified exporter country the trade liberalisation is followed by a rise 
in the price of fish and an upward shift on the supply curve in Figure 
2.2a will take place. Hence, the production possibility frontier is shifted 
inwards, as shown in Figure 2.7.   
 
FIGURE 2.7  Pre and post trade steady state equilibrium in the small 
 exporter country.  
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Brander and Taylor (1997a).  
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The steady state equilibrium shifts from (M, Hpre-trade), where the 
indifference curve is tangent with the production possibility frontier, to 
(M, Hpost-trade) at a lower utility level. The new steady state equilibrium 
appears after an adjustment process from a temporary non-sustainable 
Ricardian equilibrium. In this process the production possibility frontier 
pivots inwards. Thereby, trade liberalisation results in a welfare loss in 
the diversified small exporter country.  
Hannesson (2000) modifies the analysis of Brander and Taylor 
(1997a), since he replaces their assumption on constant returns to scale 
in manufacturing with decreasing returns to scale. Thereby a “humped” 
PPF with a harvest peak at MSY is obtained as shown in Figure 2.8.  
 
FIGURE 2.8 Pre and post trade steady state equilibrium in the small 
 exporter country with decreasing returns to scale in 
 manufacturing. 
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Source: Hannesson (2000).  
 
The PPF is deduced on the basis of the backward bending supply curve 
in Figure 2.2. It can be shown that the hump-shaped form in Figure 2.8 
appears. The PPF is decreasing to the right of the hump, but positively 
sloped to the left. The hump appears as one moves to the left since more 
labour is used inefficiently for overexploitation. Given that optimal 
  
2-38 
management existed, the PPF would be negatively sloped all along, as 
for conventional goods. 
 Based on this, a welfare analysis is performed by introducing utility 
in the model. It is assumed that M and H are perfect substitutes, 
implying that the indifference curves are linear. The indifference curves 
are negatively sloped and the numerical value of the slope is the relative 
price between M and H. The line drawn in Figure 2.8 reveals the relative 
price in the autarky equilibrium and the equilibrium point is the left 
intersection between the PPF and the indifference curve. At that 
equilibrium point the open access renewable resource is exploited above 
MSY, which is the traditional result.  
 Liberalising trade will now result in a price increase in the renewable 
resource. This implies that the relative price on H in relation to M rises 
and the line pivots. Now the utility level can be measured in terms of the 
original indifference curve intersection with the M-axis, which can be 
done due to the perfect substitution assumption, and a higher utility 
level is reached. Finally, the prices will adjust to the world market 
prices, and the initial indifference curve will make a parallel move to the 
right as shown. The result is that a trade liberalisation in the renewable 
resource based good implies that a higher level of welfare is obtained at 
higher production levels of both goods. The result contrasts the Brander 
and Taylor (1997a) result, the reason being that decreasing returns to 
scale and perfect substitution is assumed here. 
Brander and Taylor (1998) use a similar approach in a two-country 
model where both countries are diversified and have open access fish 
stocks. They find that the resource importer gains from trade and that 
the resource exporter suffers a decline in steady state utility. Hence, it is 
found that “tariffs imposed by the resource importer country always 
benefit the resource exporter, and may be Pareto improving”.   
Furthermore, Brander and Taylor (1997b) find in a two-country 
model of trade between a consumer country with an open access 
renewable resource and a conservationist country with a well-managed 
renewable resource, that trade liberalisation will cause net-export of the 
consumer country to rise in the short run and steady state utility to fall in 
the mild-overuse case in the long run. In the severe overuse case, 
however, both countries will experience gains from trade liberalisation.  
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Emami and Johnston (2000) show in a two-country, two-good model 
that import tariffs on a renewable natural resource with incomplete 
property rights might reduce losses in steady state utility in both 
countries, caused by weak resource management in one of the two 
countries.  
Finally, Bernard (1998) proposes a computable general equilibrium 
model in the analysis of specific fisheries. This model includes a 
conventional numeraire good, as well as a renewable resource. The 
focus is on the interactions between the seafood market and all other 
commodity markets in the economy. Two computable models are 
introduced, one dealing with open access and one with optimal 
management. The open access model of Bernard (1998) is used in a 
hypothetical numerical example in the appendix to analyse the effect of 
removing a tariff on a renewable resource in a small country exporting 
the renewable resource. The model is used together with the technical 
implementation in the Excel spreadsheet using the Problem Solver, 
according to Jorgensen (2003). The removal of the tariff is assumed to 
increase the domestic price on the harvesting goods by 10%. Based on 
that model and with the numbers presented in the appendix, the effects 
of removing a tariff in a small exporter country is shown in Figure 2.9.  
 
FIGURE 2.9  Effects of removing a tariff in a small exporter country with 
 open access.  
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From the Figure the hump-shaped production possibility frontier, 
following from open access in the exploitation of the renewable 
resource, appears together with two trade triangles. These trade triangles 
show production and consumption before and after the trade 
liberalisation. The prices are normalised to one in the initial situation in 
order to show changes and the slope of the production possibility 
frontier depicts the international relative price between the harvesting 
and manufacturing goods. The relative price is exogenous due to the 
small country assumption. In the initial situation production of H and M 
is 1,200 and 800, respectively, where the consumption is 500 and 1,500. 
Hence, export of the harvesting goods as well as import of the 
manufacturing good, is 700. In the terminal situation appearing after the 
10% price increase on the harvesting good, the production of H and M is 
1,191 and 697, respectively, where the consumption is 456 and 1,506. 
Export of H is then 735 and import of M 808. The initial and terminal 
situations are depicted by triangles A1C1P1 and A2C2P2.  
 On this basis it is found that the trade liberalisation implies that the 
production of both goods fall. Furthermore, with the iso-welfare contour 
(W1 and W2) drawn in the Figure, which can be deduced from 
individual well-behaved preferences, welfare falls as a result of the trade 
liberalisation. In the present numerical example with the well-behaved 
preferences, the small exporter country loses from the removal of the 
tariff, since production of H and M, respectively, is reduced by 0.7% 
and 12.8%.  
 This numerical model can be used to study the effects of trade 
liberalisation in hypothetical situations, which can be fitted to depict 
“real world” fisheries. This would in particular be relevant when 
studying the interactions between the fisheries and the other sectors in 
the economy. For example one could study how the harvesting good is 
affected indirectly by a trade liberalisation in all other goods (i.e. in the 
manufacturing good). The model is, however, not well suited for taking 
fisheries management, mesh size regulation, shared stocks and multi-
species environmental relations into account. And these may be decisive 
for whether trade liberalisation results in welfare gains or losses. 
Therefore, a partial equilibrium approach is introduced in the next 
section focusing explicitly on the modelling of these items.  
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The partial equilibrium model  
The supply functions of the previous section are integrated with the 
basic tariff analysis for two countries, according to Houck (1986) and 
used by Francois and Hall (1997) and Krugman and Obstfeld (2000). 
This is combined with the welfare concepts of Copes (1972) and a new 
analytical framework for analysing the welfare effects of seafood trade 
liberalisation is developed. This is referred to as the partial equilibrium 
model. Although it is partial it gives important information, since a 
broad welfare concept is applied. Welfare in this model includes 
consumer surplus, producer surplus (infra-marginal rent), resource rent 
and tariff revenue, implying that the welfare effects of trade 
liberalisation can be allocated among sectors in the economy.  
Furthermore, it is possible to identify welfare effects of trade 
liberalisation under management systems between pure open access and 
optimal management in a consistent way. These management systems 
include mesh size regulation, regulated open access and regulated 
restricted access. This is important since most fisheries today are 
managed by some of these regimes. To the knowledge of the author 
such an integrated approach for trade liberalisation in a renewable 
resource is presented in the literature for the first time.  
The analytical framework consists of an initial situation where two 
countries (home as the importer and foreign as the exporter) own an 
open access fish stock which both over-exploit. The two countries trade 
with one another and home uses an import tariff. The effect of removing 
this tariff is analysed for one of the countries, considering the other 
country as the rest of the world. This framework is applied as the basis 
here, whereas Houck (1986) perform their analysis for a conventional 
good.  
The analysis departs from two open access fish stocks fished with 
small mesh sizes, based on the situation in Figure 2.2a. Subsequently 
larger mesh sizes, the presence of different management schemes, 
shared ownership of resources, predator-prey relations, aquaculture and 
processing are introduced. The price and quantity effects of removing 
the tariff are presented in Figure 2.10a and welfare effects in Figure 
2.10b and 2.10c. The supply curves in Figure 2.10b and 2.10c are 
identical to the curves in the left and right hand diagrams of Figure 
2.10a, respectively.  
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FIGURE 2.10 Effects of removing a tariff with open access.  
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Figure 2.10a consists of three diagrams, one of the home market, one 
of the world market and one of the foreign market. Supply curves on 
both markets are for the small mesh size situation of Figure 2.2a, but the 
analysis of the medium and large mesh size situations can easily be 
performed by replacing the supply curve by the ones in Figure 2.2b and 
2.2c. Supply and demand on the world market appears as excess supply 
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from the foreign market and excess demand from the home market. At 
the world market, the initial import tariff used in home is shown 
together with the corresponding price in home (PTH) and foreign (PTF). 
Moreover, the free trade price (PW) is shown and it appears that 
removing the tariff implies that the tariff wedge at the world market 
between prices at the home and the foreign market disappears and drives 
international trade up from QT to QW. Subsequently, trade liberalisation 
will in the model always be followed by a fall in the price in the 
importer country and a price rise in the exporter country.  
Based on this framework, the welfare effect of removing the tariff is 
outlined in Figure 2.10b and 2.10c in home and foreign and summarised 
in Table 2.4.  
 
TABLE 2.4 Welfare effects of liberalising trade in an open access fish stock.  
 Importer country Exporter country
 
Change in consumer surplus (a + b + g + h) - (x)
Change in producer surplus + (d + e + f) – (a) + (x + y) – (v + w)
Tariff revenue - (f + g + h + i + j) .
Change in welfare (b + d + e) – (i + j) + (y) – (v + w)
 
The welfare effect of trade liberalisation in the importer country is 
generally indeterminate. The consumer surplus rises the tariff revenue 
disappears and the producer surplus is indeterminate. In the small 
importer case where the country does not possess power on the world 
market, PW = PTF, implying that the terms of trade effect (f + i + j) is 
zero. The tariff is then measured by the difference between PTH and PW 
(g + h) and the welfare change becomes (b + d + e + f). Thereby, the 
welfare effect of trade liberalisation in a small importing country with 
an open access fish stock is positive. On the foreign market, the welfare 
effect of trade liberalisation is also ambiguous. The consumer surplus 
falls and the producer surplus is indeterminate. If y > (v + w) welfare 
will rise, otherwise welfare will fall. In two situations the total welfare 
effect is negative. When the alternative value of labour and capital is 
zero and when vessels are homogeneous, the producer surplus is zero 
and the total welfare effect negative.  
 The welfare analysis of the medium mesh size supply regime is 
analogous. The change in consumer surplus and the disappearance of 
tariff revenue is the same. The change in producer surplus is, however, 
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zero when the price approaches infinitive. In the exporter country the 
total welfare effect is given by the fall in the consumer surplus. In the 
importer country the total effect remain indeterminate, since consumer 
surplus still rises and tariff revenue still disappears.  
When optimal management instead of open access exists the supply 
curves in Figure 2.10 are to be replaced by the globally increasing 
supply curve in Figure 2.3b. Furthermore, the welfare analysis includes 
the concept of resource rent. Undertaking such an analysis it can be 
shown that trade liberalisation results in a welfare gain in an exporter 
country. This can also be shown to be the case for a small importer 
country, but for a large importer country the effect remains 
indeterminate.  
When regulated open access exists, i.e. the fishery is output not input 
regulated, the fishery will be characterised by entry and exit of vessels 
until the resource rent is zero (Homans and Wilen (1997)). Furthermore, 
the change in the producer surplus in the exporter country is zero, since 
the increased turnover following from increased price is used for totally 
inefficient investments. Therefore, the fall in the consumer surplus 
creates a welfare reduction. In the analysis of the importer country the 
supply regime in Figure 2.10 is to be replaced by the one in Figure 2.3a. 
The welfare effects then depend on whether the initial and terminal 
situations are on the vertical part of the supply curve. In that case, the 
total welfare effect of the price fall is determined by the strength of the 
increased consumer surplus meet by the disappearing tariff revenue. In 
the case where the price falls to the increasing part of the supply curve, 
the changes are followed by increased producer surplus. Hence, in both 
situations the total welfare effect is indeterminate.  
Regulated restricted access is when both input and output regulation 
exists. Regulated restricted access may or may not secure optimal 
economic management, dependent on the use of management measures. 
If a quota is fixed at the maximum economic yield and input is limited 
to the minimum necessary to fish the quota, the management is optimal. 
The welfare effects of trade liberalisation then follow from the above. If, 
on the other hand, overcapacity is initially present and if the quota 
initially is fixed at a high level, neither the input nor the output 
regulation works optimally. In such a situation, a welfare gain results 
from trade liberalisation in an exporter country. The reason is that 
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increased turnover following from the price rise will increase profit and 
thereby producer surplus. The rise in producer surplus offsets the fall in 
consumer surplus. In an importer country a trade liberalisation results in 
a fall in the producer surplus, a rise in the consumer surplus and the 
disappearance of the tariff revenue. Hence, the total welfare effect is 
indeterminate.  
The above results are obtained for two countries, which each own 
their separate stock. The welfare effects of trade liberalisation for two 
countries (a large importer and a small exporter country) fishing a 
shared open access fish stock is analysed in chapter 8. The total welfare 
is reduced in both countries. In the small exporter country the consumer 
surplus falls due to the increased price. The producer surplus is also 
reduced since the increased turnover is used for totally inefficient 
investments and since the opportunity cost of fishing becomes larger 
with increased fishing. In the large importer country the producer 
surplus falls, due to the externality, and the tariff revenue disappears.  
The above results are also obtained assuming the absence of 
environmental interactions between fish species. Schulz (1997) finds 
that relations between species as well as the management system in 
place, and the economic importance of each species, in a complex way 
are decisive for the effects of trade sanctions and liberalisation. This 
follows from that the harvest of one species affects the stock and harvest 
of others. Schulz (1997) considers several situations, one being a 
predator-prey relationship between two open access species both 
harvested above the maximum sustainable yield and being of economic 
importance for an exporter country (of both species). In that situation, 
trade liberalisation in the good produced on the basis of the predator 
species implies that the price of the predator good rises and that steady 
state harvest and the predator stock falls. Thereby, either the prey stock 
or the prey steady state harvest rises. Whether a total gain or loss results 
depends on which effect dominates.  
Furthermore, the above results are obtained for a capture fish 
product. For a farm raised fish product the effects of trade liberalisation 
depend on whether fishmeal is an abundant or scarce factor. If it is 
abundant the supply curve is globally increasing and the welfare effects 
of trade liberalisation follows from conventional opinion. If it is scarce 
the supply curve is backward bending and the welfare effect depends on 
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the management system in the industrial fisheries. The reason is that it is 
impossible to substitute fishmeal as feed in aquaculture.  
Finally, the above results assume that fish products are traded only in 
one product form. Typically, fish products are sold in several different 
forms. Provided that raw material and processed products are subject to 
different tariffs, there are welfare effects of trade liberalisation 
originating from relocation of value added activities. Typically, tariffs 
on processed products are larger than on raw materials, since the 
importer country can then simultaneously protect the domestic 
processing industry from foreign competition on the market for 
processed products and allow the industry to import cheap raw material. 
The situation is referred to as tariff escalation and is of relevance here, 
since welfare creating value added activities in the processing sector 
should be added to the above analysis. Trade liberalisation will affect 
the localisation of these welfare creating value added activities through 
the relative price on processed products between importer and exporter 
countries. The reason is that liberalising trade implies that the price in 
the exporter in relation to the importer country rises, which on the 
margin causes relocation from the importer to the exporter country. 
Trade liberalisation will also affect the product mix since unprocessed 
products become relatively cheaper than processed.  
 
Synthesis 
The structure of the general equilibrium models of Heckscher-Ohlin and 
Brander-Taylor are similar. The models include the whole economy and 
two goods are produced on the basis of two factors of production. The 
difference is, however, that in the Brander-Taylor model one good is a 
renewable resource and one a conventional, where both goods are 
conventional in the Heckscher-Ohlin model. Furthermore, the renewable 
resource is produced with open access, implying that it can be over-
exploited. Hence, the Brander-Taylor model is a long run model, where 
there is no specific focus on time in the Heckscher-Ohlin model. 
Provided that the renewable resource is optimally managed, the two 
models are similar.  
 The Brander-Taylor and the partial equilibrium models face a 
different structure and focus, and can therefore be used supplementary. 
Where the Brander-Taylor model includes the whole economy and 
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focuses explicitly on the interactions between factor and good markets, 
the partial equilibrium model only focuses on the renewable resource. 
Hence, other parts of the economy, affecting the renewable resource, are 
modelled exogenously. Nevertheless, the partial equilibrium model 
possesses advantages over the Brander-Taylor model in more senses. 
Firstly, the welfare can be allocated among consumers, producers, 
resource rent and the government, where the welfare concept of the 
Brander-Taylor model focuses on steady state utility and thereby solely 
on consumers. Hence, the producer surplus is ignored, amounting to the 
implicit assumption of homogeneity of producers. Secondly, 
management can be built in the partial equilibrium model on a detailed 
level. This is important since commonly used management regimes 
worldwide, such as regulated open and restricted access as well as mesh 
size regulation, might be decisive for the welfare effects of trade 
liberalisation. Furthermore, the model may be designed to take shared 
stock and predator-prey relations into account. The Brander-Taylor 
model may also be extended to include such measures, but to the 
knowledge of the author this has not been done to date.  
 Based on the Heckscher-Ohlin model, conventional opinion states 
that liberalising trade and moving to free trade improves global welfare, 
as well as improving welfare in small countries. It also states that large 
countries only through the active use of their trade policies can 
maximise their welfare. This opinion is obtained for conventional 
goods, but might also hold in some situations for goods with production 
externalities, such as fish. However, there are several exceptions 
following from the welfare analyses of both models. In the Brander-
Taylor model it is found that exporter countries with overexploited open 
access fish stocks with constant returns to scale in the production of 
other goods lose steady state utility from trade liberalisation. 
Furthermore, small fish importing countries with under exploited open 
access fish stocks lose steady state utility from trade liberalisation.  
 From the partial equilibrium model, it is not possible to draw 
unambiguous theoretical conclusions on the welfare effects of trade 
liberalisation. Whether trade liberalisation results in welfare gains or 
losses depend on several factors, the main ones summarised as: 
 
1. The country’s status as importer or exporter. 
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2. The input-output regulation in place and the use of it. 
3. Mesh size regulation. 
4. The state of the fish stock. 
5. The size of the country on the world seafood market. 
 
These factors are of decisive importance in determining the welfare 
effects. For example, Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United 
Nations (2001) assess that the majority of global fish stocks are either 
fully exploited, overexploited, or close to extinction. This implies that 
perverse effects of trade liberalisation are likely to happen. On the other 
hand, mesh size regulation is compulsory in most countries worldwide. 
Interpreted together with the overexploited state of most global stocks, 
supplies are determined on the vertical part in Figure 2.2b. Thereby, 
further biological overexploitation is almost impossible, although 
further economic overexploitation can result. The reason is that totally 
inefficient investments in fishing capacity can rise. The existence of 
regulated open or restricted access in most fisheries support this result, 
although regulated restricted access in some fisheries might be applied 
optimally. If that is the case conventional opinion applies. But the 
management of several fish stocks might not be effective, since 
Hannesson (1996) summarises the management situation for the North 
Atlantic cod in one word: “mismanagement”.  
Other than the five factors, such as returns to scale in the non-fish 
sector, the presence of homogeneity or heterogeneity in the economic 
performance of fishermen and the alternative value of capital and labour 
is also relevant. In addition the analyses above are performed only in 
two-country models for fleets fishing on one species solely owned by 
the single country, and for trade in only one product form. Thereby, 
aspects such as competition between different exporter countries, shared 
stocks, multi-species fisheries, environmental multi-species relations 
and localisation of value added activities are ignored. This does not 
mean that trade liberalisation through such factors does not affect 
welfare. Trade liberalisation will e.g. affect welfare when fish products 
are traded as both raw material and processed products subject to 
different tariffs, since welfare originating from value added activities 
might then be relocated. 
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Given this framework, the main conclusion arising is that welfare 
effects of trade liberalisation are case specific and thus, the question of 
welfare effects remains empirical. Therefore, the identification of 
welfare effects of seafood trade liberalisation must be based on 
empirical studies, which are therefore reviewed. 
 Empirical analyses of liberalising international seafood trade are 
limited. One study focuses on the effects of removing tariff barriers on 
fish products between all members of the Asian Pacific Economic 
Council (Hartmann, Klijn and Cox (2000)), two others on the effects of 
antidumping duties on an integrated global salmon market (Anderson 
and Fong (1997); Asche (1997, 2001)), others focus on the effects of 
tariffs on EU import of fish products (Guillotreau and Péridy (2000); 
Péridy, Guillotreau and Bernard (2000)), and finally the analysis of 
chapter 8 identifies welfare effects of removing tariffs on East Baltic 
cod products, as a consequence of the EU enlargement. 
 Hartmann, Klijn and Cox (2000) use a traditional partial equilibrium 
model to identify the welfare effects of removing tariffs on seafood 
trade in the Asian-Pacific area. Consumer and producer surplus is 
identified considering fish products as private goods. The welfare 
effects of a total removal of the tariff barriers appear to be small, but 
due to tariff escalation the effect is larger on processed than on 
unprocessed products. It is further concluded, “it is likely that non-tariff 
barriers have influenced trade to a much greater degree than have tariff 
barriers”. Since the fish products are treated as a private good, the 
welfare effect due to that “the removal of the tariff barriers will place 
greater pressures on existing fish stocks, unless sustainable management 
regimes are implemented”, is neglected.  
 Anderson and Fong (1997) examine the Norway-US salmon dispute 
on dumping and Asche (2001) uses market integration studies to 
identify one integrated world market for salmon. Asche (2001) further 
argues that the antidumping measures imposed on imports of Norwegian 
salmon to the US, to protect the domestic producers, are inefficient. The 
reason is that although US import from Norway will fall, other suppliers 
on the world market will take over the Norwegian position. Hence, it is 
argued “the trade disputes is closely related to who is going to benefit of 
the productivity gains in the industry – producers by high profit or 
consumers by low prices”. Asche (1997) also argues that “the disputes 
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are also related to who is going to survive in the industry, those who 
have the best productivity or those located inside the main markets”.  
 Guillotreau and Péridy (2000) and Péridy, Guillotreau and Bernard 
(2000) estimate an import function for fish imported to the EU on the 
basis of panel data. Determinant of the EU import of fish products 
include tariff barriers, price, exchange rates and distances between 
countries. However, where price, exchange rates and distances between 
countries are influential, tariff protection has little effect on imports. The 
effect from tariff protection is, due to tariff escalation, larger for 
processed than for unprocessed products. Welfare effects are not 
identified in the study, but may also be small.  
 In chapter 8, a quantitative supply model for the East Baltic cod 
fishery is introduced and used to study the effects of the tariff removal 
on imports into the EU from Poland, following from the EU 
enlargement. To the knowledge of the author, a model simultaneously 
quantifying the welfare effects of liberalising seafood trade and 
explicitly taking the link to sustainability and fisheries management into 
account, is presented in the literature for the first time. Assuming open 
access and simultaneous use of mesh size regulation, a welfare 
reduction follows, but this reduction is almost solely related to 
economic over-exploitation more than to biological over-exploitation.  
 Poland is negatively affected through a fall in consumer surplus. The 
producer surplus is unaffected, since the increased profit is used for 
totally inefficient investments. The EU is affected through the 
externality in the fishery of the shared stock. This implies that the 
producer surplus falls. The tariff revenue also falls, due to the removal 
of the tariffs. The consumer surplus remains unaffected, since falling 
domestic catches are assumed replaced by other sources and, therefore, 
the total welfare fall. Alternatively assuming the presence of regulated 
open access implies that the result still applies. The welfare rise 
following from a hypothetical change from regulated open access to 
optimal management is, however, twenty times larger than the welfare 
reduction of trade liberalisation.  
 On this basis it is concluded that fisheries management remains the 
first best policy to achieve welfare from fish stocks, where trade 
liberalisation remains the second best. The two policies must, however, 
be coordinated. Or as formulated by Schulz (1996) “trade policy is a too 
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general measure for the management of living resources, and may 
implicate important economic distortions to the ecological system”. 
Contrary to this view, Stone (1997) assesses that the use of trade laws to 
limit fisheries subsidies and thereby overcapacity globally “should be 
more aggressively used in the campaign to reduce the pressure on 
stocks”. Furthermore, Stone (1997) concludes, “the elimination or 
confinement of these subsidies would not, in themselves, heal the world 
fisheries. But it would relieve national budgets of perverse expenditures, 
ease the task of fisheries managers, remove distortions to trade, help 
foster a larger, more valuable catch in the long run, and protect the 
environment”.  Between these views, Emami and Johnston (2000) 
conclude that the World Trade Organisation “should not always insist 
on free trade, rather they must pay careful attention to the particular 
relationships between trade conditions and natural resource policies 
among trading nations”. Hence, no agreement on the use of trade 
measures for resource conservation purposes exists in the literature. On 
the other hand there is no doubt that liberalising seafood trade affects 
resources and welfare. But the conclusion here points to that the effect is 
more on welfare than on the resource.  
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Appendix  
 
A basic CGE-model with a natural ressource, spreadsheet version 
Base parameters 
 alpha 0,67 
beta 0,50 
gamma 2,00 
lambda 1,89 
teta 0,25 
Inst. Growth (v) 2400 
Carrying cap. (S) 2,00 
 
 
Derived paramters 
    
Unit factor req.: 
aKH 0,72 
aLH 0,37 
aKM 0,49 
 aLM  0,51 
 
 
Exogenous Endogenous Equations 
      Terminal Initial
Change 
(%)  Terminal Initial 
Change 
(%)
PHW_ 1,1 QH 1.191 1.200 -0,7 ConsH 456 500 -8,7
PMW_ 1,0 QM 697 800 -12,8 ConsM 1.506 1.500 0,4
e 1,0 CH 456 500 -8,7 FDemKH 858 800 7,2
K_ 1.200 CM 1.506 1.500 0,4 FDemLH 445 400 11,2
L_ 800 XH 735 700 5,0 FDemKM 342 400 -14,4
   MM 808 700 15,5 FDemLM 355 400 -11,2
   PH 1,1 1 10,0 PriceH 1,1 1 10,0
   PM 1,0 1 0,0 PriceM 1,0 1 0,0
   r 1,0 1 1,9 ClearH 735 700 5,0
   w 1,0 1 -1,8 ClearM 808 700 15,5
   Y 2.008 2.000 0,4 ClearK 1.200 1.200 0,0
   KH 858 800 7,2 ClearL 800 800 0,0
   KM 342 400 -14,4 Income 2.008 2.000 0,4
   LH 445 400 11,2 SOH 1,1 1 10,0
   LM 355 400 -11,2 SOM 1,0 1 0,0
   G 1,0 1 0,0 ExtBal 735 700 5,0
    S 0,9 1 -8,5 StockG 1.191 1.200 -0,7
  
Sources. Calculations based on the model specified by Bernard (1998) and the 
technical implementation in Excel using 
'"Problem Solver" by Jorgensen (2003). 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
The use of tariff measures on seafood products in OECD countries  
 
Published in OECD (2003), Liberalising Fisheries Markets – Scope and 
effects, Paris, pp. 80-92. 
 
1. Introduction 
The purpose of this paper is to present an overview of the information 
gathered for the OECD Committee of Fisheries' Study on Market 
Liberalisation. The paper seeks to assess the extent of use of tariff 
measures among OECD countries and to identify key issues arising 
from the use of these measures. The basis is information supplied by the 
OECD member countries in the Committee. In addition, a number of 
studies and web sites have been consulted. The paper only assesses the 
use of tariff measures, but the full study also assesses the use of other 
policies, which limit free trade internationally. These include import 
quotas, countervailing duties, price mechanisms, licensing 
arrangements, export measures, government financial transfers, sanitary 
and hygiene requirements, technical import requirements, access to 
ports, investment restrictions, and services restrictions. Assessments of 
these measures are available in OECD (2003), Liberalising Fisheries 
Markets – Scope and Effects.  
 
2. The present tariff situation 
Following the Uruguay Round (UR), which culminated with the 
Marrakech Agreement (1994) members of the WTO commenced the 
reduction of their tariff rates from the pre-UR level to the agreed level 
                                                                      
This paper is identical to the authors contribution to the published study 
”Liberalising Fisheries Markets – Scope and Effects”, Paris, pp. 80-92, undertaken 
for the OECD Committee of Fisheries under the 2001-02 programme of work. The 
paper was prepared during a stay at the Fisheries Division of the Directorate of 
Food, Agriculture and Fisheries in the OECD in Paris in the winter 2001-02. The 
author wish to thank the OECD and in particular Carl Christian Schmidt for 
obtaining the opportunity of working with such a timely policy relevant topic. The 
author also thanks Carl Christian Schmidt for valuable comments on earlier drafts 
of this paper.  
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of tariff bindings. This process of tariff reductions was to have been 
finalised by year 2000 according to the UR Agreement implementation 
schedule. For fish and fish products the average across-the-board Most 
Favoured Nation (MFN) bound tariff rate applied by developed 
countries was reduced from 6.1% to 4.5%, or by 26%1. The reductions 
in tariff levels for fish and fish products were somewhat lower than for 
other industrial products (which ended with an average reduction of 
40%). In addition the reductions covered a wide range of possibilities; 
some rates were not reduced at all while others were reduced to zero or 
eliminated.  
 Table 3.1 provides an overview of the reductions agreed to during the 
Uruguay Round by showing the relative distribution of imports by tariff 
level (bound tariffs), pre- and post-Round. It is noted that the relative 
share of trade taking place at lower rates of duty has increased with the 
full implementation of the Uruguay Round results. Although there are 
differences among the countries, a comparison pre- and post-UR of the 
distribution of tariff lines clearly shows that the number of tariff lines in 
the lower bands has increased. 
 
                                                                      
1 See GATT, The Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade 
Negotiations. Overview of the Results, Geneva, November 1994. 
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3. Tariff information 
In building the present inventory of tariff measures a peculiarity became 
an obvious obstacle to the work. WTO members are not obliged to 
notify, to the WTO, the tariff rates actually used, although several do. 
For some OECD countries this is a cause of concern as the actual used 
tariff rates can be very different from the MFN tariff rates they are 
obliged to notify. Whilst this situation renders an inventory exercise 
difficult it is likely to be a serious concern for exporters and importers 
who lack instant knowledge of the likely rate of duty by which their 
trade will be assessed.   
 However, some OECD countries have set up web sites that provide 
tariff information on a real time basis. This concerns in particular: 
 
• The European Union - the market access database2 
(http://mkaccdb.eu.int/) provides information on applied tariffs, 
sectoral trade barriers, WTO bound tariffs, import formalities. It 
also includes a GATS Info-Point, a statistical database and studies 
and the EU Commission’s Directorate for Customs and Direct 
Taxation “TARIC” database3 includes MFN and preferential tariff 
rates, tariff quota fill and other information relevant for traders and 
policy makers.  
• The United States (http://www.usitc.gov/taffairs.htm) provides the 
US tariff schedule.  
• Canada’s online tariff database for 2002 “Tariff Wizard” is 
available at 
http://207.61.56.166/services/t,wiz2002/twiz2002e.cfm    
• Also the Asia Pacific Economic Co-operation (APEC) Tariff 
Database provides tariff schedules, concessions, prohibitions for 
APEC Member countries at http://www.apectariff.org/ 
• And the Inter-American Development Bank provides tariffs and 
trade schedules for the Free Trade Area of the Americas at 
http://198.186.239.122/. 
 
                                                                      
2 Access to the Sectoral and Trade Barriers Database is free. However, information 
under the Exporters Guide, Applied Tariffs, and WTO Bound Tariffs is restricted 
users in the 15 Member States of the European Union. 
3 See http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/taxation_customs/dds/en/tarhome.htm. 
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Tariff information has been received from several OECD countries and 
this information has been used as the starting point for the analysis. 
Additional tariff information from already published sources (basically 
on tariff schedules in APEC countries) has also been used. Thus detailed 
information on tariff schedules on the most detailed level from eleven 
OECD countries (out of sixteen4) has been made available. Insofar as 
trade figures are concerned, the OECD International Trade Statistics 
Database and the Eurostat Comext Database has been consulted. 
Finally, the WTO tariff information submitted to the Study has been 
used to verify the information from OECD countries. 
 
4. Harmonised system 
All OECD countries base their tariff nomenclature on the international 
Harmonised System (HS) administered by the World Customs 
Organisation (WCO). 177 countries (153 of which are WCO members) 
use the HS as the basis for customs classification and for trade statistics 
purposes. According to the WCO (see http://www.wcoomd.org) 98 % of 
all merchandise trade is based on the HS system. The WCO's primary 
function is to ensure uniform interpretation of the HS coding system, a 
process that is carried out through its Harmonised Systems Committee. 
Amendments and updating to the HS are carried out every four to six 
years on the proposal of the WCO’s HS Committee with the last update 
taking place in 2002.  
 Due to the way the Harmonised System (HS) is constructed (defined 
by the WCO to the sixth digit level) and modified and the multitude of 
fish species and fish products traded, some species and products thereof 
do not have a code in the HS (and hence a specific tariff line). Such 
products are generally lumped together in the category, "other" which 
often attracts a higher tariff rate. This has been a cause for concern by 
some OECD countries whose fish species are only slowly entering the 
international market for fish and fish products. As the HS only 
undergoes substantial changes every four to six years (see above), some 
countries’ fisheries may be at a disadvantage. This issue is likely to 
become more prevalent in the future as traditional fish stocks become 
over-exploited and new fish species enter international trade. Also to 
ensure the proper function of trade information systems (see below) it is 
                                                                      
4 The EU is considered as one country. 
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of importance for the surveillance of international trade flows that HS 
codes actually exist for single species of fish and products thereof. An 
international effort to ensure this may be required. In this regard it is 
worth noting that with tariff reductions more attention may be given to 
measures taken by regional fisheries organisations including the 
surveillance of trade flows and hence more detailed trade information 
may be warranted. However it should be recalled that the more detailed 
the HS becomes the more resource intensive it will be to administer the 
system. Checks on imports and their conformity to declaration by 
importer/exporter involve considerable expertise (including on biology 
and taxonomy) and follow-up procedures for the final destination and 
use of the imports may be administratively expensive. 
 
5. Tariff bindings 
The binding of tariffs ensures that tariffs are not raised above the bound 
level and ensures a stable trading environment as it "disallows" 
countries to change the tariff rate to above the bound level. According to 
a Study by UNCTAD5 all tariff lines of the United States, Norway, 
Canada and the European Union are bound.  The level of binding 
remains an issue for Japan, Korea, Poland and Turkey, where some 
tariff-lines remain unbound, although Japan has not raised its bound 
rates.  
 
6. Tariff averages 
Tariff averages can be based either solely on the MFN tariff rates or on 
actual applied tariff rates6. Tariff averages can be calculated as simple 
averages and as trade weighted averages. Below, two types of tariff 
averages are calculated; 1) simple averages of the MFN tariff rates and 
2) trade weighted averages of the applied tariff rates. Simple tariff 
                                                                      
5 See Shirotori, UNCTAD, Fishery Sector: The Post Uruguay Round Trade 
Environment,  (1997). 
6 The MFN (Most Favoured Nation) tariff rate is the maximum rate of duty that 
can be used. The MFN rate can be either bound or unbound. The bound rate of 
duty applied from 1 January 2000 as agreed upon in the Uruguay Round. The 
applied rate of duty is the one actually applied on import and is normally lower 
than the MFN rate. 
  
3-7 
averages and trade-weighted averages are, however, not straightforward 
to interpret. 
 A simple tariff average (where the sum of all tariffs across the 
product selection has been divided with the number of tariff 
lines/products) disguises the possibility that a country could have most 
of its trade in the products that are levied zero tariff rates. As such the 
simple average tends to overstate the real tariff level. This may be a 
particular problem in fisheries with relatively low tariffs and a relatively 
higher level of trade in raw materials (HS 03) accompanied by high 
tariff rates and relatively lower levels of trade for processed products 
(HS 16).  
 Trade weighted tariff averages are weighted according to the traded 
value of the product in question or measured as total tariff revenue 
divided with total value of trade. Trade weighted averages tend to 
underestimate the real protection as the lower tariff lines are usually the 
ones with the highest value of trade. 
 The trade-weighted averages of applied tariff rates and simple 
average of MFN rates are presented in Table 3.2. Fish products are 
defined as all products included in the HS-group 03 "Unprocessed and 
semi-processed fish and seafood", 1604 "Processed fish products" and 
1605 "Processed crustaceans, mussels etc."7.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                      
7 Almost all fish and seafood products are covered. However, due to lack of 
comparable data a few products remain unaccounted for. These are fish waste 
(051191), seaweed (121220), fish liver oil (150410), fishoil 150420), fishmeal 
(230120) and fish soluble (230910). 
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Table 3.2 Trade weighted average of applied tariff rates and simple average of 
MFN rates on imports of fish and fish products to OECD countries (% and 
USD million1). 
 Aus Can EU2 Ice Jap Kor Mex NZ Nor Pol USA All RO3 RW
Tariff 
average 
(%): 
  
Trade 
weighted 
0.4 0.5 4.24 0.1 4.0 12.7 11.2 0.7 0.0 9.3 0.2 3.1 - -
   
Simple 
(MFN) 
0.0 1.5 12.1 1.4 5.9 16.9 19.3 0.7 0.0 18.4 2.4 7.0 - -
   
Import 
value  
458 1,134 8,888 63 12,576 538 84 42 483 328 8 524 33,118 573 9,424
 
Notes: 
1. Tariff data covers the year 2000 for the EU, Iceland, Norway and Poland and 
2001 for the remaining countries. Tariff averages are calculated using trade 
values in 1998 as trade weights. 
2.  The calculation includes only extra EU trade.  
3.  Rest OECD includes the sum of the import value in Czech Republic, Slovak 
Republic, Turkey, Hungary and Switzerland. 
4.  Estimates by the European Commission suggest a trade weighted tariff average 
on EU imports of fish and fish products of 3.7%, where the Secretariat in their 
calculations obtain a trade weighted tariff average on 4.2%. The difference is 
possible due to the underlying data and the assumptions made on the use of 
tariff quotas and on the treatment of countries with special arrangements.  
Source: OECD (2003), Liberalising Fisheries Markets – Scope and Effects, Paris.  
 
Tariff averages for imports into the eleven OECD countries are 3.1% 
and 7.0%, respectively for the trade weighted average of the applied 
tariff rates and for the simple average of the MFN rate. The tariff 
revenue collected by OECD countries amounts to USD 1 billion8. 
Moreover, it appears that the lowest tariff average is present in Norway 
as all tariff lines have zero rates9. Tariff averages are also low in 
Iceland, Australia, New Zealand, Canada and in the US.  
 Korea, Mexico and Poland exhibit the highest tariff averages, both 
measured as the trade weighted average of the applied tariff rates and as 
                                                                      
8 Calculated as 3.1% of the USD 33 118 million. 
9 However, this is only because the HS-groups 03, 1604 and 1605 are considered. 
Within the fish oil group (1504) a MFN tariff rate of 170% is reported by Norway 
and within the fishmeal group (2301) a MFN tariff rate of 283% is reported. 
Tariffs are applied for animal feed purposes. 
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the simple average of the MFN rates. The weighted applied tariff 
averages in Japan and in the EU are both at the same level of around 
4%. However, the simple average of the MFN rates is considerably 
higher in the EU than in Japan, mainly due to the extensive use by the 
EU of tariff quotas and suspensions for imports of raw materials and 
preferential agreements.  
 Table 3.3 presents tariff averages of fish products together with tariff 
averages on a selection of other food products. The tariff averages for 
fish products are trade weighted where the tariff averages for other 
products are weighted with domestic production, implying that the 
figures are not directly comparable. Moreover, it is underlined that the 
tariff averages calculated for fish products cover year 2000, where the 
tariff averages on the other products cover 1996. Nonetheless, the 
figures give a rough indication of the level of protection provided by 
tariffs on fish products related to other food products. 
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Table 3.3   Weighted tariff averages, selected OECD countries and product
 groups (%). 
 EU USA ICE JAP CAN AUS NOR NZ 
Fisheries (2000) 4.2 0.2 0.1 4.0 0.5 0.4 0.0 0.7 
Agriculture products 
(1996)1/2 
10.7 7.9 2.1 5.0 5.5 0.5 60.3 1.7 
Food, beverages and 
tobacco (1996) 1/2 
32.5 15.9 10.6 18.9 57.4 3.3 135.1 5.2 
Total all products 7.7 5.2 5.2 3.4 12.1 4.2 22.3 51 
 MEX TUR AUT FIN SWE KOR   
Fisheries (2000) 11.2 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 12.7   
Agriculture products 
(1996)1/2 
14.7 9.1 7.0 4.2 1.3 n.a   
Food, beverages and 
tobacco (1996) 1/2 
43.6 82.3 14.7 11.9 1.0 n.a   
Total all products 18.0 10.6 8.8 5.2 3.0 n.a.   
Notes: 
1.  The average tariff rates of these products are weighted with domestic 
production, where the tariff average for fisheries is  
 weighted with imports.  
2.  The groups "agriculture products" and "food, beverages and tobacco" can be 
considered as unprocessed and processed  
 foodstuff respectively.  
3.  Figures for Austria, Finland and Sweden refer to 1993. 
Source: OECD, Indicators of Tariff and Non-tariff Trade Barriers, Paris, (1997) 
 
From Table 3.3, it appears that the weighted tariff averages on fish 
products in the countries for which data are available are lower than on 
both imports of unprocessed and processed foodstuffs. The extreme is 
Norway with very high tariffs on foodstuffs and other imported goods, 
but without tariffs on fish.  
 Despite a low overall level of protection, tariffs on some specific fish 
species are significant and markets for these species therefore heavily 
affected. In other words, liberalising trade by reducing tariff barriers 
would be felt on markets with relatively large tariff averages but less so 
on markets with relatively low tariff averages. This is for example 
important in assessing whether tariff rate reductions gives supply 
responses, as supply responses are connected to fisheries management, 
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which again is related to fish species. Table 3.4 highlights this by 
showing tariff and trade data for selected fish species. 
 
Table 3.4 Tariff averages and trade values for the eleven OECD countries, by 
species. 
Tariff average     /% Trade value     /USD Million   
Species1 
Trade-weighted 
(applied) 
Simple (MFN) Import Export Trade balance
Trout 3.6 5.6 258 157 101
Salmon 2.4 6.2 2 147 1 873 274
Expensive 
flatfish 
1.5 5.8 226 220 6
Cheap flatfish 3.8 5.6 169 121 48
Cod 1.8 6.2 1 158 964 194
Fillets  
(all species)  
2.1 5.8 4 980 2 583 2 397
Tuna 4.5 9.4 3 658 992 2 666
Herring 6.2 6.7 194 386 -192
Sardines and 
anchovies 
3.8 7.9 286 189 97
Mackerel 4.4 7.9 398 449 -51
Lobster 1.4 8.0 1 002 971 31
Shrimps 1.9 8.2 8 693 1 398 7 295
Crabs  3.2 8.9 1 360 458 902
Bi-valves 5.4 8.7 1 921 1 166 755
Cuttlefish 4.6 5.4 1 410 295 1 115
Other 4.2 6.5 5 258 2 993 2 265
Total 3.1 7.0 33 118 15 214 17 904
Note:  Species defined according to OECD (2003), Liberalising Fisheries Markets 
– Scope and Effects, Paris, where tariff and trade data are also further 
detailed      
Source: OECD (2003), Liberalising Fisheries Markets – Scope and Effects, Paris.  
 
Table 3.4 shows that the largest trade weighted tariff averages are on 
herring (6.2%) and bi-valves (5.4%) and the lowest are on lobster 
(1.4%), expensive flatfish (1.5%) and shrimp (1.9%). All the remaining 
rates are within the interval 2-5%. The interval of the simple averages of 
the MFN rates is also within a limited interval (5-10%). As the tariff 
averages on imports of the selection of fish species to the eleven OECD 
countries do not differ significantly it is not possible to identify 
particular markets for fish species where the impacts of liberalising 
trade by reducing tariff rates are more pronounced than others.  
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As trade weighted averages underestimate the real protection, the 
distribution of imports according to tariff treatment is reported in Table 
3.5. 
 
Table 3.5 Distribution of imports (based on value) according to tariff 
treatment (%). 
 Aus Can EU Ice Jap Kor Mex NZ Nor Pol USA All 
Imports:             
 - With zero rates    92 87 46 99 0 0 43 62 100 34 89 42 
 - Under  preferential 
rates  (rate > 0)   
0 10 24 0 18 0 0 19 0 29 0 14 
 - With MFN rates 
applied (rate > 0)  
8 3 30 1 82 100 57 19 0 37 11 44 
Source: Calculations based on data in the document, Inventory of tariffs and trade 
data available in OECD (2003), Liberalising Fisheries Markets – Scope and 
Effects, Paris.  
 
From Table 3.5, it appears that 42% is imported without tariffs, 14% on 
preferential rates and 44% on MFN rates. However there are 
considerable differences among countries.  
 
7. Tariff quotas and tariff suspensions 
A tariff quota is an allocation of a given amount of imports to which a 
lower than normal rate of tariff is imposed. Tariff quotas may be opened 
on an autonomous10 basis while a few tariff quotas are GATT/WTO 
bound and have been negotiated in the context of a multilateral trade 
negotiation. Tariff suspensions are the unilateral lowering of the normal 
tariff rate and may be applied throughout the year or for a given period 
of time. 
 Tariff quotas or tariff suspensions are used in the European Union 
and Korea (in Korea this is known as an "Elastic Tariff System"). Tariff 
quotas or suspensions are opened to complement domestic shortfalls in 
landings with a view to better manage the supply situation for 
unprocessed products which serve as a basis for activities in the 
processing sector. 
 In the case of the European Union, the tariff quotas for herring, cod 
and silver hake are GATT bound (and therefore not subject to change 
without re-negotiation) whilst others are opened on a unilateral basis; 
                                                                      
10 Voluntarily opened by a country. 
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the tariff quotas can be used by any exporter on an erga omnes basis. 
The quotas cover, in particular, cod (25 000 tons), herring (34 000 tons) 
and cold water shrimp (12 000 tons) destined for further processing. The 
European Union also operates a series of tariff suspensions — some of 
which are permanent (e.g. frozen tuna for further processing), some are 
opened on a yearly basis and others are opened to cover shortfall during 
certain periods of the year.  
 Korea applies the "Elastic Tariff System" on some products chosen 
annually.  In 2000 (and 1999) the elastic tariff system included 14 fish 
and fish products including live eels (30 % in lieu of 10 %) and sea 
bream (70 % in lieu of 10 %), frozen croaker (70% in lieu of 10), frozen 
Alaska Pollack (30 % in lieu of 10 %), shrimp (35 % in lieu of 20 %), 
squid (40 % in lieu of 10%) and seasoned squid (25 % in lieu of 20 %). 
Tariffs are adjusted to compensate for the negative impact of import 
liberalisation following import liberalisation of fish imports on 1st July 
1997. In essence tariffs are increased according to the domestic supply 
situation and import possibilities and fixed annually.  These “elastic 
tariffs” are unbound. However, they have been marginally bound and 
the number of products covered has been reduced in recent years. 
 The United States applies a tariff quota on canned tuna not packed in 
oil. The tariff quota is based on the previous year's domestic pack 
(production) of canned tuna not packed in oil. Up to a ceiling of 20% of 
the previous year domestic pack imports are assessed at a tariff rate of 
6% increasing to 12.5% for imports above the ceiling. 
 The fill rates (i.e. the level at which the quota or suspension is used) 
is a useful indicator in evaluating the trade impact of tariff quotas and 
(time limited) suspensions. For example, if exporters/importers are fully 
utilising the possibility for cheaper imports offered by the tariff 
quota/suspension, an extension of the quota/suspension offer to cover 
additional quantities will expand trade and thus constitute a move 
towards further liberalising trade. However, while it may be argued that 
the opening of tariff quotas and tariff suspensions is a move towards 
trade liberalisation, it should be noted that for the exporters at least three 
issues arise in their application. First, a tariff quota or a time limited 
tariff suspension may give rise to uncertainty — in particular when the 
quota is close to being filled. Second, once opened, the trade in the 
product that benefits from the tariff quota/suspension may become 
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important and a discontinuation of the measures will therefore have 
more impact. Finally, tariff quotas and suspensions may give rise to 
trade diversion towards the products benefiting from the measure. 
 
8. Preferential tariff arrangements 
Basically there are two types of preferential access arrangements; 
Autonomous preferential agreements like the GSP scheme and bi/pluri-
lateral preferential reciprocal arrangements. 
 
Autonomous preferential agreements 
Most OECD countries apply preferential tariff treatment to developing 
countries - either under the General System of Preferences11 (GSP 
schemes) or under particular preferential arrangements (e.g. the 
European Union-ACP12 agreement - the so-called "Cotonou 
Partnership" Agreement covering 71 ACP countries). Ultimately, the 
intention is to move towards a free trade area13.  
 
Bilateral and multilateral preferential reciprocal arrangements 
The European Union offers preferential access to fish and fish products 
from Greenland and the Faeroe Islands (Danish territories), to Norway 
(as a compensation for lost trade opportunities when Sweden and 
Finland became members of the European Union), and to members of 
the European Economic Area (EEA agreement14). The European Union 
also operates a series of arrangements with countries in transition and 
Mediterranean countries that (for some products) open either tariff 
quotas or suspensions. 
 On the few product lines that carry a tariff, New Zealand offers 
preferential tariff treatment to Australia and Canada, developing 
                                                                      
11 Detailed information on the GSP schemes can be found on 
http://www.unctad.org/gsp/Default.asp Presently, Australia, Canada, EU, Japan, 
Norway, Poland, Slovak Republic, Switzerland, USA and New Zealand applies a 
GSP scheme. 
12 ACP denotes Asian, Caribbean and Pacific. 
13 The preferential arrangements of the eleven OECD countries is summarised in 
OECD (2003), Liberalising Fisheries Markets – Scope and Effects, Paris, pp. 128-
9. 
14 The EEA Agreement extends the single market of the European Union to three 
(out of the four) EFTA countries; namely, Norway, Iceland and Liechtenstein. 
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countries, and to the South Pacific island countries, which receive 
duty-free access under the South Pacific Regional Trade and Economic 
Co-operation Agreement (SPARTECA). 
 Under the North American Free Trade Area (NAFTA) agreement, 
fish and fish products can be traded tariff free between three OECD 
countries; i.e. Canada, United States and Mexico.  
 Canada applies preferential tariff treatment to Commonwealth 
countries in the Caribbean and to Chile under the Canada-Chile Free 
Trade Agreement. The United States applies tariff free trade in its trade 
with Israel. 
 The European Free Trade Association (EFTA), whose membership 
includes the OECD countries Switzerland, Norway, Iceland as well as 
Lichtenstein, has free trade agreements with nineteen countries, ongoing 
negotiations with four, and exploratory talks and declarations on co-
operation with nine other countries/organisations. The elements of the 
EFTA free trade agreements with non EU-countries are in principle 
similar to the trade regime prevailing among the EFTA States 
themselves providing for free trade in industrial products, processed 
agricultural goods, as well as fish and other marine products. In the last 
few years the negotiated agreements also comprise among other 
elements areas such as services and investment, rules of competition, 
protection of intellectual property rights. 
 Poland offers free or preferential access on imports for several fish 
products imported from Eastern European and the Baltic countries, as 
well as from EFTA countries. Iceland offers free access on imports from 
European countries. 
 The wide use of preferential arrangements implies that exporters to 
OECD countries are treated differently and this gives rise to competitive 
advantages for some countries.   
 
9. Rules of origin 
The use of preferential tariff treatment may give rise to issues of rules of 
origin. This might be the case where a domestic processing industry 
(dependent on imported raw material) competes on the home market 
with a foreign fish processing industry (also dependent on imported raw 
materials), where tariff rates on raw materials differ. In this situation the 
domestic industry faces a disadvantage in relation to the foreign 
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industry15. This is a problem for fish and fish products that are traded in 
both raw, semi-processed and processed forms but are caught by a 
multitude of vessels in many parts of the world.  
 The only way of determining origin is through a chain of custody 
verification, the costs of which may be high16. Tuna caught by 
developed countries and subsequently transhipped and landed in a 
developing country for processing (e.g. canning) is a case where rules of 
origin and the extent of transformation may give rise to problems. 
However, it should also be noted that a chain of custody is needed to 
ensure traceability of these products and that traceability is gradually 
becoming a sine qua non in international trade in fish and fish products. 
Traceability through chain of custody verification is required, inter alia, 
for compliance with sanitary and health regulations, for labelling 
purposes and for the implementation of conservation measures (e.g. 
"Tuna Tracking System"). See also under 2.e. Licensing arrangements 
and trade information systems. 
 
10. Tariff peaks 
There are a number of tariff peaks i.e. very high tariff rates, defined as 
tariff lines with an MFN tariff rate at or above 15%. The number of 
tariff peaks for fish products in HS-groups 03, 1604 and 1605 are 
provided in Table 3.6. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                      
15 The absence of an international recognised system capable of securing 
traceability through the trade and distribution channels makes rules of origin 
difficult to enforce. 
16 In particular for developing countries costs associated with chain of custody 
verification may be prohibitively high. 
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Table 3.6 Tariff peaks measured as tariff lines with MFN tariff rates >15%.  
 Aus Can EU Ice Jap Kor Mex NZ Nor Pol USA 
            
Tariff peaks (MFN 
rate) 
           
 - Total  number of 
tariff lines at or 
above 15% 
0 0 128 0 10 225 106 0 0 270 6 
- of which 
processed products 
i.e. 1604 and 1605 
  29  0 64 19   45 4 
 - Total number of 
tariff lines 
101 117 394 101 285 322 113 137 101 386 175 
Source: Inventory of tariffs and trade data available in OECD (2003), Liberalising 
Fisheries Markets – Scope and Effects, Paris.  
 
Table 3.6 shows that only six OECD countries have MFN tariff rates at 
or above 15%. The largest number of tariff peaks relative to the number 
of tariff lines is present in Korea, Mexico and Poland. In the EU, 128 of 
394 tariff lines are at or larger than 15%. The US and the EU tariff rates 
on canned tuna are also high, respectively 35% and 24%. In Korea a 
number of products carry a general 20% tariff. However, adjustment 
tariffs in Korea were used on a small number of products, lifts tariff 
peaks to 80 % (e.g. frozen croaker). In Norway, tariff rates on fish for 
consumption are zero. However, the MFN tariff rate on fishmeal used in 
animal feed is 283%.  
 The limited number of extreme tariff peaks suggests that protection 
provided by tariffs is at a relatively low level in most OECD countries. 
However, they also show that there is room for further trade 
liberalisation, as some specific products are still subject to high tariffs. 
Moreover, it is possible that some of these tariffs are sufficient to deter 
imports. This will depend however on the value of the product, the level 
of domestic production and the availability of substitutes.  
 
11. Tariff escalation 
Tariff escalation exists when, during subsequent processing stages, the 
applied tariffs increases thus resulting in a higher effective protection (a 
tariff rate exceeding a calculated rate that compensates for yield losses 
and value added from a change in processing stage) for the processed 
products and hence the processing industry. This produces a bias 
  
3-18 
towards the importation of raw material. Trade weighted tariff averages 
on processed and unprocessed imports are shown in Table 3.717. 
 
Table 3.7 Trade weighted tariff averages for eleven OECD countries  
total imports, separated by processing stages. 
 HS-
codes 
Aus Can EU Ice Jap Kor Mex NZ Nor Pol USA All 
All   /%  0.4 0.5 4.2 0.1 4.0 12.7 11.2 0.7 0.0 9.3 0.2 3.1 
- Unprocessed 0301-
0303/0
306-
0307 
0.0 0.1 2.9 0.0 3.5 12.4 10.2 0.0 0.0 8.2 0.0 2.5 
- Fillets 0304 0.0 0.0 2.3 0.0 3.9 10.0 16.7 0.0 0.0 7.9 0.0 2.1 
- Smoked, 
salted etc.  
0305 0.0 0.0 2.0 0.0 1.4 20.0 14.4 0.0 0.0 12.7 0.6 1.5 
- Processed 1604-
1605 
1.2 1.8 10.4 5.2 7.0 20.0 9.0 1.0 0.0 21.8 0.9 6.3 
Source: OECD (2003), Liberalising Fisheries Markets – Scope and Effects, Paris. 
 
Trade weighted tariff average on imports of processed products to the 
eleven OECD countries for which data are available is 6.3%, where it is 
only 2.5% for unprocessed and less for semi-processed products (fillets, 
smoked and salted products). Hence, tariff escalation is present. 
Moreover, it appears that this situation is present in all the countries, 
except Mexico. The situation is most noticeable in Poland, Korea, the 
EU and Japan. In Japan and Korea, tariff escalation does not depend 
pronouncedly on fish species, whereas in Poland and the EU it does. In 
Poland, tariff escalation is pronounced on herring and mackerel as well 
as on salmon. In the EU, tariff escalation is largest for tuna, shrimp, 
salmon, herring and mackerel. An extreme example is for example 
fishmeal and oil in Norway (not covered in Table 3.7), which applies a 
tariff rate of 170% on fish oil and 283% on fishmeal for feed purposes 
compared to a zero rate on raw material. 
                                                                      
17 Tariff escalation is identified by comparing the nominal tariff rates on processed 
and unprocessed products. However, the nominal tariff rates are calculated on the 
basis of the value of the final product, not on the basis of value-added. To identify 
this the effective rate of protection should be calculated. The effective rate of 
protection (=ERP) is formally defined as 
FTV
FTVPVERP −= , where PV  is value added at 
the present level of protection provided by tariffs and FTV  is value added at free 
trade. 
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In Table 3.8, trade weighted tariff averages on exports from all the 
eleven OECD countries to all the other eleven OECD countries (i.e. 
“intra –OECD trade”) are shown.  
 
Table 3.8 Trade weighted tariff averages for intra-OECD fish trade, by 
processing stage. 
 Aus Can EU Ice Jap Kor Mex NZ Nor Pol USA All 
All   /% 4.4 3.4 7.1 4.1 2.2 6.9 0.4 2.7 2.9 1.3 4.1 3.7 
-  Unprocessed 4.2 3.9 7.2 3.4 1.9 5.6 0.4 3.7 3.1 2.0 3.9 3.8 
-   Fillets 2.4 0.1 5.4 1.5 0.8 5.6 0.1 1.2 2.0 0.0 4.7 2.2 
-   Smoked, 
salted etc.  
8.3 8.2 6.0 0.4 1.3 8.6 0.2 7.6 1.0 8.1 4.0 2.5 
-   Processed 9.6 2.6 8.4 16.3 4.5 10.8 0.3 4.2 9.5 0.4 3.6 7.2 
             
Export value to 
OECD   /USD 
Million 
380 2 197 622 1 211 233 1 040 608 497 2 950 183 2 152 12 06
7 
Share of total 
export exported 
to OECD   /% 
51 97 34 99 33 85 99 77 84 88 95 79 
Source: OECD (2003), Liberalising Fisheries Markets – Scope and Effects, Paris. 
 
The trade weighted tariff average on “intra-OECD trade” is 3.7% for a 
total value of trade of USD 12 billion, corresponding to a total tariff 
revenue paid on USD 450 million.  
 Meanwhile the tariffs applied differ considerably among countries. 
As was the case for total OECD imports, tariff escalation does also exist 
in intra OECD trade, as the trade weighted tariff average of processed 
products is 7.2%, only 3.8% for unprocessed and less for semi-
processed products. The figures show that the processing sectors in 
Iceland, Norway, Australia and Korea are likely to be hit hardest by the 
present tariff structure as they face tariff escalation in their principal 
export markets i.e. the EU, the USA and Japan. In particular products of 
salmon (smoked), tuna (canned) and shrimps (preserved) in all the three 
major import markets show evidence of this problem.  
 In Table 3.9, trade weighted tariff averages are given for exports 
from developing countries (DEV) and least developed countries (LDC) 
to the eleven OECD countries. 
 
 
  
3-20 
Table 3.9 Trade weighted tariff averages for developing countries exports to 
OECD countries, by processing stage 
 LDC DEV All other 
All   /% 2.5 2.9 3.2 
-  Unprocessed 2.5 2.5 2.5 
-   Fillets 2.8 2.5 2.0 
-   Semi-processed 0.5 1.9 1.4 
-   Processed 1.7 4.3 8.0 
    
Total value in USD Million 437 10 689 21 992 
 Source: OECD (2003), Liberalising Fisheries Markets – Scope and Effects, Paris. 
 
From the Table it appears that the trade weighted tariff average on 
exports from developing countries to the eleven OECD countries is 
2.5% and 2.9%, respectively from least developed and other developing 
countries. Compared with the trade weighted tariff average on exports 
from all other countries to the OECD of 3.2%, the difference is due to 
the preferential access of developing countries to markets in most 
OECD countries. Moreover, it also appears that the trade weighted tariff 
averages on processed products are lower for developing countries, 
where this is not the case for other products. Therefore, preferential 
access to the OECD markets is mainly granted for processed products. 
Of the total OECD imports, one-third originates from developing 
countries and 25% of this is processed products18.  
 
 
12. Implications of reducing tariff barriers 
In capture fisheries, trade can only be expanded through the 
implementation of proper fisheries management systems that balance 
resources with fishing capacities. However, market measures may be  
                                                                      
18 Which can be compared with 15% on products originating in non-developing 
countries. 
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helpful to correcting price and information signals. Several studies have 
been published on this issue19.  
 
 
                                                                      
19 Recent studies in this area include: Hartmann, J., N. Klijn and A. Cox (2000), 
Seafood Trade in the APEC Region, Research Report no. 3 from the Australian 
Bureau of Agricultural and Resource Economics; Guillotreau, P. and N. Péridy 
(2000), Trade barriers and European imports of seafood products: a quantitative 
assessment, Marine Policy, 24, 431-37; Heiberg, I.  (1996), Implications of 
possible trade political penalties against Norwegian fish export (in Norwegian), 
Report from the NFR-project Marine resources and Trade Policy Norwegian 
School of Fisheries Science, University of Tromso; Stendal, D. (2000), Does 
liberalisation of fish trade cause increased pressure on fish stocks? Assessed in the 
light of the present fisheries management regime and the importance of 
aquaculture for fish supply (in Norwegian), note from SINTEF Fishery and 
Aquaculture. 
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The traditional process of liberalising trade and reducing tariff barriers 
is through multilateral WTO trade negotiations; firstly by agreeing on 
binding the tariff rates at certain levels and then by agreeing on reducing 
the bound tariff rates. As have been shown above, however, several fish 
products are traded at tariff rates lower than the bound rates. Hence, 
reducing the MFN tariff rates20 by a certain percentage will not imply 
that the tariff revenue collected will fall by the same percentage. Table 
3.10 provides actual tariff revenue today and potential revenue 
following reductions in MFN rates. The effects of reducing the MFN 
rates on potential tariff revenue are also shown. This is an 
approximation only, as the calculated figures centres around revenue 
rather than on rates21.  
 Table 3.10 shows that USD 2 264 billion would have been collected 
in tariff revenue totally from the eleven OECD countries if preferential 
arrangements, temporary tariff reductions, tariff quotas and tariff 
suspensions did not exist i.e. if the maximum tariff protection as given 
by the MFN rates were applied. This compares with the USD 1 billion 
collected today. It implies that MFN tariff rates should be reduced 
considerably if the intention is to reduce actual protection. On average 
across the countries for which data are available, the MFN rates should 
be reduced by 78% to reduce tariff revenue by 50%. However, the 
effects differ and are only important among countries with significant 
tariff revenues, mainly Japan and the EU. In Japan the effects of 
reducing MFN tariff rates would be apparent even at small reductions, 
as the difference between actual and potential tariff revenue is small. 
This is not the case in the EU. Reducing the EU MFN tariff rates would 
have a limited effect on actual protection. For example, given the 
assumptions, reducing the MFN tariff rates by three-fourths of the 
present level would only reduce tariff revenue by 2%.  
These observations are based on the assumptions that reducing tariff 
rates does not affect the level of trade and that potential tariff revenue is 
reduced before actual tariff revenue.  
 
                                                                      
20 MFN rates are identical to bound rate in all countries except Japan. In Japan 
unbound MFN rates remain. 
21 Preferably, effects of reducing MFN tariff rates on potential tariff revenues 
should be identified. Hence, the figures given above overestimate the effects. 
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CHAPTER 4 
 
Price formation and market integration on the European first-hand 
market for whitefish 
 
Max Nielsen  
 
Forthcoming in Marine Resource Economics. 
 
Abstract. Total Allowable catches (TACs) for whitefish in European 
Union (EU) waters have been reduced each year for the past five years, 
thereby reducing fleet revenue. During the same period prices increased, 
partly offsetting the reductions in income. However, price changes 
depend on the structure of the market within which they are formed and, 
therefore, this paper examines the structure of the European first-hand 
market for whitefish. A Vector Auto Regressive (VAR) model in Error 
Correction form (ECM) is used to analyse landing prices among the 
main fishing nations, using co-integration tests and tests for the Law of 
One Price (LOP) to determine the degree of market integration. A 
partially integrated European first-hand market for whitefish is 
identified and as a part of this a perfectly spatially integrated cod 
market. The existence of this relatively loose market integration is 
explained by the presence of rigidities on the supply side. The 
implications are discussed in relation to reductions in the EU whitefish 
TACs and quotas and to the market policies applied.   
 
Keywords. Price formation, market integration, co-integration, Law of 
One Price, first-hand market for whitefish. 
 
Introduction 
The purpose of this paper is to contribute to the understanding of the 
price formation process through a market integration analysis of the 
European first-hand whitefish market. When supply changes, as it did 
recently, and you wish to know the effects of this change, you need to 
know what to compare with i.e. you need to have an adequate 
perception of what the total volume of the relevant market is. Is it a 
local specialized market or is it a global market for homogenous 
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standard products? The market integration analysis is a suitable tool for 
revealing the adequate delimitation of the relevant markets. The 
understanding of the role of market integration in the price formation 
process then allows for an assessment of the effects of changing 
fisheries management (e.g. stock conservation policies) on prices and 
thereby on the income of fishermen. This is an issue of high 
applicability, since the EU Commission has proposed a moratorium on 
cod fishing in the North Sea for 2003. Moreover, increased knowledge 
of market integration allows for assessments of the effectiveness of 
regional market policies. The subject is analysed within the multivariate 
co-integration framework by identifying market integration, sizes and 
boundaries of markets, and then uses the obtained information to 
illustrate implications for the price formation process.  
 The issue is important on a resource constrained capture fish market, 
such as the European first-hand whitefish market. Several authors have 
found that prices were inflexible in relation to changes in landed 
quantities1. Whether price changes are great or small will have an effect 
on the quantities demanded by consumers and on the income of 
fishermen.  However, since these studies usually cover only single 
countries, they may have underestimated price flexibilities in the 
presence of market integration between countries. If markets are 
integrated and an internationally coordinated quota reduction is 
undertaken, prices might well be more flexible than the literature 
indicates, implying that quota reductions are followed by larger price 
increases than might be expected on the basis of studies of single 
markets. Where markets are not integrated, prices would remain 
inflexible and increases would be relatively small. In the quota setting 
process in the Northeast Atlantic Ocean, the International Council for 
Exploration of the Sea (ICES) is also of importance, since it through the 
Advisory Council of Fisheries Management provide advises to all 
                                                                      
1 Prices are inflexible when the own-price flexibility (defined as the percentage 
change in the price of a good as demand increases by one percent) in an inverse 
demand system is negative and less than one in magnitude, implying that, for 
example, a 10% reduction in quantities will lead to an increase in the price that is 
less than 10%. The authors include Ioannidis and Whitmarsh (1987), Barten and 
Bettendorf (1989), Burton (1992) and Millán (1998), who all find that European 
first-hand whitefish prices are inflexible. 
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countries fishing in the area. The issue is of particular current interest in 
relation to the gradually worsening condition of several of the main 
European whitefish stocks, together with reduced quotas and declining 
domestic supply, as shown for the period 1997-2002 in Table 4.1. 
 
Table 4.1 European Union TACs for selected whitefish, 1,000 tonnes 
Species Sea 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Cod North Sea1 103 125 120 74 41 41
Cod Baltic Sea 70 87 77 64 66 46
Haddock North East Atlantic 84 85 70 61 48 82
Hake North Sea1 60 59 55 42 23 27
Saithe North Sea1/Baltic Sea 55 47 53 42 43 66
Total  372 402 375 283 221 262
Note 1: North Sea includes Kattegat and Skagerrak. 
Source: European Commission. 
 
The numbers clearly demonstrate that during the period 1998-2002 
dramatic changes have occurred in the TACs of the selected fisheries. In 
2002 quotas were 65% of the levels prevailing in 1998. Moreover, for 
cod in the North Sea, the quota in 2002 is only one-third of the quota in 
1998, and on the basis of the continued worsening of the stock, 
scientists from the International Council for the Exploration of the Sea 
(ICES) proposed a moratorium on cod fishing in the North Sea for 2003. 
It is to be presumed that these measures will cause prices to rise, 
although to what extent will depend heavily on the size of the market 
within which they are being formed. Hence, one hypothesis of this paper 
is that, in the literature, price flexibilities estimated for the European 
first-hand markets for whitefish underestimate price increases that 
follow internationally coordinated quota reductions, since the markets 
are integrated. 
 Market integration is also interesting in relation to regional market 
policies, since their regional effectiveness depends on the degree of 
market integration. If market integration is absent these policies are 
potentially effective, since price levels may respond. On the other hand, 
such policies are ineffective if market integration is tight, since price 
levels can then only be affected marginally. Thus, the second hypothesis 
is that European market policies are ineffective since first-hand markets 
for whitefish are internationally integrated.  
 Finally, market integration is of importance from a theoretical point 
of view, since the correct specification and calibration of economic 
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management models require a good understanding of the size and 
linkages in the relevant markets. Price formation has traditionally been 
studied empirically in the Neo-classical tradition by estimating demand 
and supply systems, based on implicit assumptions on market sizes and 
boundaries, as revealed by the choice of goods included in analyses. 
Goods included are to some extent part of the market, where goods 
excluded are implicitly assumed not to be part of the market. The new 
econometric methods made available over the last decade, such as the 
co-integration analysis of non-stationary time series and the emergence 
of tests for the LOP, however, provide suitable tools for assessing these 
implicit assumptions. This allows us to obtain consistent pictures of 
market integration, and thereby market structures, before analysing price 
formation processes. 
In the economic literature, several articles identify market sizes by 
testing the Law of One Price on European Union import markets for 
whitefish. The main conclusions obtained from the literature, which 
include Gordon and Hannesson (1996), Asche, Salvanes and Steen 
(1997), Guillotreau (1998), Asche, Gordon and Hannesson (2002), and 
which use foreign trade data, are: 
 
• The markets for whitefish are integrated between EU countries in all 
cases examined. 
• The cod market is strongly integrated with the markets for all other 
whitefish.  
• The markets of other whitefish species are also integrated, but the 
integration is looser than for cod. Hence, the studies indicate that cod is 
a price leader.   
• The markets for fresh cod in the UK, France and Germany are not 
integrated with the market in the US. The market for frozen cod fillets, 
however, in the three EU countries are weakly integrated with the US 
market.  
 
Based on these surveys, market integration is found both between 
countries and between species in EU import markets, which, given perfect 
market conditions, would predict that the first-hand markets would also be 
integrated. However, this will not necessarily be the case. Previous 
research deals with the markets for partly processed products, or products 
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close to final consumption, whereas this paper deals with the market for 
raw materials. Markets for whitefish might consist of many sub-markets 
and signals might therefore not be transferred perfectly between these 
markets. Moreover, Asche and Hannesson (2002) and Asche et al (2002) 
study price transmission and relationships between prices at different 
market levels. Proportional relationships between ex-vessel prices and 
domestic fresh and dried salted cod prices are found in Norway. However, 
a proportional relationship between ex-vessel prices and the export price 
of frozen fillets could not be found. Other articles identify market sizes in 
EU landing markets for whitefish. Clay and Fofana (1999), for example, 
find that the quayside price formation process of different whitefish 
species in the UK are integrated and the LOP is in force.  
 The author is not aware of any articles identifying the sizes and 
boundaries of landings markets for whitefish between countries and, 
therefore, this paper will explore this further. Given the results of 
previous research, knowing that the majority of total European whitefish 
catches are consumed within Europe and knowing that considerable 
trade takes place within Europe, some level of market integration is 
expected on the first-hand European market for whitefish, with the 
closest integration expected between the cod markets. Whitefish 
includes cod as well as haddock, hake and saithe.  
 
Methods 
A market, according to Stigler (1969), is defined as “the area within 
which the price is determined, allowances being made for transport 
costs”. Based on this definition, this paper uses econometric tests to 
determine market sizes and boundaries, thereby enabling the 
identification of integrated markets. The implication is, according to 
Asche, Bremnes and Wessells (1999, 2001) that the Generalised 
Composite Commodity Theorem of Lewbel (1996) holds, and that 
commodities as a consequence can be aggregated2. Co-integration tests 
and tests of the LOP are undertaken in order to determine market 
boundaries and sizes. When the co-integration test identify a single 
integrating factor which is common to all the price series and the test of 
                                                                      
2 For a deeper discussion see Asche, Bremnes and Wessells (1999, 2001) and 
Miljkovic and Paul (2001).  
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the LOP shows that the LOP is in force, the goods analysed are 
homogeneous3, relative prices are constant and markets are perfectly 
integrated. When the co-integration test identify a single common 
integrating factor and the LOP is rejected, the markets are partially 
integrated, since markets, according to Stigler and Sherwin (1985), they 
can “show every level of interdependence from absolute homogeneity to 
complete independence – the continuity of the conventional criteria of 
cross-elasticities of demand and supply are enough to suggest that”. 
Thus, goods may be neither perfect substitutes nor absolute 
independent. If markets are partially integrated the goods will be partial 
substitutes. Where the co-integration test cannot identify one common 
integrating factor, some of the goods might be heterogeneous and their 
markets independent. As a consequence, subsystems for which a single 
common integrating factor exists should be sought by excluding price 
series from the tests one-by-one until a subsystem with a single common 
integrating factor is identified. The price series thus excluded are then 
not part of the integrated market. Hence, the test of the LOP is used to 
identify market inter-dependence, while the co-integration test is used to 
identify market boundaries.  
 The LOP is tested between prices of the same species landed in 
different countries and between different species landed in different 
countries in a multivariate co-integration framework. The LOP in the 
basic simple bivariate form is, according to Stigler (1969), tested by 
estimating Equation 1: 
 
( ) ( ) ttt pABp ε++= ,1,1 lnln  (1) 
 
where the price of good one ( tp ,1 ) and the price of good two ( tp ,2 ) are of 
two different products, for example cod landed in Norway and cod 
landed in the UK and where A=1 implies that the law of one price is in 
force. This simple bivariate form of the LOP can easily be extended to a 
multivariate form by adding extra products, e.g. ( )tpC ,3ln , and then 
testing jointly whether 1=+CA . However, the regression is only valid 
                                                                      
3 In the sense that prices of two goods follow each other over time. 
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for stationary data series4. For non-stationary data series, co-integration 
analysis must be used, since regressing data series integrated of different 
orders may cause spurious correlations between them. Therefore, one 
has to confirm that data series are integrated (in the econometric sense) 
of the same order, determining whether the individual data series are 
stationary, I(1) or I(2).  
 Based on an I(1) nature of the price series, the Johansen co-
integration rank procedure is used and a Vector Auto Regressive (VAR) 
model in Error Correction form is formulated following Asche, Bremnes 
and Wessells (1999), as given in Equation 2: 
 
tttktktt DtXXXX εδµ +Ψ+++Π+∆Γ++∆Γ=∆ −+−−− 11111 ...  (2) 
  
where tX∆ is the differenced price series, ktX −∆ is the price series 
differenced between the present period and period k, 1−tX  is a price 
series in a basic period, t is a trend and tD  is a vector of other 
deterministic components, such as seasonal dummies and dummies for 
outliers. 11... −ΓΓ k , Π , µ , δ  and Ψ are all parameters. The matrix Π  is the 
long-run solution to the VAR model and contains the possible co-
integrating relations. The rank of Π  determines the number of stationary 
linear combinations of the variables in tX . If the rank equals the number 
of variables, all the price series are stationary and if the rank is 0, none 
of the price series are stationary. If the rank is less than the number of 
variables minus one but larger than zero, it is not possible to identify the 
exact nature of stationarity and the LOP cannot be tested. However, if 
the rank is exactly the number of variables minus one, a single 
integrating factor which is common to all the price series exists and Π  
can be decomposed into 'αβ , where α  contains the adjustment 
coefficients and β  the co-integrating vectors. In that case the LOP can 
                                                                      
4 A data series is stationary if it moves randomly around a constant mean over time 
(that is, mean and variance are independent of time) and is non-stationary if it 
follows a trend. A stationary data series is said to be integrated of degree zero (i.e. 
I(0)). A non-stationary data series is said to be integrated of degree one (i.e. I(1)) if 
its first differences (the difference between two periods) move randomly around a 
constant mean over time and integrated of a higher order (i.e. I(z)) where z≥2, if it 
follows a trend. 
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be tested. The Johansen test is used in this framework to test for the 
number of co-integrating vectors, using the Trace Test. In this test, the 
null hypothesis is that there are up to a given number of co-integrating 
vectors, whereas the alternative hypothesis is that there is exactly one 
more co-integrating vector. However, since the asymptotic distribution 
of the test for the co-integration rank changes, depending on the 
assumptions regarding the constant term (µ ) and the parameters for the 
trend term (δ ), the co-integration rank test must be undertaken based on 
assumptions about these terms. Tests are undertaken in this paper on the 
basis of three alternative assumptions; that the constant term is 
unrestricted, that the constant term is restricted to the co-integration 
space and that the trend term is restricted to the co-integration space. 
Critical values for the tests based on the three alternative assumptions 
are known from Johansen (1996).  
 Based on the chosen rank (larger than zero), the LOP is tested using 
Likelihood Ratio tests of restrictions imposed on β . In a bi-variate set-
up, tX  contains two price series (as in Equation 1). If these price series 
are co-integrated, the rank is one and a test of ]'1,1[' −=β  is the test of the 
LOP. In a multivariate set-up, and assuming that the rank is the number 
of variables minus one, a test of the LOP is a test of whether the 
columns in the β  matrix sum to zero5. This implies that the price series 
are pair wise co-integrated and thereby follow a common trend. The 
tests of the LOP are undertaken without any identification problems in 
all cases in this paper, due to the fact that the rank condition of Johansen 
and Juselius (1994) will always be fulfilled.  
 Only multivariate and not bivariate tests are performed here, partly as 
the issues by nature are multivariate and partly as it has recently been 
demonstrated, according to Gonzáles-Rivera and Helfand (2001), that 
bivariate models are “inadequate for capturing the spatial dynamics of 
                                                                      
5 In that case, and given a rank of the number of variables minus one, the β  matrix 
in a multivariate test with four data series becomes: 










−
−
−
=
1001
0101
0011
'β    
Testing whether the LOP holds is now a test of whether imposing the restriction 
on 'β  makes tX'β  stationary. 
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price adjustments”. The software package used for estimation is CATS 
in RATS, following Hansen and Juselius (1994). 
 
Data 
Data covering the EU were sought using the New Cronos Database, 
supplied web-based by EUROSTAT. However, data from Sweden were 
only available after 1995, so data from the Swedish Board of Fisheries 
were used instead. The Norwegian Directorate of Fisheries and the 
Icelandic Ministry of Fisheries provided landings from Norway and 
Iceland. However, whereas the EUROSTAT database includes all 
landings in each country, the other sources only include landings made 
in the home country by domestic fishermen. For Sweden and Iceland 
this is not a problem, since less than 5% of total landings are by foreign 
fishermen. For Norway, however, 20-25% of total cod landings are 
made by foreign fishermen (mainly Russian) and data on these landings 
are only available on an annual basis. Data summary statistics are given 
in Table 4.2. 
 
Table 4.2 Summary statistics 
Data series Quantity /average tonnes live weight per month1 
Start End No. Missing Cod Haddock Hake Saithe
Belgium 92.01 00.12 108 0 260 30 4 6
Denmark 92.01 00.10 106 2 7.731 506 133 1.614
Germany 92.01 99.07 91 17 1.448 129 1 1.132
Greece 92.01 96.12 75 33 0 0 398 0
Spain 92.01 00.12 108 0 672 33 8.077 41
France 98.01 01.01 37 71 1.100 344 566 1.554
Ireland 92.01 97.12 72 36 372 281 175 165
Italy 92.01 00.08 104 4 0 0 2.062 0
Netherlands 92.01 00.07 103 5 1.377 41 12 8
Portugal 92.01 00.06 102 6 423 0 0 0
Sweden 94.01 00.12 84 24 2.913 86 3 129
UK 94.01 00.08 104 4 5.740 6.652 364 1.167
Norway 92.01 00.12 108 0 25.845 5.730 66 16.030
Iceland 92.01 00.12 108 0 14.544 2.650 0 3.148
Total 62.425 16.482 11.861 24.994
Note:  1. Bold indicates that these landings are selected for further analysis. 
Sources: EUROSTAT New Cronos Database (EU, Sweden excluded), the Swedish 
Board of Fisheries, the Norwegian Directorate of Fisheries and the Icelandic 
Ministry of Fisheries.  
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In Table 4.2 the data series and the landed quantities are presented. The 
time series are chosen for the period January 1992 to December 2000, 
but for most countries there are some missing observations at the 
beginning or end of the period. These observations are excluded from 
further analysis. Landings are made in several different forms (whole 
fish, gutted, headed and gutted, filleted etc.) and, as a consequence, the 
landed quantities are calculated in live weight using biological 
conversion factors used by the national authorities for quota control. 
The choice of supply sources selected for further analysis is partly based 
on their importance and partly on the length of the available time series. 
For cod Norway, Iceland, Denmark, the UK and Sweden are selected for 
further analysis, for haddock Norway, the UK and Iceland, for hake 
Spain, and Italy, and for saithe Norway, Iceland, Denmark and the UK.  
 Landings of whitefish are sold either at fish auctions or directly to 
fish processors, with direct landings being either on contracts, or to 
processors that own (or is vertically integrated with) the fishing vessels. 
The degree of market integration within each market level is determined 
by several factors. One is that first-hand sale within vertically integrated 
firms does not necessarily reveal the real market value, implying that 
spatial market integration might not exist between first-hand markets. 
Another factor is that markets for frozen imported whitefish are found to 
be more closely integrated internationally than markets for fresh 
whitefish, than found by other authors, implying that first-hand markets 
are closer integrated when the markets are dominated by direct landings 
and signals from second and third-hand sale are perfectly transmitted to 
first-hand sale. On this basis it is not a priori given whether markets 
dominated by auction sale are tighter integrated than markets dominated 
by direct landings. Nonetheless, the expected existence of several sub-
markets for cod in Europe might imply that signals from second and 
third-hand sales are not perfectly transmitted to first-hand sale. Further, 
since first-hand sale within vertically integrated firms does not always 
reveal the real market value this also implies that first-hand markets 
dominated by auction sale might be closer integrated.  
 The patterns of sale vary according to country, with Denmark and 
Iceland representing two extremes. In Denmark the overwhelming 
majority of landings are sold at fish auctions but in Iceland 
approximately two-thirds of whitefish are sold directly to processors 
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who often own the fishing vessels6. The situation in countries, such as 
Sweden, Norway and the UK is close to that in Denmark, whereas in 
Spain it is closer to the situation in Iceland. On this basis it would have 
been interesting to examine detailed data for auctions and direct sales in 
Iceland and Spain, but it was only possible to obtain data for Iceland. By 
value, the market share of auction sales of cod and saithe was around 
one-third of total Icelandic landings over the entire period, while the 
share for haddock increased from 50% in 1992 to 80% in 2000. This 
was because total Icelandic haddock catches fell, but sales on auction 
markets in absolute terms remained largely unchanged.  
Price series in nominal terms of the whitefish species from the 
selected supply sources are shown graphically over the entire time 
period in euros per kilo live weight in Figure 4.1.  
 
Figure 4.1 
Monthly landing prices of whitefish in Europe, Euros per kilo live weight 
Cod
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6 Processors in Iceland might not only own the fishing vessels, but also the fishing 
right (Individual Transferable Quotas). 
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Saithe
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From Figure 4.1 it appears that hake (merluccius merluccius) is the most 
expensive species, followed by cod (gadus morhua) and haddock 
(melanogrammus aeglefinus). Saithe (pollachius virens) is a cheaper 
species. Moreover it appears that prices vary by country for the same 
species. There can be many reasons for this. If prices are not formed on 
the same market there are no obvious grounds for prices to be the same. 
However, if prices in different countries are formed on the same market, 
implying that prices follow the same development over time, differences 
in price levels can still be present. Several factors can explain this. First 
the conversion process is important. There are two conversions that may 
each introduce differences: a) the conversion from the price of landed 
fish to the price of live weight and b) the conversion from national 
currencies to Euros. These are not price differences themselves, but 
errors arising from arithmetic mechanism used to produce a common 
unit account for comparing prices. Secondly, and more fundamentally, 
variations in quality and size can explain the difference. This might be 
the case for the different price levels between species, as for example 
hake is considerably more expensive than the other species. Moreover, 
the large price difference between cod in the UK and in Sweden can be 
explained by quality differences, since Swedish cod mainly originates 
from the Baltic Sea, whereas the UK cod originates from the North Sea 
and the waters surrounding the British Isles. The reason is that the North 
Sea cod is tastier with firmer flesh and the Baltic Sea cod has a larger 
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head, unfit for human consumption. The North Sea cod is the thus more 
expensive. Differences in processing costs between larger and smaller 
fish may also play an important role. Processing smaller fish is more 
costly as it is more labour intensive. Finally, differences in 
transportation costs can explain differences. This is confirmed by the 
observation that prices of all species originating in Norway and Iceland 
are generally lower than the corresponding prices in the EU, since 
transportation costs of supplies from Iceland or Norway, mainly 
exported to the EU market, are larger than for domestic EU supplies. 
From Figure 4.1 it further appears that prices of cod, haddock and saithe 
landed in the different countries seem to follow each other in looser or 
closer relations over the entire time period, whereas this seems not to be 
the case for hake. Hence, markets for cod, haddock and saithe might be 
integrated across borders, whereas this may not necessarily be the case 
for hake. Moreover, it appears that the UK prices decreased 
considerable in the period 98:09-98:11 for cod and 98:09-98:12 for 
haddock and saithe, as the UK fishermen ran out of quota7. Finally, it 
appears as expected that prices of whitefish landed for auction in 
Iceland are greater than prices for total landings of whitefish.  
 
Results 
The presence of unit roots was tested for with Augmented Dickey-Fuller 
tests in order to ensure that all the data series were integrated of the 
same order. Two versions of the Augmented Dickey-Fuller test were 
used. Both include a constant in the regression. One excludes a 
deterministic trend and one includes it. Moreover, tests were undertaken 
in both levels and differences in the logarithms of the price series in 
nominal terms8. The optimal number of lags in the regressions was 
                                                                      
7 This implies that dummies for outliers must be introduced in the estimations. For 
the cod price series, a dummy equal to one in 98:09, 98:10 and 98:11 and equal to 
zero in all other periods is introduced and for the haddock and saithe price series, a 
dummy equal to one in 98:09, 98:10, 98:11 and 98:12 and equal to zero in all other 
periods is introduced. 
 
8 Analyses can be carried out both in nominal and real prices. According to 
traditional Neo-classical theory “money is an illusion” implying that analysis of 
economic values should be undertaken in real terms, since the values of goods are 
then measured in terms of the values in relation to other physical goods. On the 
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chosen according to the Schwarz Criteria and test results are presented 
in Table 4.3. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                             
other hand, testing for market integration and finding closer relationship between 
prices in nominal terms than between prices in real terms is not easily explained 
on the basis of traditional theory. Moreover, it is not always possible to identify a 
suitable deflator in practice, in particular not when analysing market integration 
between countries, which trade with one another. Furthermore, if applied it is 
preferable to use the same deflator for all price series, since it removes all the other 
economic effects on exchange rates relating to international trade, monetary 
policy, interest rates, etc. Therefore, an analysis might be undertaken in both 
nominal and real prices. In the literature, both types of analyses exist, with 
Gonzáles-Rivera and Helfand (2001) being an example of an analysis of prices in 
real terms when analysing the spatial delineation of the Brazilian rice market. 
Asche, Bremnes and Wessells (1999) is an example of an analysis of prices in 
nominal terms when analysing the world salmon market.  
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Table 4.3 Unit root (ADF) tests1 
H0 of non-stationarity in price levels H0 of non-stationarity in differenced 
prices 
 
ADF without trend ADF with trend ADF without trend ADF with trend 
Cod:     
Denmark 0.36 (8) -1.80 (8) -2.34 (12) -7.61 (7)** 
Sweden -0.20 (12) -2.08 (12 -2.87 (11)* -2.91 (11) 
UK -2.22 (0) -3.76 (0) -9.96 (0)** -9.93 (0)** 
Norway -0.28 (0) -2.40 (1) -12.16 (0)** -12.58 (0)** 
Iceland (total) 0.86 (6) -3.46 (1)* -8.01 (5)** -8.34 (5)** 
Iceland (auction) 0.82 (7) -1.53 (7) -8.56 (6)** -8.92 (6)** 
     
Haddock:     
UK -2.66 (4) -2.80 (4) -4.96 (7)** -5.02 (7)** 
Norway -0.44 (12) -1.95 (12) -1.95 (11) -2.27 (11) 
Iceland (total) -1.01 (0) -2.52 (0) -10.73 (0)** -7.20 (8)** 
Iceland (auction) 0.17 (12) -1.50 (12) -1.88 (12) -2.53 (12) 
     
Hake:     
Italy -0.50 (2) -3.68 (2)* -10.26(1)** -10.42 (1)** 
Spain -1.84 (5) -2.22 (5) 10.95 (4)** -10.99 (4)** 
     
Saithe:     
Denmark -1.27 (12) -2.92 (12) -3.61 (12)** -3.58 (12)** 
UK -2.71 (0)2 -3.49 (4)* -5.89 (4)** -5.86 (4)** 
Norway -1.39 (12) -5.49 (2)** -2.68 (12) -2.68 (12) 
Iceland (total) -1.90 (1) -3.73 (1)* -7.79 (0)** -7.75 (0)** 
Iceland (auction) -1.66 (5) -3.58 (2)* -6.52 (6)** -6.53 (6)** 
     
Note 1. Critical values are known from MacKinnon (1991) and are with constant 
but without trend –3.43/-2.86/-2.57 respectively at 99%, 95% and 90% 
levels and are with constant and trend –3.96/-3.41 /-3.13 respectively at 
99%, 95% and 90% levels. Number of lags is shown in parentheses. **/* 
= significance at 1 and 5 percent levels.  
2.  The test is undertaken without the outlier observations in 98:09, 98:10, 
98:11 and 98:12.   
 
From Table 4.3 it appears that the null hypotheses of unit roots in price 
levels without trends are all accepted at the 5% level. Moreover, the null 
hypotheses of unit roots in price levels with trends are accepted at the 
1% level for all the price series, except for saithe in Norway. It further 
appears that the null hypotheses of a unit root in the differenced price 
series are all rejected at the 5% level, except for the differenced price 
series for cod in Denmark, haddock in Norway and Iceland (only 
auction prices) and saithe in Norway. However, at the 10% level the null 
hypothesis of a unit root in the differenced price series of saithe in 
Norway is rejected, and the test with a null hypothesis of a unit root in 
  
4-17 
the differenced price with trend for cod in Denmark is also rejected. 
Contrary, the test with a null hypothesis of a unit root in the differenced 
price with trend for haddock in Norway and Iceland (auctions) was 
accepted, implying that potential I(2) remains. As a consequence, 
further analysis was not carried out for haddock in Norway and for 
auction prices in Iceland, but only for all the other price series, by 
maintaining the hypothesis that all these are I(1)9. 
 Based on the I(1) nature of selected price series, co-integration tests 
as well as tests for the LOP were undertaken between different countries 
for each of the four species. The countries were selected on the basis of 
Table 4.2 and tests were undertaken using a strategy starting with 12 
lags (one year) to search for a model without any misspecification 
problems and with a rank of the number of variables minus one. The 
misspecification tests included autocorrelation, normality and 
autoregressive conditional heteroscedasticity (ARCH) tests and 
conclusions on the presence and absence of misspecification problems 
are obtained at the 5% significance level10. The analysis was carried out 
by removing lags, by including and excluding 11 centred seasonal 
dummies as well as dummies for outliers, and by running regressions 
with the three alternative assumptions on the deterministic terms; that 
the constant term was unrestricted, that the constant term was restricted 
to the co-integration space, and that the trend term was restricted to the 
co-integration space. When a model with a rank of the number of 
variables minus one without misspecification was found, it was chosen 
and the LOP was tested. If such a model could not be found, price series 
were excluded on a one-by-one basis and the search was repeated until 
                                                                      
9 In order to eliminate potential I(2), data was deflated using the Consumer Price 
Index for the whole EU, since the majority of whitefish landed in all the countries 
is consumed within the EU. Results, however, remained unchanged. Thereafter, all 
haddock price series were deflated using the Consumer Price Index for the UK, 
since the UK is the leading market for haddock. Again, results remained 
unchanged and the two price series were excluded from further analysis. 
10 The tests used are the multivariate LM test for first and fourth order 
autocorrelation in the residuals, a multivariate test of normality of the Shenton-
Bowman type (Doornik and Hansen 1994) and univariate LM tests for 
autoregressive conditional heteroscedasticity with degrees of freedom = number of 
lags. The results of the misspecification tests are not reported, only mentioned in 
the text. 
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such a model was found or only one price series remained. Because of 
the special position in the Icelandic landings market, the tests were 
carried out for average prices on total Icelandic landings. However, if a 
rank of the number of variables minus one without misspecification 
problems could not be found or if the LOP was rejected, tests on auction 
prices alone were undertaken. After the co-integration tests and tests of 
the LOP between countries for each of the whitefish species, co-
integration tests and tests of the LOP were carried out between species, 
where the largest supplier country for each species was included. Test 
results are reported only where a rank of the number of variables minus 
one without misspecification could be found and only for the largest 
number of price series included. That is, results for tests with a reduced 
number of price series included are reported only if higher degrees of 
market integration were found. Test results are shown in Table 4.4. 
 
Table 4.4A Multivariate Johansen Tests and Tests for the LOP - Prices of 
Whitefish in Europe 
       
  Multivariate Johansen Tests 
Price series1 Model2 Eigenvalues 
  1 2 3 4 5 
       
Cod       
Den/Ice/Nor/Swe/UK RC/D/10 0.86 0.46 0.27 0.18 0.12 
Den/Ice/Nor/Swe/UK RT/10 0.74 0.68 0.48 0.37 0.12 
       
Saithe       
Den/Ice3/Nor/UK UC/SC/12 0.61 0.38 0.19 0.03 . 
Ice4/Nor/UK UC/SC/D/12 0.81 0.28 0.01 . . 
Ice4/Nor/UK RT/SC/12 0.77 0.31 0.15 . . 
       
Inter-species       
Cod Nor/Had UK/Hak Spa/Sai Nor UC/SC/12 0.56 0.39 0.31 0.03 . 
Cod Nor/Had UK/Hak Spa/Sai Nor RT/D/11 0.93 0.28 0.24 0.11 . 
       
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
4-19 
Table 4.4B Multivariate Johansen Tests and Tests for the LOP - Prices of 
Whitefish in Europe 
        
 Multivariate Johansen Tests   
 Trace test5 LOP Tests 
 p=0 p<=1 p<=2 p<=3 p<=4 LR p
  
Cod  
Den/Ice/Nor/Swe/UK 225.42** 87.08** 43.74** 22.12* 8.64 6.88 0.14
Den/Ice/Nor/Swe/UK 272.42** 163.60** 85.63** 40.69** 9.20 37.97 <0.01
  
Saithe  
Den/Ice3/Nor/UK 112.98** 48.79** 16.19* 1.84 . 21.08 <0.01
Ice4/Nor/UK 134.48** 23.10** 0.58 . . 41.07 <0.01
Ice4/Nor/UK 133.97** 35.43** 10.83 . . 80.31 <0.01
  
Inter-species  
Cod Nor/Had UK/Hak Spa/Sai 
Nor 
116.69** 61.03** 27.07** 1.93 . 13.61 <0.01
Cod Nor/Had UK/Hak Spa/Sai 
Nor 
233.77** 49.85** 27.13* 8.38 . 12.48 0.01
  
Notes: 
1. Den = Denmark, Ice = Iceland, Nor = Norway, Swe = Sweden, UK = the UK, 
Spa = Spain, Had = haddock, Hak = hake and Sai = saithe. All tests results 
reported in the Table are based on the period 1994.01-2000.08, corresponding to 
80 observations. 
2. C = model with an unrestricted constant, RC = model with a constant restricted 
to the co-integration space, RT = model with a trend restricted to the co-
integration space, SC = seasonal corrected by introducing 11 centred seasonal 
dummies and D = dummy introduced to correct for outlier observations. The 
numbers measure the lags at which the estimations are undertaken.  
3. Includes only landings sold at auctions.  
4. Includes total landings.  
5. **/* = significance at 1 and 5 percent levels, according to critical values known 
from Johansen (1996). 
 
The results reported in Table 4.4 are based on the test procedure 
described above and each line represents a separate test. Results are only 
reported for cod, saithe and between species, since it was only possible 
to obtain a rank of the number of variables minus one without 
misspecification for these groups of price series. Since tests were also 
carried out for haddock and saithe, test results are described below for 
cod, haddock, hake, saithe and between species.  
 The tests for co-integration and for the LOP between prices of cod 
landed in Norway, Iceland, Denmark, the UK and Sweden identify a 
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common integrating factor (the rank is 4 in the model with 5 price 
series). The test of the LOP is accepted for a model with a constant 
restricted to the co-integration space. Hence, the LOP is in force on the 
European cod market and cod landed in the different countries are 
nearly perfect substitutes for each other. For haddock, tests were only 
made between the price series of total landings of haddock in Iceland 
and the UK, since it, according to Table 4.3, could not be rejected that 
the price series of landings in Norway and the price series of landings 
sold at auctions in Iceland are I(2). In the co-integration test it was not 
possible to identify a common integrating factor (i.e. to obtain a rank of 
one without misspecification problems), implying that the two haddock 
markets might not be integrated. For hake, the co-integration test could 
not identify a common integrating factor between landings in Spain and 
Italy, and markets are not integrated. On the saithe market, co-
integration tests were first undertaken between the price series of total 
landings in Norway, Iceland, Denmark and the UK without being able 
to identify a common integrating factor. Therefore, direct landings for 
further processing in Iceland were excluded and the test was repeated 
including only landings sold at auctions from Iceland. In that case it was 
possible to identify a common integrating factor (of rank 3), but the test 
of the LOP was rejected. Alternatively, the test on the price series of 
total landings in all countries was repeated by removing price series on a 
one-by-one basis. In the case where the Danish price series was 
excluded a rank of 2 was found, both in a model with an unrestricted 
constant and with a restricted trend. However, in both cases the LOP 
was rejected. That is, co-integration was found between the price series, 
but the LOP was rejected, implying that the first-hand European saithe 
market are partially, but not perfectly, integrated. The European market 
for whitefish as a whole consists of all the species examined and market 
integration was tested between the largest supplier countries of each of 
the four species. The co-integration tests identified a common 
integrating factor between cod and saithe landed in Norway, haddock 
landed in the UK and hake landed in Spain, both in a model with an 
unrestricted constant and in a model with a restricted trend. The tests of 
the LOP were rejected in both models, implying that the first-hand 
markets for whitefish in Europe are partially integrated.  
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Discussion 
In this paper the size and boundaries of the first-hand European market 
for whitefish were identified between markets in different countries 
using multivariate market delineation methods. It was generally found 
that co-integration tests in most cases identified common integrating 
factors, but that the tests of the LOP were rejected. These results imply 
that partial integration exists on the European markets for whitefish, 
although exceptions were also present. The LOP was found in force 
between all the cod markets but no common integrating factor was 
identified between the hake markets. The results confirm the expectation 
from other authors studying import markets that the cod market would 
be the most strongly integrated and that the saithe market would be 
more loosely integrated. Moreover, the expectation of the existence of 
one integrated European market for whitefish was also confirmed, with 
the integration being loose. For haddock, results are ambiguous owing 
to the possible presence of I(2). 
The implications of these findings are two-fold, covering economic 
modelling and policy issues. These are discussed in this section. Before 
this, however, methods and results are qualified in order to assess the 
reliability of the applied methods and the validity of the results obtained.  
A potential problem with the analysis lies in the time series used. 
There are only a relatively small number of observations available. 
Moreover, the fact that the data are monthly can invalidate the results, 
since the long-run variation may simply not be reflected in the data. 
Another potential problem lies in that the European market might form 
part of a globally integrated whitefish market. Given that this is the case, 
the European market interacts with whitefish markets elsewhere and 
integration should be examined not only in the European market, but 
also in the world market. Therefore, the results should be interpreted 
with due caution, although the problems encountered do not give 
sufficient reason to reject the results in general.  
The implications for economic modelling are numerous and suggest 
that co-integration between price series and the LOP should be tested 
before traditional estimation and analysis of demand are carried out. The 
advantage of such a procedure is that knowledge of market sizes and 
boundaries is obtained and the determination of price elasticities can be 
based on a more reliable and consistent statistical basis, as opposed to 
  
4-22 
using the usual assumption of product heterogeneity (Armington 1969). 
This assumption can be replaced by one of homogeneity among the 
products where the LOP is in force since the products can be considered 
as one and the same, and their quantities and values aggregated.  
A possible interpretation of the implications for econometric 
estimation and equilibrium of using market delineation methods is 
shown in Table 4.5. 
  
Table 4.5 Implications of the presence and absence of market integration 
Test results Market integration Modelling Action
LOP accepted Perfect Aggregate variables
A common integrating factor identified and 
the LOP rejected 
Partial Model variables with 
substitution elasticities
 
A common integrating factor not identified 
 
None Exclude variables
 
The policy implications of the finding that the European markets for 
whitefish are partially integrated between countries, combined with the 
knowledge that prices within the single country according to the 
literature review in Nielsen (1999) are inflexible, indicate that decreased 
North Sea and Baltic Sea whitefish quotas, as implemented over the past 
3-4 years, will have caused prices to rise. Moreover, these price 
increases might be higher than those that might be predicted from the 
economic literature (where estimations are made for a single country). 
However, the finding also implies that the supply from the large 
fisheries in Norway and Iceland will serve as a stabilising factor for EU 
whitefish prices. Therefore, on balance, the EU policy of reducing 
quotas in the North Sea and the Baltic Sea may be expected to cause 
moderate increases in whitefish prices.  
This result can be clarified by a simple worked example (with 
randomly chosen numbers), following Nielsen (2000). Based on Neo-
classical theory and assuming exogenous supply, an inverse demand 
system can illustrate how quantities affect prices in the absence of 
integration and in the presence of perfect integration. 
Let us formulate a double logarithmic inverse demand system with 
spatially separated markets. 
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( ) ( ) ( ) ( )jjiimi qqmp lnlnlnln 0 αααα ++= +  (3) 
 
where pi = price of the good on market i, m = income, qi = quantity of 
the good on market i, qj = quantity of the good on market j, i = the local 
market, j = the large market and α  are the intercept and coefficient for 
scale and quantity effects. Thus, the price of the good on market i is a 
function of income and own and cross-quantities. 
The own price flexibility describes the effect changing quantities 
have on prices. Where the price of the good analysed is formed on its 
own separate market, the own-price flexibility of the local market (fp) is 
the first derivative in relation to quantity, as shown in Equation 4. When 
the price is formed within a perfectly integrated market, and given that 
quantities in the different parts of the market is independent (i.e. vary 
randomly in relation to each other over time), the own-price effect on 
the total market can be calculated using Equation 5, taking into account 
the share the analysed good provides of the whole integrated market. 
Given that quantities on different parts of the perfectly integrated market 
are inter-dependent (i.e. follow each other over time), the price 
flexibility for the local market also applies for the total market, since 
every change in the quantity on the local market also takes place in the 
 
total market11. Subsequently, the own-price flexibility follows from 
Equation 4. 
 
i
i
p q
Pf
ˆ
ˆ
=  (4) 
 
                                                                      
11 The reason for the method on perfectly integrated markets being different, 
dependent on whether quantities are independent or inter-dependent, is that price 
flexibilities known from the literature are estimated for markets in single countries 
and used here for international cross-country markets. That is, a ceteris paribus 
assumption is implicitly made on relationships with other countries in the studies 
where price flexibilities are estimated. This assumption does not affect the results 
when quantities are inter-dependent, since quantities follow each other over time. 
However, it does affect results when quantities are independent, since they then 
vary randomly in relation to each other. 
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i
i
pi w
qfP ˆˆ =  (5) 
 
where iPˆ  = the change in price of good i, caused by the change in the 
quantity of good i, iqˆ  = the change in the quantity of good i and wi = 
market share of good i.  
Using this system with numbers by assuming the existence of a price 
flexibility of –0.30 on the local market12, the effect of an internationally 
coordinated quota reduction, defined as a 10% decrease in the quantity 
on the total market, is illustrated in Figure 4.2 in the absence of 
integration and in the presence of perfect integration.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                      
12 According to the literature review in Nielsen (1999), a price flexibility of this 
size for whitefish is not unrealistic. 
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Figure 4.2 The effects of a 10% reduction in the quantity on the total market,  
assuming absence and presence of perfect integration.  
Absence of integration:
The price on the local market A 
will rise by 3%. The price effect on 
the large market B is unknown 1.
The local market A
= 1,000 tonnes
fp= -0.30
The large market B
= 4,000 tonnes
Perfect integration:
1. and quantities inter-dependent: The price 
on all markets (A, B and C) rise by 3% 1. 
2. and quantities independent: The price on 
all markets (A, B and C) rise by 15%2. 
The local market A
= 1,000 tonnes
fp= -0.30
The large market B
= 4,000 tonnes
The total market C (=A+B)
= 5,000 tonnes
 
Note: 1. The price rise is calculated as -10%*-0.30 = +3%.  
2. The price rise is calculated in two steps. Firstly, the price flexibility 
on the total market is identified on the basis of the price flexibility 
on the local market, knowing that a 10% reduction in the quantity 
on the local market implies that the price on the total market 
increases by 3%. As a 10% or 100 tonnes decrease on the local 
market equals a 2% decrease on the total market, the price 
flexibility on the total market is 3%/2%=-1.5. Secondly, the effect 
of a 10% reduction in the quantity on the total market is calculated 
as –10%*-1.5 = +15%.  
 
In the example in Figure 4.2, the effect of an internationally coordinated 
quota reduction (a 10% fall in the quantity on the total market) in the 
absence of integration, ceteris paribus, is a price rise of 3% on the local 
market A. The effect on the large market B is unknown. In the presence 
of perfect integration and given that quantities are inter-dependent, the 
price will rise by 3% on all markets. Given that quantities are 
independent the price will rise by 15% on all markets. Thereby, the only 
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situation wherein a price rise of 15% will result is when markets are 
perfectly integrated and quantities are independent.  
Owing to the presence of partial integration on the European market 
for whitefish, integration is neither perfect nor absent, and the price 
effect might be found between the two extremes. Moreover, fisheries 
management including quotas is an important factor in determining 
whether quantities on the European whitefish market are independent or 
inter-dependent. Whitefish are mainly caught in four separate seas (the 
Barents Sea, the North Sea, the Baltic Sea and Icelandic waters), where 
the state of the stocks does not affect one another and where fisheries 
management is separate. This would indicate that quantities from each 
of these stocks are independent. Moreover, catches of different species 
of whitefish do not necessarily follow each other over time, implying 
that quantities are independent. Contrary, the existence of international 
management plans for some stocks, including for North Sea cod 
between the EU and Norway, and for Barents Sea cod between Norway 
and Russia, implies that catches in the single countries from each of 
these stock may follow each other over time and be inter-dependent. 
Therefore, quantities on the European whitefish market might neither be 
independent nor inter-dependent, but rather somewhere in between. 
Thus, the presence of a dependency between quantities, which is neither 
perfect nor absent, as well as the presence of market integration which is 
neither perfect nor absent, both indicate that the price effect might be 
found between the two extremes. Subsequently, the effect of an 
internationally coordinated quota reduction is moderate increases in 
whitefish prices.  
The finding of only partial integration in this paper modifies the 
results obtained by other authors, who as discussed in Section 1, found 
only perfect integration. The results confirm that the European markets 
for whitefish are generally integrated and that the cod markets are the 
most strongly integrated. However, they contradict the findings of other 
authors in that the LOP is not in force between species, implying that 
market integration appears looser on the first-hand market than on the 
second and third-hand markets for frozen products. However, whereas 
the results obtained by other authors are based on European import 
prices, the results in this paper are based on landing prices. The use of 
foreign trade data, as opposed to landing data, implies that locally 
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induced price variation caused by, for example, mobility limitations due 
to infrastructure and logistical problems, is not taken into account. 
Moreover, the presence of rigidities on the first-hand supply side caused 
by, among other things, fisheries management (quotas, days at sea, etc.), 
results in less flexibility in fishermen’s behaviour, as compared to 
processors and intermediate traders. 
These results raise the issue of the effectiveness of the market 
policies used in Europe. In the EU, the market policy is managed 
directly and through regional Producer Organisations (POs). POs 
operate withdrawal prices to stabilise internal EU landings prices. Trade 
rules use reference prices to prevent dumping of fish on EU markets by 
controlling prices of fish originating from outside the EU. In Norway, 
fishermen’s associations negotiate minimum prices for each fishing 
year, which usually depend on prices the previous year. Asche, Gordon 
and Hannesson (forthcoming) found evidence of a robust French market 
for imported whitefish and, based on this finding, argue that in the case 
of France, the market for whitefish leaves no scope for regional 
associations to influence prices of whitefish. In other words, in the case 
of France the EU market policy is largely ineffective. However, given 
the results here showing that the European first-hand markets for 
whitefish, including the Norwegian markets, are generally integrated, 
their conclusion applies also to Norway. Hence, the Norwegian 
minimum price scheme is shown also to be largely ineffective. On the 
other hand, despite the conclusion that the EU and Norwegian market 
policies are largely ineffective, the finding of partial integration in 
European markets for whitefish implies that there is greater scope for 
affecting prices through the policies than if there were perfect 
integration.  
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CHAPTER 5 
 
International market integration and demand: An analysis of the 
Norwegian and Danish herring market  
 
Max Nielsen 
 
Published in Food Economics, 1 (3), 175-84. 
 
Abstract.  
This paper provides a method where pre-tests for international market 
integration are used to identify market structures before estimating 
demand systems. The method is applied to the analysis of the European 
herring market. A Vector Auto Regressive model in Error Correction 
form is used to identify co-integration vectors between price series and, 
based on this, to test for the Law of One Price. The Law of One Price is 
in force between the landing markets for herring in the two largest 
global supplier countries, Norway and Denmark. Therefore, an inverse 
demand function is estimated for the combined Norwegian and Danish 
market. The results are used in the interpretation of the increase in the 
prices of herring on the Danish ex-vessel market in 2001, given the 
stability of the Danish market. The implication is that even though 
Denmark did not export to the main Norwegian export markets in the 
former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, the Danish landing price is 
influenced by the situation there.  
 
Key words: Co-integration, herring, inverse demand, law of one price, 
market integration, weak exogeneity.  
 
1. Introduction 
The purpose of this article is to contribute to the understanding of the 
price formation through market integration and demand analysis of a 
first hand seafood market. The paper discusses the relevant tools and a 
procedure is set up for revealing the adequate delimitation of seafood 
markets, which are often internationally integrated. The focus is on the 
European herring market and the question raised is why the prices on 
  
5-2 
the Danish ex-vessel market increased from 2000 to 2001? Is it supply 
and demand in Denmark or is it the derived effects from other parts of 
an internationally integrated market? The analysis includes both 
Denmark and Norway, and since Norway is the world largest supplier of 
herring and Denmark the largest processor, the analysis covers a large 
part of the world herring market. This is emphasised by the fact that the 
majority of the Norwegian supply is exported to the main markets in the 
former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. The understanding of the 
price formation process then allows for an assessment of the effects of 
changing fisheries management (e.g. stock conservation policies) on 
prices and thereby on the income of fishermen. This is an issue of high 
applicability, since such an understanding allows for an assessment of 
how the fishermen are affected by changing conditions on the export 
markets. Market integration analysis is a suitable tool for revealing the 
adequate delimitation of the relevant markets and demand analysis for 
identifying the effect appearing from changing quantities.  
 The issue of international integration of markets is important in 
studying the price formation process in a country. Whether markets are 
integrated or not will have an effect on the price formation. If markets 
are separate, the domestic price will be determined by domestic supply 
and demand. However, if markets are integrated, the domestic price will 
be determined by supply and demand on the whole international market, 
of which domestic supply and demand forms only a fraction. One 
hypothesis in this paper is that first-hand markets are integrated between 
the two largest supplier countries, Norway and Denmark. Provided that 
markets are actually integrated, the landing price in Denmark will be 
determined by supply and demand on the whole international market. 
The development in the quotas, as the main determinant of supply on 
the whole European market, is shown in Table 1.  
 
TABLE 5.1 Herring quotas in Europe, 1,000 tonnes. 
 2000 2001 
Norwegian Sea 1,252 852 
North Sea etc.  345 370 
Baltic sea 490 380 
Other 84 72 
Total 2,171 1,674 
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It appears that the total quotas in 2001 fell from 2.171 to 1.674 million 
tonnes, i.e. by 23%. As a consequence, the supplies also decline and the 
hypothesis is that reduced supplies explain a part of the price rise on the 
Danish first-hand market. This is examined by estimating an inverse 
demand system, i.e. where the causality goes from quantities to prices, 
given exogenous supply. The demand on parts of the international 
market also changed considerably in 2001, due to increased purchasing 
power in the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. However, where 
the supplies changed drastically from one year to another, the change in 
demand in 2001 is part of a longer and more steady development, due to 
the gradual economic improvement and thereby increasing incomes in 
these countries after the opening of markets following the fall of the 
Berlin wall. Hence, another hypothesis is that the Danish first-hand 
price is determined by changing demand in the former Soviet Union and 
Eastern Europe. This is expected to be the case since Norway as the 
main supplier nation on the international market exports mostly 
unprocessed products to these countries, but without any export from 
Denmark to these countries.  
 Linked analysis of international market integration and demand is 
also of importance from a theoretical point of view, since consistent 
aggregation of goods included in demand analyses is necessary to 
provide reliable results, when international markets are integrated. 
Otherwise, important parts of the international market are left out of the 
analysis corresponding to an unrealistic ceteris paribus assumption, 
which makes results unreliable. The new econometric methods made 
available over the last decade, such as the co-integration analysis of 
non-stationary time series and the emergence of tests for the Law of One 
Price (LOP), provide suitable tools for obtaining consistent pictures of 
market integration, and thereby market structures, before analysing 
demand. 
 In the economic literature, studies of the European herring market are 
few and include only the Nilsson (1998) study of the emerging herring 
market in the former Soviet Union and the Food and Agriculture 
Organisation of the United Nations (2000) study on the world market 
for herring. Several articles do, however, identify demand for other fish 
species, including Ioannidis and Whitmarsh (1987), Barten and 
Bettendorf (1989), Burton (1992) and Eales, Durham and Wessells 
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(1997). Whereas these studies estimate demand systems in Seemingly 
Unrelated Regression (SUR) models, Jaffry, Pascoe and Robinson 
(1999) estimate a demand system in a Vector Auto Regressive (VAR) 
model, since their data series are non-stationary. Moreover, several 
articles examine the integration on other fish markets. Articles 
examining market integration between fish species and fish products 
include Guillotreau (1998) and Asche, Gordon and Hannesson 
(forthcoming), where studies of international market integration include 
Gordon and Hannesson (1996) and Nielsen (forthcoming). Furthermore, 
Asche et al (2002) find that “when there is only one variable factor in the 
intermediaries’ production technology, prices at different levels in the 
value chain will move proportionally to each other over time” and that 
“derived demand elasticities contain information about consumer 
elasticities”. Finally, Asche, Bremnes and Wessells (1999) link the 
relationships between prices with product aggregation and it is found 
that “when markets are well integrated, a single aggregate quantity and 
price for the good in question can be constructed”.  
 This paper presents an empirical extension to the Asche Bremnes and 
Wessells (1999) approach by undertaking both market integration and 
demand analyses simultaneously, using the results from market 
integration tests to construct a single aggregate quantity and price for 
herring in two countries, to be included in the estimation of an inverse 
demand system. That is, the purpose is to estimate an inverse demand 
function based on consistent aggregation of goods included. The 
approach is new in that no other studies are known to use the same data 
for both pre-test for market integration and for the subsequent 
estimation of inverse demand systems. The approach is also new in that 
it is based on a VAR model of non-stationary time series for both 
market integration and demand analysis. Due to the possible presence of 
a structural break in the data appearing from the large price rise from 
one year to the next, all estimations are performed for the period before 
2001. 
 
2. Methods 
A market is, according to Stigler (1969), defined as “the area within 
which the price is determined, allowances being made for quality 
differences and transport costs”. Based on this definition, the basic idea 
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in this paper is that econometric tests should be used as a pre-test to 
determine market sizes before estimating demand systems. Thereby, 
through the identification of perfectly integrated markets, it becomes 
possible to aggregate these commodities in the estimation of demand 
systems. The reason is that the Composite Commodity Theorem by 
Lewbel (1996) holds. 
 Co-integration tests and tests of the LOP are undertaken in order to 
determine whether prices move together over time and thereby 
determine market sizes. Provided that the co-integration test identifies 
one (and only one) integrating factor which is common to all the price 
series, and that the test of the LOP shows that the LOP is in force, the 
analysed goods are homogeneous in the sense that prices of two goods 
follow each other over time, relative prices are constant and markets are 
perfectly integrated.  
 The LOP in the basic simple bivariate form is, according to Stigler, 
tested by estimating (1). 
 
 ( ) ( ) ttt pABp ε++= 21 lnln  (1) 
 
where the price of good one ( 1tp ) and two ( 2tp ) are of two different 
products. Testing whether A=1 is now a test of the LOP. This simple 
bivariate form of the LOP can easily be extended to a multivariate form 
by adding extra products, e.g. ( )3ln tpC , and then test jointly whether 
1=+CA . The regression is, however, only valid for stationary price series. 
For non-stationary data series, co-integration analysis must be used, as 
regressing price series integrated of different orders may cause spurious 
correlations. Therefore, one has to confirm that the price series are 
integrated of the same order, i.e. are I(1). 
 Based on an I(1) nature of the price series, the Johansen co-
integration rank procedure is used and a VAR model in Error Correction 
(ECM) form is formulated following Asche Bremnes and Wessells 
(1999), as given in (2). 
 
tttktktt DtXXXX εδ +Ψ++Π+∆Γ++∆Γ=∆ −+−−− 11111 ...  (2) 
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where tX∆ is the differenced price series, ktX −∆ is the price series 
differenced between the present period and period k, 1−tX  is a price 
series in a basic period, t is a trend and tD  is other deterministic 
components, such as seasonal dummies. 11... −ΓΓ k , Π , δ  and Ψ are all 
parameters. The ECM form in (2) then explains changes in a price series 
by price changes in relation to former periods and by price levels in a 
base period, thereby taking account of the non-stationarity of the price 
series. The matrix Π  is the long-run solution to the VAR model and 
contains the possible co-integrating relations. The rank of Π  determines 
the number of stationary linear combinations of the variables in tX  and 
Π  can be decomposed into 'αβ , where α  contains the adjustment 
coefficients and β  the co-integrating vector. 
 Provided that the rank equals the number of variables minus one, one 
common integrating factor exists and the LOP can be tested using 
Likelihood Ratio tests of restrictions imposed on β . In a bi-variate set-
up, tX  contains two price series. If these price series co-integrate, the 
rank is one and a test of ]'1,1[' −=β  is the test of the LOP. In a multivariate 
set-up, and assuming that the rank is the number of variables minus one, 
a test of the LOP is a test of whether the columns in the β  matrix sum to 
zero. This implies that the price series are pair wise co-integrated and 
thereby follow a common trend.  
 Tests of weak exogeneity of price series can identify causal 
relationships, thereby allowing the identification of market leaders. 
Given a rank of the number of variables minus one and accepting the 
test of weak exogeneity of a given price series, implies that the price 
series drive the others without being affected by them. Thereby, the 
price series can be considered as the market leader. Weak exogeneity is 
tested using Likelihood Ratio tests of restrictions imposed as zero rows 
in α , since this implies that the equation for tX∆ does not contain 
information about the long run parameter. The test is performed without 
maintaining the restrictions on β . 
 In order to identify the effects that changes in supplies have on the 
prices on the international market, a simple inverse double logarithmic 
demand function with only one good included is estimated, assuming 
exogenous supply. This is done for the whole international market, 
provided that the LOP was found to be in force. Through this estimation 
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the price flexibility appears, defined as the percentage change in the 
price of a good, as the quantity demanded increases by one percent. 
Thereby knowledge of the effects of changing supplies on prices 
internationally is obtained. The inverse version is selected since in the 
case of fisheries it is quantity that is predetermined at the market level 
due to the widespread use of quantity regulation. The double 
logarithmic form follows from a Cobb-Douglas utility function and is 
selected since the price flexibility is constant. The model is given in (3): 
 
 ( ) ( )tt QbaP ln*ln +=  (3) 
 
where Pt is the average price on the international market and Qt the total 
quantity on the same market. This regression equation is, however, only 
valid for stationary data series. For data series integrated of degree one, 
co-integration analysis must be used. Thus, the data series must be 
tested for the presence of unit roots in order to confirm that the data are 
I(1). Based on the I(1) nature of the data series, the Johansen co-
integration rank procedure must be used again. The regression equation 
remains as in (2), except that tX  now includes the average price as well 
as the total quantity on the total market, and except for that the 
deterministic trend is replaced by a constant. Given a rank of one, the 
demand function can be exactly identified, Π  decomposed into 'αβ , 
where β  is the co-integration vector. Normalising the price series 
around minus 1 identifies the demand system as [ ]










−=
1
1' Q
P
abX tβ .  
 
 
3. Data 
Data on landings of herring in Denmark and Norway were obtained 
from the Directorate of Fisheries in the two countries. The data are 
monthly, cover the period January 1992 to September 2000 and include 
both landings of domestic and foreign fishermen. The period is chosen 
to avoid 2001 and the end of 2000, since a structural change occurred 
with price increases. The Danish Directorate of Fisheries and the 
Norwegian Seafood Export Council provided data on export of herring 
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products. Data summary statistics are shown in Table 2 with values and 
prices in nominal terms.  
 
TABLE 5.2. Data summary statistics, yearly avr, 1,000 tonnes, Million kr and 
kr/kilo1. 
Denmark Norway  
Quantity Value Price Quantity Value Price 
       
Landings 260 419 1.61 686 976 1.42
 
Export 
Fresh whole 35 96 2.79 99 229 2.32
Frozen whole 5 27 5.33 212 786 3.72
Fresh fillets 27 140 4.88 11 59 5.56
Frozen fillets 2 15 7.66 72 396 5.48
Minced meat 8 42 5.19 . . .
Smoked 0 3 24.70 1 11 16.07
Salted 9 78 8.86 9 45 5.07
Processed . . . 7 70 10.45
Pickled in jars 4 70 17.68 . . .
Soured 20 192 9.45 . . .
Total 111 664 5.95 410 1,597 3.90
 
Note: 1. Data period is from January 1992 to September 2000.  
 
It appears that the landings in Norway are 2.5 times larger than in 
Denmark and that the Danish export is more widespread than the 
Norwegian, with Norway exporting frozen herring products and with 
Denmark exporting mainly processed products. This reveals that the 
level of value added is larger in Denmark than in Norway. Furthermore, 
Norway is the world-leading exporter of frozen herring products, 
whereas Denmark is the leading processor and leading exporter of 
processed herring. In Denmark, a considerable home market for pickled 
herring in jars also exists. Denmark exports to other EU countries, 
mainly Germany, which obtains the majority of its herring import from 
Denmark. Norway exports mainly to the former Soviet Union and 
Eastern European countries. These countries are supplied mainly by 
Norway but also Iceland. Besides that, the countries are partly self-
supplying. The trade between Norway and these countries is relatively 
new, emerging in the nineties as a result of the post-Berlin wall opening 
of markets combined with the subsequent increase in purchasing power. 
The opening of markets followed the improvement of the atlanto-
scandic herring stock in the Norwegian Sea, which also occurred in the 
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nineties, and made it possible for Norwegian suppliers to meet the 
increased demand.  
 Price series in nominal terms of landings in the two countries as well 
as price series of the most important herring export item in each 
country, soured from Denmark and frozen from Norway, are selected 
for further analysis and shown in Figure 1.  
 
FIGURE 5.1. Monthly landing and export prices of selected herring 
products in Denmark and Norway, Dkr. per kg. 
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It appears that the prices rise with degree of processing in both 
countries. It remains, however, unclear whether upward or downward 
trends, if any, are present in the period. Thus, whether the price series 
are non-stationary or stationary must be determined by testing for unit 
roots.  
 
3. Results 
The price series (in natural logarithm1) selected in Figure 1 to be 
included in the further analysis were tested for the presence of unit roots 
in order to ensure that all the price series were integrated of the same 
order. This was done using the Augmented Dickey-Fuller test with 9 
lags and a constant and a trend included in the regression. Tests were 
                                                                      
1 All estimations undertaken below are performed with the data series in natural 
logarithm. 
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undertaken for both levels and differences. The test statistics for the 
price series for levels are –3.02 for the Danish landings, -3.14 for the 
Norwegian landings, -1.59 for the Danish export and –2.74 for the 
Norwegian export. The corresponding test statistics for first differences 
are –6.04, –5.11, –5.09 and –6.38, respectively. Thereby, none of the 
null hypotheses of unit roots for levels are rejected and the null 
hypotheses of unit roots for first differences are all rejected at the 1% 
level, using critical values known from MacKinnon (1991). Thus, the 
hypothesis of I(1) is maintained.  
 Based on the I(1) nature of the price series, co-integration tests, tests 
for the LOP and weak exogeneity were undertaken. Tests were 
undertaken using a strategy starting with all the four price series 
included and starting with 9 lags to search for a model without any 
misspecification problems and with a rank of the number of variables 
minus one.  
 The misspecification tests included autocorrelation, normality and 
autoregressive conditional heteroscedasticity (ARCH) tests and 
conclusions on the presence and absence of misspecification problems 
were obtained at the 1% level. The analysis was carried out by removing 
lags and by in- and excluding 11 centred seasonal dummies. When a 
model with a rank of the number of variables minus one without 
misspecification was found, it was chosen and the LOP and weak 
exogeneity was tested. If such a model could not be found, price series 
were excluded on a one-by-one basis and the search was repeated until 
such a model was found. In the test with all the four price series 
included it was not possible to identify one common integrating factor. 
Excluding the price series of Norwegian export of frozen herring did not 
help to identify it either. However, when excluding the price series of 
Danish export of soured herring, one common integrating factor was 
identified and test results are reported in Table 3.  
 
TABLE 5.3 Multivariate Johansen test of the price series and test of the LOP. 
Model H0: rank=p Eigenvalues Trace test1 C95% 
Period = 1992.01-2000.09 p=0 0.32 64.33* 42.20 
Lags = 9 p<=1 0.17 27.15* 25.47 
11 seasonal dummies p<=2 0.09 9.30 12.39 
105 observations     
     
Note:  1. * denotes significance at the 5% level (Johansen 1996). 
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It appears that the rank is two at the 5% level in the model with the three 
price series included, as required. The model was estimated without 
misspecification problems at the 1% level. The test of the LOP is 
accepted with a Likelihood Ratio test statistic at 2.64, corresponding to 
p=0.27. Hence, the LOP is in force and prices of herring landed in 
Denmark and Norway and the Norwegian export prices of frozen 
herring follow each other over time. This implies that one market for 
raw material exists across the two countries and that prices on the raw 
material market (the landing market) develop similarly to the price of 
the low processed frozen herring export from Norway.  
 The market for raw material and the market for Norwegian export of 
frozen herring do not seem to be integrated with the export market for 
the Danish export of soured herring. Thereby, a situation remains, where 
the Danish landing price interacts closer with Norwegian export prices 
than with Danish export prices. The result might, however, not be 
surprising taking into account the flexibility of fishermen from the two 
countries to unload in the country they prefer. Several factors may play 
a role in the decision of the single fisherman of where to unload, 
including the price of the fish and transportation costs from the fishing 
ground to the port. That is, the fishermen might, when they are still at 
sea, obtain information of where the price is good before they take the 
decision of where to go. This information might be either from physical 
(auction) markets or from quotations, and might be what ties the landing 
prices of herring in Denmark and Norway together. Moreover, the result 
might not be surprising taking into account that the Norwegian herring 
export is less processed than the Danish, as revealed by the price 
difference between export from the two countries. Costs of other input 
factors than herring, where prices probably vary independently, make up 
a larger share of the processing costs in Denmark.  
 The test of weak exogeneity is clearly accepted for the Norwegian 
landing price with LR=1.63 and p=0.44, but rejected for the other price 
series. Thus, the Norwegian landing price is the price leader. This result 
may not be surprising, since Norway is the largest market for raw 
material and presuming that the development on the market is mainly 
determined from the supply side. Demand conditions on the export 
markets for Norwegian frozen herring in mainly the former Soviet 
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Union countries and Eastern Europe, will also determine prices on the 
landing markets in Norway and Denmark.  
 Since the LOP was shown to be in force in a test where both the 
Danish and the Norwegian landing prices were included, the two data 
series can be aggregated. This was done by summing quantities as well 
as values in the two countries at given points in time. The aggregated 
price and quantity series are then included in the estimation of a simple 
inverse demand system and the test of the LOP is used as a pre-test to 
identify the market size, before estimating demand systems.  
 Again, it is necessary to confirm that the two data series are 
integrated of the same order. This is tested using the Augmented 
Dickey-Fuller test now with 12 lags and only a constant included in the 
regression. The test statistic for the price series for levels is –2.16 and 
for the quantity series –3.41. For first differences the test statistics are –
3.05 and –4.27. Hence, none of the null hypotheses of unit roots for 
levels are rejected at the 1% level. The null hypothesis of unit roots in 
first differences is rejected at the 1% level for the quantity series. For 
the price series this is only the case at the 5% level. Accepting this level, 
the hypotheses of I(1) are maintained.  
 Based on the I(1) nature of the data, the demand function is estimated 
with 12 lags included, since quotas are annual2. The estimation was 
performed without misspecification problems at the 1% level and results 
of the rank test are presented in Table 4.  
                                                                      
2 Tests of market integration in the VAR model were undertaken as a search 
procedure with 2-12 lags and with an unrestricted constant, a constant restricted to 
the co-integration space and a trend restricted to the co-integration space. The 
model with the tightest market integration without misspecification and with unit 
root tests not rejecting the presence of I(1) was chosen. That was with 9 lags and a 
trend restricted to the co-integration space. Correspondingly, the Augmented 
Dickey-Fuller tests were performed with 9 lags and a constant and a trend. The 
inverse demand system was estimated in the VAR model with 12 lags, since 
fishing quotas are fixed for a year. The model was also estimated with a constant 
restricted to the co-integration space, since a constant is included in an inverse 
demand system. Again, the Augmented Dickey-Fuller tests were performed with 
12 lags and a constant.  
 
  
5-13 
TABLE 5.4. Johansen test with average price and quantity included. 
Model H0: rank=p Eigenvalues Trace test C95%
Period = 1992.01-2000.09 p=0 0.15 23.12* 19.99
Lags = 12 p<=1 0.08 7.55 9.13
11 seasonal dummies  
105 observations  
  
 
The rank is one at the 5% level and, based on this rank, 
[ ]
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50.642.01' Q
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X tβ . That is, the price flexibility on the total landing 
market for herring in Denmark and Norway is –0.42, implying that a 
10% reduction in quantities, e.g. following a reduction, gives a price rise 
of 4.2%. It does not matter whether the quantity reduction takes place in 
Denmark or Norway, since the effect on the prices in the two countries 
is the same. The estimation result is in accordance with a priori 
expectations, since the price flexibility is between zero and minus one. 
The magnitude of the price flexibility is relatively close to results 
obtained for other fish products, e.g. in Barten and Bettendorf (1989) 
and in Eales, Durham and Wessells (1997), with estimates in the range 
of  –0.09 to –0.52.  
 The implication of the price flexibility of –0.42 on herring landed in 
Norway and Denmark is that since quantities of herring landed in the 
two countries totally decreased by 23% in 2001 due to quota reductions, 
the prices are ex post forecasted to rise by 10% solely due to the change 
in supply in Denmark and Norway. Thereby, decreased landings in the 
two countries alone can explain 10% of the 80% price increase in 2001.  
 The cause of the remainder of the price increase remains a matter of 
speculation. It is possible that it could be driven from both the supply 
and the demand side. On the supply side, falling catches of herring in 
other herring supplier nations might explain parts of the price rise, 
provided that the markets are integrated. Provided that this is the case, 
falling catches in the Russian Pacific Ocean herring fishery as well as 
falling catches of herring by vessels from Iceland, Russia and Sweden in 
the Norwegian Sea might explain part of the remaining price increase. 
Total global catches of herring were 2.8 million tonnes in 2000 (Food 
and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations 2001), of which 
Norway and Denmark accounted for 42%. Other important supplier 
countries were Russia, Iceland and Sweden accounting for a 35%. 
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Global supply fell 17% in 2001 after decreases in all the 5 largest 
supplier countries. Another explanation might be that, provided that 
herring and Alaskan Pollack are substitutes, the Russian catches of 
Alaskan Pollack in the Pacific Ocean were approximately halved in 
2001. On the demand side increased purchasing power in the former 
Soviet Union and Eastern European countries might contribute to 
explain the price rise, since prices of Norwegian export of frozen whole 
herring to these countries was found to be formed within the same 
market as the landing prices in Denmark and Norway. Uncertain 
information on the final market in the former Soviet Union and Eastern 
Europe among the Norwegian exporters might also have caused 
Norwegian exporters to overestimate the potential of the market, thereby 
giving an upward shift in demand and prices. This might be probable 
since prices of herring in 2003 fell 28% with a largely unchanged 
international supply, thereby “normalising “ the market.  
 
4. Discussion  
In this paper it has been demonstrated how tests of market integration 
can be used systematically and consistently to obtain knowledge before 
estimating demand systems. It has also been demonstrated that the 
knowledge obtained from the market integration tests can sometimes be 
counterintuitive on how international markets work. This is 
demonstrated by the 80% price rise in 2001 on herring landed in 
Denmark, which appeared without large falls in the landed quantities in 
Denmark and given relative stable conditions on the export market. The 
rise in the Danish landing price might be explained by the developments 
on other parts of the European herring market, which is found integrated 
between countries. Thus, the price rise in Denmark is explained by the 
reduced quotas in the herring fishery in the Norwegian Sea and by 
improved conditions on the Norwegian export markets in the former 
Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. Thereby, due to changing conditions 
in Norway, the Former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, the Danish 
prices were able to increase considerable, even though Danish export to 
these countries was largely non-existent. Thus, leaving an important part 
of the international market out of analysis corresponds to an unrealistic 
ceteris paribus assumption, which makes results unreliable.  
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 The result underlines the importance of including knowledge of 
international market integration in analyses of demand of products 
traded across borders. Undertaking fish demand analysis for single 
countries will in several and presumably most cases be misleading, 
since fish markets today are international and cannot be analysed 
consistently ignoring that fact. The result also applies for markets for 
other food items with mainly one variable factor in the intermediaries 
production technology and traded at internationally integrated markets. 
Furthermore, the result implies that European prices of raw material of 
herring reveal information on derived consumer demand. Hence, 
consumer demand can be modelled as derived demand for raw 
materials.  
 In the paper it has also been demonstrated how the VAR models can 
be used as a basis for the estimation of demand systems when data are 
non-stationary, following e.g. Jaffry, Pascoe and Robinson (1999). Most 
existing demand studies, including Ioannidis and Whitmarsh (1987), 
Barten and Bettendorf (1989), Burton (1992) and Eales, Durham and 
Wessells (1997), use SUR models. In cases where time series data are 
non-stationary, VAR models provide a structured framework of 
estimation as an alternative to SUR models. SUR models can still be 
applied, but only if data are properly differenced.  
 The results are important for the newly introduced individual 
transferable quota scheme in Denmark (Regulation 958, Danish 
Ministry of Food, Agriculture and Fisheries 2002), since the 
development in the determinants of the price of herring give indications 
of how the individual quota market can be expected to develop. It is 
expected that the volatility of the landing market resulting from the 
price rise also cause volatility on the market for the individual quotas. 
This will cause uncertainty of the real value of the individual quota 
during the implementation period. Furthermore, the value of the 
individual quota will be determined by supply and demand factors on 
the whole European market. Hence, important determinants of the 
individual quota price are the expected future supply from the large 
herring stock in the Norwegian Sea, expected development in 
purchasing power on the Norwegian export market in the former Soviet 
Union and Eastern Europe, and expected supply of substitutes in those 
countries. Thus, volatility on the market for the individual quotas is 
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related to the development in these factors and whether to introduce 
individual transferable quotas is thus a decision under uncertainty.  
 The analysis was capable of explaining 10% of an 80% price rise, but 
an extension of the model within the same framework, by the inclusion 
of further variables in the estimation of the inverse demand system, 
might increase the explanatory power. Firstly, even though Denmark 
and Norway are the main European herring supplier countries, other 
supplier countries are also important and should be included. These are 
Iceland, Russia and Sweden fishing in the North Atlantic Ocean, and 
Russia fishing in the North Pacific Ocean. None of these were included 
in the analysis due to data limitations. Secondly, potential substitutes on 
the market, such as Alaskan Pollack in Russia, should be included. 
Furthermore, income effects should be included in the model 
emphasising the importance of increasing income in the former Soviet 
Union and Eastern Europe. Finally, exchange rate fluctuations should be 
included in the analysis, since they contribute to the price formation 
process at international markets. The analyses were undertaken in 
Danish kroner, thereby ignoring that the Norwegian currency was strong 
at the end of the period and that the Russian currency was devalued in 
1998. 
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CHAPTER 6 
 
Application of the Inverse Almost Ideal Demand System to Welfare 
Analysis  
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Abstract. This paper presents the theoretical properties of the Inverse 
Almost Ideal Demand System and applies the system on time series data 
for cod, herring and plaice in Denmark. The suitability of the Inverse 
Almost Ideal Demand System when applied to welfare analysis is 
discussed. The properties of the demand system show that - since the 
demand system is a second-order approximation to the true system - it 
does not have global applicability for welfare measurement. It may, 
therefore, not satisfy the conditions for calculation of consumer surplus 
(negative slope and positive point of intersection with the price-axis). 
The demand system is neither suitable for global welfare analysis and, 
therefore, nor for relative welfare analysis. It is, however, under certain 
conditions and using the appropriate calculation method, suitable for 
marginal welfare analysis of small policy changes. The theoretical point 
is illustrated by an empirical example of the Danish fish market. Using a 
vector auto regressive model in error correction form to overcome the 
problem of non-stationarity of data, the Inverse Almost Ideal Demand 
System is estimated. For cod the intercept is negative and for herring 
and plaice the slope of the demand function is positive in the data 
interval investigated. Thus, the estimated demand system is not suitable 
for welfare analysis. 
 
Key words: Inverse Almost Ideal Demand System, Welfare analysis, 
Co-integration and Fish. 
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1. Introduction 
The valuation of environmental goods has theoretically had a dual 
development. Two distinct schools, stated preferences and revealed 
preferences, can be precipitated (Tietenberg (2002) and Braden and 
Kolstad (1991)). These two schools have very different theoretical 
points of origin. The most common valuation method of especially 
environmental damages of non-market goods builds on stated 
preferences, where hypothetical bids of individuals are facilitating the 
valuation of non-market good carried out through questionnaeres. The 
most well known stated preference method is contingent valuation 
(Mitchell and Carson (1989) and Toivonen et al (2001)). Revealed 
preferences, on the other hand, is based on observed market behaviour 
(Bockstael and McConnel (1999)). An example of revealed preference 
methods is the hedonic method (embedded preferences), where the 
value of a property is embedded as in the normal consumer good and 
elicited through the marked behaviour of consumers. For both distinct 
schools a common denominator is the estimation of consumer’s surplus 
in order to obtain an estimate for the welfare gain or loss of changes in 
non-market natural resources. 
 The background of the present paper is the desire to develop a 
revealed preference model suitable for estimating the indirect benefit of 
fish purchase, credence parameters as quality, which might be 
internalised though labelling and environmental properties tied to fish 
caught. Only through the development of such a model existent data can 
be applied as an alternative to the more expensive stated preference 
methods. The model can be based on several different demand systems. 
Commonly used are either based on a postulated utility function, like the 
Cobb-Douglas utility function, or based on knowledge of the true 
preference structure in the optimal point, like in the Inverse Almost 
Ideal Demand System (IAIDS). The demand system applied in the 
present paper is the IAIDS. The inverse version where the causality goes 
from quantities to prices is chosen since quantity regulations are widely 
used in fisheries management. In the literature, the IAIDS have been 
used to identify market structures (Eales and Unnevehr (1994) and Eales 
et al (1997)), where the use of the IAIDS for welfare analysis, and 
thereby for valuation of environmental and non-market goods, have 
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been more sparse. Teisl et al (2002) do, however, use the ordinary 
version of the AIDS for welfare analysis.  
 The aim of the paper is to discuss the suitability of the IAIDS for 
theoretical and empirical welfare analysis, including the identification of 
conditions under which the system is suitable for welfare analysis. It is 
shown that IAIDS is unsuitable for estimating global welfare in the form 
of total consumer surplus, since when the IAIDS is extended to welfare 
analysis, the adding-up restriction and the fact that the demand system is 
based on a second-order approximation to the true demand system, 
gives the result that the demand curves may have a positive slope.1 This 
is illustrated by estimating demand curves for fish using co-integration 
because data are non-stationary. The use of co-integration to estimate 
parameters in IAIDS is a new research area and, therefore, this paper 
also contributes to the debate about estimating IAIDS systems. The 
argument that IAIDS cannot be used for welfare analysis also applies to 
ordinary almost ideal demand systems (AIDS), where prices determine 
quantities, because the ordinary AIDS is also a second-order 
approximation of the true demand system. 
 A true demand system in unrestricted form gets very complicated as a 
very high number of equations are involved. Therefore, a true demand 
system is almost impossible to estimate. To cope with these problems, 
the traditional method has been to approximate the true demand system 
with a second-order approximation and to make restrictions on the 
parameters in connection with the econometric estimation (Deaton and 
Muellbauer (1980a) and (1980b)). This is exactly the procedure in the 
IAIDS. Welfare analysis in its basic form has to satisfy special 
requirements with regard to the demand system. To estimate consumer’s 
surplus, a positive intercept and a global negative slope must be 
obtained.  In the present paper it is shown that IAIDS does not fulfil 
these conditions.  
 Knowledge of the suitability of the IAIDS for welfare analysis is 
important, since only through such knowledge a revealed preference 
model can be developed. And only through the development of such a 
                                                                      
1 The normal procedure used when consumers surplus is calculated is to estimate a 
demand function and then take the integral of the estimated demand function in 
order to find consumers surplus. If consumers surplus for a price increase is to be 
calculated, positive sloped demand functions can cause problems 
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model, seafood markets where there traditionally has been little 
differentiation can be analysed. Consumers have traditionally largely 
been unable to exercise choice as to neither the location nor the state of 
the fishery their seafood came from. Furthermore, it has not been 
possible to exercise choice regarding how the fish was caught because 
of lack of eco-labelling of fish. If credence parameters are introduced by 
establishing standards for quality or eco-labelling, this development 
calls for rational considerations as to whether the welfare gains of 
consumers exceed the marginal cost of production and a cost incurred 
running a labelling scheme. In that context, development of the present 
market model of fish may potentially be important.  
 The paper is organised as follows. In section 2 IAIDS is introduced, 
while an empirical example is presented in section 3. Section 4 
concludes the paper.  
 
2. IAIDS 
The Almost Ideal Demand System (AIDS) (Deaton and Muellbauer 
(1980a) and (1980b)) has enjoyed great popularity in applied demand 
analysis. There are several advantages of this demand system. First, it is 
derived from a specific cost function and thus corresponds to a well 
defined preference structure. Second, a property of AIDS is a consistent 
aggregation from micro to market level. Third, non-linear Engel curves 
are possible. Finally, the preferences can be thought of as a local 
second-order approximation of an unknown true preference structure. 
Although AIDS has worked well in many applications, a critical 
assumption is that prices are predetermined at the market level. In the 
case of fisheries it is the quantity that is predetermined at market level 
due to the widespread application of quantitative regulations (Wilen 
(2000)). To analyse such cases Eales and Unnevehr (1994) suggest 
IAIDS. In this section the theory behind IAIDS is outlined. Again 
following Eales and Unnevehr (1994) and Deaton (1979), a distance 
function function, also known as the direct cost unction, is introduced as 
a representation of preferences, which measure what the consumers 
have to give up of one good to achieve another good. The distance 
function is sketched in Figure 6.1. 
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Figure 6.1: A distance function 
q2
q1
A
B
U0
 
In Figure 6.1, q1 is the quantity consumed of good 1 while q2 is the 
quantity consumed of good 2. U0 is a pre-selected utility level. The 
distance function, D(U0, q), is defined as the amount by which all 
quantities must be changed proportionally to obtain a given utility level. 
Thus, in Figure 6.1 D(U0, q) = 0B/0A. 
 
 The IAIDS starts by specifying a distance function representing the 
preferences of consumers. The distance function must possess the 
following properties: 
 
1. It is linear homogeneous, concave and non-decreasing in quantities 
(Diewert (1982)). 
2. It is decreasing in utility (Diewert (1982)). 
3. Differentiation with respect to quantities at optimum yields the 
compensated inverse demand function. 
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Following the specification of the cost function in Deaton and 
Muellbauer (1980b), a logarithmic distance function may be specified 
as: 
 
 )(ln)(ln)1(),(ln qbUqaUqUD +−=  (1) 
 
lna(q) and lnb(q) may also be specified in a way analogous to Deaton 
and Muellbauer (1980b): 
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Inserting (2) and (3) in (1) yields: 
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By differentiating with respect to qi the budget shares, wi, may be found: 
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−
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j
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where γij = 0.5(γij* + γji*). 
Inversion of the distance function at optimum yields the direct utility 
function: 
 
 )(ln)(ln
)(ln)(
qaqb
qaqU
−
=  (6) 
 
(5) and (6) yields the IAIDS: 
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 ( )qai
n
j
jqijiiw ln
1
ln βγα +∑
=
+=  (7) 
 
where )(ln qa is given in (2). Eales and Unnevehr (1994) argues that )(ln qa  
ought to be substituted by a Stone quantity index. If this is done, IAIDS 
may be written as: 
 
 Qi
n
j
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1
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where Q is the Stone quantity index. Some authors have argued that Q 
ought to be substituted with other indices (Buse (1994)). However, 
irrespectively of which index is used, (8) causes problems for welfare 
measurement. The reason for this is that (8) is a second-order 
approximation to the true demand system even if other indices than the 
Stone index is used. 
However, a problem arises with (8). (8) may be written as: 
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Multiplying both sides with ∑
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1i
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(10) may be written as: 
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Solving (11) for pi yields, the demand curve: 
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Using (8), (12) can be rewritten as: 
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Differentiating (13) with respect to qi  yields the slope of the demand 
function: 
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 To interpret (14) note that if ( )iwiwii −> 1γ , 0<
∂
∂
iq
ip  and the slope of the 
demand curve is negative. Contrary, if ( )iwiwii −< 1γ , 0>
∂
∂
iq
ip  and the slope 
of the demand curve is positive. Thus it is impossible on theoretical 
grounds a priori to determine the slope of the demand curve. This point 
is illustrated in Figure 6.2. 
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Figure 6.2: The demand function in IAIDS 
pi
qi
A
 
In Figure 6.2 the local approximation point is A. Around A, a second-
order approximation to the true demand system is conducted. This 
means that the demand function is approximated with a parable as 
drawn in Figure 6.2. A parable has a positive slope on some parts and a 
negative slope on other parts. This point is illustrated in (14). It is clear 
that the demand function in Figure 6.2 is unsuitable for global welfare 
analysis. To repeat, the distance function is based on a second-order 
approximation around the optimal point only. The implication of this is 
that IAIDS is well suited for calculating the flexibility in a point. But 
when the analysis is extended to calculating consumer surplus the 
extrapolation is done in this specific point. Therefore, the demand curve, 
due to the configuration of the demand system, may have a positive 
slope.  
 Since the IAIDS is not suitable for welfare analysis, it follows that it 
is also unsuitable for relative welfare analysis. The system may, 
however, provided that the slopes are negative in the approximation 
point, be used to calculate marginal welfare changes around the optimal 
point. Welfare changes following from small policy changes under this 
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condition can potentially be determined by calculating the integer under 
the demand curve or by extrapolating from the price flexibility in the 
optimal point. Calculating the integer may, however, give spurious 
results, provided that the marginal change is sufficient large to cross the 
peak of the parable formed demand curve shown in Figure 2. Hence, the 
only secure method for calculating marginal welfare changes is 
extrapolation, following Teisl et al (2002). In the next section these 
points are illustrated empirically in the case of fisheries.  
 
3. Empirical estimations 
The purpose of this section is to illustrate the theoretical finding, that 
IAIDS have shortcomings in welfare analysis, with an empirical 
example. The fish market in Denmark is selected because harvest of fish 
is subject to quantitative regulation. Therefore, the natural choice of 
model specification is the IAIDS where quantities are pre-determined. 
 In section 3.1 the data from which the estimations are performed is 
presented, while section 3.2 develop an estimation methodology. The 
results of the estimations are presented in section 3.3 and in section 3.4 
it is discussed whether consumer surplus could be calculated in the 
empirical example. The purpose of section 3.1-3.3 is to obtain estimates 
for the parameters in the theoretically IAIDS model. These parameters 
are then used to calculate the slope of the demand function in section 
3.4. 
 
3.1 Data 
Time series on landed fish in Denmark are available for different fish 
species at first-hand market level from the Danish Directorate of 
Fisheries. Measured in value of landings, cod, herring and plaice are the 
most important fish species for human consumption and these species 
are, therefore, included in the analysis. Cod, herring and plaice account 
for two-thirds of the total fish landing value in 2001 and a time series is 
available of these species quarterly for the period 1986-2001. Summary 
statistics for the three species are presented in Table 6.1. 
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Table 6.1: Data summary statistics, averages 
Quantity Price Market share  
/1,000 tonnes /dkr per kilo /% 
Plaice 7,619 5.48 0.19 
Cod 24,747 5.50 0.60 
Herring 41,180 1.39 0.21 
 
From Table 6.1 it appears that cod is the most important species 
covering 60% of the market, while the two other species are of almost 
equal importance. Moreover, it also appears that the average prices of 
cod and plaice are on the same level, while the price on herring is lower. 
The development in landed quantities is shown in Figure 6.3. 
 
Figure 6.3: The composition of landings (tonnes) 
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From Figure 6.3 it is seen that the landed quantities of cod, herring and 
plaice do not follow the same pattern over time. Landings of cod 
decrease from a high level due to over-exploitation of the cod stock 
while the herring landings increase due to a gradual improvement in the 
herring stocks. Landings of plaice are relative constant, although weekly 
decreasing. 
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3.2 Estimation methodology 
From the description in Figure 6.1, it appears that the quantities of cod, 
herring and plaice followed either a downward or upward trend. 
Therefore, the data for quantities are probably non-stationary.2 Based on 
this fact and knowing that the time series for prices generally are non-
stationary, estimation of IAIDS must be undertaken using Vector Auto 
Regressive (VAR) models. The reason for this is that traditional 
Seemingly Unrelated Regression (SUR) models might result in spurious 
correlations. 3Consequently, a VAR model is used for estimations. 
 Moreover, since only three fish species are included in the analysis, 
weak separability of parameters are implicitly assumed. The reason is 
that consumer choices can be considered a multistage decision process 
wherein the choice of fish species is the last decision. 
 The methodology is developed on the basis of the existing literature 
where IAIDS is estimated (Eales and Unnevehr (1994) and Eales et al 
(1997). However, because only a few estimations of IAIDS are known 
and because these estimations are based on SUR models, the 
methodology is also based on the existing literature where AIDS 
systems is estimated.  SUR models is applied to estimate AIDS in, for 
example, Deaton and Muellbauer (1980b), Hayes et al (1990) and Eales 
et al (1997), while VAR models is used in Lind (2002) and Kaabia and 
Gil (2001). In this section the methodology for using co-integration to 
estimate AIDS models is reviewed. However before that it is necessary 
to secure that all data are non-stationary and integrated of the same 
order (e.g. I(1)) 
 Based on the I(1) nature of the data, the estimation of the IAIDS, as 
presented in (8), is performed in the following two steps. First, the 
number of co-integrated relationship is determined using the procedure 
in Johansen (1988). Second, exact identifications and over-identification 
restrictions is introduced to ensure theoretical consistency.  
                                                                      
2 A time series is non-stationary if it follows a trend. 
3 In a VAR model the non-stationarity problem is solved because the model is 
based on a pre-defined preference structure where all variables are endogenous, 
with exogenous variables being of the same lags. However, the model is due to 
this structure only applicable in the estimation of systems with small number of 
variables 
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 The procedure in Johansen (1988) is based on the following VAR 
model: 
 t1t1kt1k1t1t XX...XX εµ∆Γ∆Γ∆ ++∏+++= −+−−−  (15) 
 
where: Xt is a column vector made up by the market shares of the 
products included in the analysis, the natural logarithm of the 
quantities of these products and the Stone index. 
∏ is the long run solution to the VAR model and contains the 
possible co-integrating relations. 
 
 The rank of ∏ determines the number of stationary linear 
combinations of the variables in Xt. If the rank equals the number of 
variables which is 2n + 1, where n is the number of products, all 
variables are I(0) (stationary). Contrary, if the rank is zero, none of the 
variables are stationary. If the rank is less than n – 1, it is not possible to 
identify the exact nature of stationarity and IAIDS cannot be estimated. 
However, if the rank is exactly n – 1, ∏ can be decomposed into 'αβ , 
where β contains the co-integrating vectors. This implies that IAIDS can 
be identified by imposing restrictions. If the rank is between n and 2n + 
1, the same procedure can be used, but now the restrictions remove 
over-identification. 
 From (15) it appears that the constant is restricted to the co-
integration space. The Johansen test can be used to test for the number 
of co-integrating vectors. In this test, the null hypothesis is that there are 
up to a given number of co-integrating vectors, whereas the alternative 
hypothesis is that there is exactly one more co-integrating vector. 
 Based on the chosen rank the exact identification restrictions and the 
over-identification restrictions can be imposed and tested using the 
Likehood Ratio test of restrictions imposed on β . 
 Following Pesaran and Shin (1999) the exact identification 
restrictions, given the rank n – 1, is the removal of other market shares 
from the two co-integration vectors as well as normalisation. The exact 
identification restriction in the case that is analysed in this paper is: 
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 Following Kaabia and Gil (2000), the exact identification restrictions, 
given a rank of n or more, is the removal of other market shares from 
the two first co-integration vectors as well as normalisation. In addition, 
zero restrictions are imposed on all market shares and the Stone index in 
the third co-integrating vector, in order to remove interference in the 
system from this co-integrating vector. Thereby, the exact identification 
restrictions are: 
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Provided that the rank is larger than or equal to n but less that 2n – 1, the 
β  vector would consist of one more co-integration vector for each rank 
and the forth and fifth row in β would be the last row in (17). 
 (16) and (17) are, however, only exact identification restrictions, 
which has to be imposed together with the over-identification 
restrictions which are introduced to ensure theoretical consistency of the 
IAIDS model. The over-identification restrictions are: 
 
Adding up 1
i i
=∑α 0
i ij
=∑γ  (18) 
Homogeneity 0
j ij
=∑γ  (19) 
Symmetry jiij γγ =  (20) 
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The three restrictions implies that (8) represents a system of inverse 
demand functions which add up to total expenditures (18), are 
homogeneous of the degree of zero in quantities (19) and have 
symmetric cross effects (20).  
 Testing whether a model with both exact identification and over-
identification form a better model than a model without both 
restrictions, can be performed by examining whether imposing the 
restrictions make β Xt   stationary. 
 
 
3.3 Results 
Based on the above methodology, tests for non-stationarity is 
undertaken, the Johansen co-integration rank test is performed and the 
IAIDS is estimated with the restrictions imposed, given the rank 
determined. Tests for non-stationarity are performed in order to secure 
that all data series are integrated of the same order. Two tests are 
performed, one excluding and one including a trend. Moreover, tests are 
performed in both levels and differences. Test results are presented in 
Table 6.2. 
 
Table 6.2: Unit root tests in real terms 
H0 of non-stationarity in price levels1 H0 of non-stationarity in price 
differences1 
 
ADF without trend ADF with trend ADF without trend ADF with trend 
Quantity     
Herring -1.90 (3) -1.87 (3) -15.08 (2) -15.02 (2) 
Plaice -1.93 (3) -1.52 (3) -20.62 (2) -20.88 (2) 
Cod -1.07 (4) -2.28 (4) -5.27 (3) -5.23 (3) 
     
Share     
Herring -1.52 (4) -2.67 (4) -3.38 (3) -3.44 (3) 
Plaice -2.59 (4) -3.38 (4) -5.35 (3) -5.30 (3) 
Cod -1.96 (4) -2.25 (4) -4.16 (3) -4.18 (3) 
     
Stone Index -1.85 (4) -2.95 (4) -5.53 (3) -5.50 (3)      
Note 1. Critical values are known from MacKinnon (1991) and are with constant 
but without trend –3.43/-2.86/-2.57 respectively at 99%, 95% and 90% 
levels and are with constant and trend –3.96/-3.41/-3.13 respectively at 
99%, 95% and 90% levels. 
 
In Table 6.2 the results of the Dickey-Fuller tests with lags chosen 
according to the AIC criteria in real terms are reported. As shown, all 
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data series are non-stationary, but stationary in first differences. It also 
appears that the null hypothesis of a constant and a trend in the data are 
accepted in levels and rejected in first differences. Thereby, all data 
series appear I(1) and further analysis can be performed. 
 Based on the result that all variables with critical values are I(1), the 
estimation of IAIDS is undertaken as a search procedure. First, models 
with the constant restricted to the co-integration space and without 
misspecification problems are identified among eighteen models. The 
eighteen models have two, three and four lags, with and without three 
centred seasonal dummies and wh, wp and wc included.  Misspecification 
tests for autocorrelation, normality and autoregressive conditional 
heteroscedasticity are performed. In eight of the eighteen models no 
sign of misspecification on a five percent level appear, increasing to 
eleven when accepting a three percent level. For the eleven models, the 
Johansen test is used to determine the number of co-integrating 
relations, which in all cases are found to be two or three as required for 
further IAIDS estimation. 
 Among the eleven models the model that gives the most reasonable 
price and scale flexibilities is chosen. The first criteria requires the 
compensated own price flexibility to be negative. The second criteria 
express the scale flexibility in the range of zero to minus one. None of 
the models were reasonable in relation to both criteria. Therefore, the 
model with reasonable own price flexibilities was chosen. The result of 
the Johansen test for the chosen model is presented in Table 6.3. 
 
Table 6.3: Multivariate Johansen Test - market shares of plaice and herring, 
quantities of plaice, herring and cod and Stones Index 
Model H0: rank=p Eigenvalues Trace Test C90% 
Period = 1986.1-2001.4  p=0 0.52 117.68* 97.17 
Lag = 4 p<=1 0.47 74.07*** 71.66 
64 observations p<=2 0.21 36.27 49.92 
 p<=3 0.17 22.30 31.88 
 p<=4 0.13 11.03 17.79 
 p<=5 0.04 2.49 7.50 
     
Note: */*** = significance at 1 and 10 percent levels, respectively.  
 
From Table 6.3 it is seen that the rank is two at a 10 % level. On the 
basis of two co-integration relations, the exact identification and over-
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identification restrictions (16) and (18)-(20) are imposed. The 
parameters of the β vector are: 
 
 
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X' tβ  (21) 
 
The first row is the parameter estimates for plaice, while the second row 
is the parameter estimates for herring. Based on symmetry, homogeneity 
and adding-up the parameters for cod may be found. However, for the 
purpose of highlighting whether IAIDS can be used for welfare 
estimation it is sufficient to calculate the intercept. Based on adding-up 
the intercept for the cod demand function is – 1.859.  
 In the next section the estimated parameters are used to show whether 
IAIDS can be used for calculating consumer surplus. 
 
3.4 Welfare measurement. 
The usefulness of IAIDS for welfare measurement is analysed in this 
section. For the cod market IAIDS cannot be used for measuring 
consumer surplus because the intercept is negative. Thus, as a 
consequence of adding-up IAIDS may be unsuitable for measuring 
welfare. 
 For the herring and plaice market, the slope of the demand curve can 
be calculated by (14)4. In calculating the slope of the demand function 
for herring and plaice, it is chosen to insert actual values for the Stone 
Index and the quantities for other species. If consumer surplus is going 
to be calculated in a given year, actual values for the involved variables 
must be inserted in the estimated demand function (21). In calculating 
the slope of the demand function for plaice, the first row in (21) is used, 
while the second row in (21) is used when the slope is calculated for 
herring. It is chosen to present the slopes as a function of the quantities. 
By presenting the results in this way, the original demand curve can be 
analysed. The slope of the demand function for plaice is shown in 
Figure 6.4, while Figure 6.5 presents the slope of the demand function 
for herring. 
 
                                                                      
4 An alternative is to draw the actual demand curve. However, the actual demand 
curve is already drawn in Figure 2, so it is chosen to calculate the slopes. 
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Figure 6.4: The slope of the demand curve for plaice 
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Figure 6.5: The slope of the demand curve for herring 
0
0,0002
0,0004
0,0006
0,0008
0,001
0,0012
0,0014
0 10.000 20.000 30.000 40.000 50.000 60.000 70.000 80.000
quantity of herring
sl
op
e 
of
 th
e 
de
m
an
d 
fu
nc
tio
n
 
 
From Figure 6.4 and 6.5 it is seen that the slopes of the demand 
functions follow exactly the same pattern for plaice and herring. The 
slopes are positive and decreasing in quantities. The implication of a 
positive slope is that IAIDS is not well suited for calculating consumer 
surplus. Calculating welfare on a demand curve with a positive slope 
simply gives no meaning. 
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 In section 2 it was mentioned that the true demand curve was locally 
approximated with a second-order equation. This implies, as sketched in 
Figure 6.2, that a parable represents the demand function and this fact 
explains the decreasing slope. An implication of this is that negative 
price flexibilities may be obtained even if the demand function has a 
positive slope. This would occur if the local approximation point (the 
point where the flexibilities are calculated) lies in the negative sloped 
part of the parable. However, despite this fact, the conclusion is that 
IAIDS is not well suited for welfare measurement where the demand 
curve has a positive slope.  
 
4. Conclusion 
In this paper it has been analysed whether IAIDS can be used for 
measuring welfare in the form of consumer surplus. An IAIDS has been 
estimated for three species of fish (cod, plaice and herring) and it has 
been shown that in calculating welfare of the present goods, IAIDS is 
not well suited. For one species a negative intercept is obtained, while a 
positive slope of the demand curve is obtained for the two other species. 
 The empirical results confirm that one should be careful in using the 
IAIDS for welfare analysis, but the results are not sufficient reason to 
abandon the use of IAIDS for welfare analysis generally. Due to the 
parable formed demand curve, the IAIDS is not suitable for global 
welfare analysis. Furthermore, the IAIDS is not suitable for relative 
welfare analysis, since global welfare cannot be determined. Moreover, 
welfare analysis cannot be made for positively sloped demand curves, 
but provided that the slopes are negative, welfare analysis might be 
possible under certain circumstances. Given the negative slopes of the 
demand curves, welfare analysis is possible marginally around the 
optimal point. Welfare can then potentially be determined either by 
calculating the integer below the demand curve or by extrapolation of 
price flexibilities from the optimal point. Calculating the integer may, 
however, give spurious results, provided that the marginal change is 
sufficient large to cross the peak of the parable formed demand curve 
shown in Figure 2. Hence, the only secure method for calculating 
marginal welfare changes is extrapolation, following Teisl et al (2002). 
On this basis, the IAIDS possess several shortcomings in welfare 
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analysis, but can be used marginally to assess small policy changes 
under certain conditions.  
 Despite the shortcomings of the IAIDS for welfare measurement, 
IAIDS remain valid to identify market structures by calculating 
flexibilities. The reason is that IAIDS is a local second-order 
approximation to the true demand curve. When flexibilities are 
calculated, the analysis is restricted to the local approximation point, 
which is in the area where the demand curve has a negative slope.  
 Traditionally, IAIDS has been estimated with SUR models. However, 
a new development in the AIDS literature is to use co-integration to 
estimate demand parameters. Co-integration departs from an assumption 
that the involved variables are non-stationary and with co-integration it 
is possible to test the theoretical restrictions. In this paper co-integration 
is used, which makes the paper a novel contribution to the estimation of 
IAIDS systems.  
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Abstract. The purpose of this paper is to introduce a new method 
capable of evaluating the economic welfare for quality graded fish 
products using the hedonic price method for plaice in Denmark. Today 
no labelling scheme exists for the final consumers of different qualities 
of fish. A scheme does only exist at the first hand market. On this basis, 
a general applicable theoretical and empirical method is developed to 
compare the costs and benefits of the hypothetical choice between the 
total absence of labelling and the presence of a public labelling scheme, 
which fully inform consumers on the quality and simultaneously allow 
the producers to differentiate prices between quality grades. Under 
certain assumptions it is shown that the economic welfare associated 
with a public labelling scheme is at minimum 263,000 euro. Sensitivity 
analysis shows that this result is robust. The policy implication is that a 
public labelling scheme should not be implemented as the demand and 
cost functions have low elasticities, implying that the welfare gain is 
low. 
 
Key words: Co-integration, fish quality, hedonic pricing, public 
labelling scheme, welfare. 
 
JEL classifications: L11, Q21, Q22. 
 
1. Introduction  
The objective of the present paper is to introduce a new method for 
calculating the economic value of fish quality, thereby being able to 
evaluate the economic rational for implementing a public labelling 
scheme for fish quality in the retail market for plaice in Denmark. The 
rationale is evaluated by comparing the welfare of total absence of 
labelling with the welfare in the presence of a full public labelling 
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scheme, where perfect information prevail and where producers 
differentiate prices accordingly. The economic welfare is calculated 
both with and without labelling, thereby identifying the rise in welfare 
associated with the introduction of labelling. This is done under two 
alternative assumptions on the reaction of the market. In the first case it 
is assumed that the price adjustment in the market remains unchanged 
despite the introduction of the public labelling scheme while the second 
case establishes a market reaction which leads to a social optimum. 
Thereby, a lower and an upper limit of the welfare associated with a 
public labelling scheme appears. Price differentiation is assumed 
possible only with labelling, with prices being higher for higher quality 
fish. Without labelling fish of all qualities are sold at the same price. 
The hypothesis of the paper is that the benefit of the introduction of a 
public labelling scheme of plaice quality is small, since demand for fish 
generally is inflexible to changing quantities (Nielsen (1999)). This is 
further underlined by the relative insignificance of supply of one 
country to the total market. Provided that this is the case, the costs might 
be larger than the benefit and the scheme should not be implemented for 
rational economic reasons.  
 The empirical analysis departs from the first-hand market for plaice 
in Denmark, where the European Council Directive (no. 2406 of 1996) 
on the common marketing standards for fish products is in force. 
According to this, quality grading of fish in all landing markets in the 
EU is obligatory. Welfare is defined as consumer and producer surplus, 
with and without labelling, and since the present data are quality 
differentiated, consumers are through intermediate purchasers per se 
able to judge quality and the market is informed. Hence, the available 
quality differentiated data represent a situation where labelling is 
present. There is, however, no comparable data available representing a 
situation without labelling, i.e. data from a non-informed markets is not 
available. Therefore, it is assumed throughout the paper that the average 
demand function of the informed market serves as an approximation for  
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the demand function on the non-informed market1. Furthermore, the 
present quality differentiation of the first-hand market serves as an 
approximation of the welfare premium at the retail market. Welfare 
appears from estimating demand and cost functions. The demand 
functions for consistently aggregated plaice products are identified using 
co-integration, since data are non-stationary. The cost functions are 
identified using a simple calculation procedure. Comparing the welfare 
with and without a public labelling scheme identifies the welfare effects 
of the potential introduction of a full scheme.  
 The welfare calculations are based on prices in the first-hand market, 
implying that these are the prices the consumers pay. Hence, an implicit 
assumption is that trade of plaice in Denmark takes place directly 
between the fishermen and the final consumers or, alternatively, that a 
fixed mark-up in the intermediate trade equal to costs prevail in the 
trade. Both assumptions have a similar outcome for the economic 
argument and imply that fishermen earn the producer surplus, while the 
final consumers earn the consumer surplus. In reality, a whole supply 
chain is present when plaice is traded in Denmark. When the fish is 
caught it is most often sold through the auction system. A part of the 
catch of plaice is exported as fresh and chilled plaice primarily to the 
European market. A large part goes to fish processing factories from 
which it reaches the market mostly through Danish and European 
supermarket chains. For each supply chain in this business procedure a 
market exist and, thereby, a consumer and producer surplus is earned. 
Therefore, the calculated welfare does not include the consumer and 
producer surplus earned in the remaining part of the supply chain.  
 The issue of quality is important in fish markets, since consumers 
cannot necessarily distinguish quality of plaice. Although it might be 
possible for some consumers to distinguish quality of fresh plaice before 
purchase, for example through the smell, the look of the eyes and the 
consistency of the flesh, it is generally presumed that only some 
consumers have this ability. Furthermore, it is more difficult for 
                                                                      
1 Better data of the non-informed market would be desirable, but have not been 
available. The implication is that the validity of the empirical results rests on the 
assumption that the average demand function of the informed market can represent 
the demand function of the non-informed market. 
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consumers to distinguish quality of processed products, such as fillets 
and breaded fillets, before purchase. It might be possible to distinguish 
the quality of these product forms during consumption, but even then it 
might not be the case for several consumers. Contrary, it can be argued 
that since fish purchase in most instances is a repeated game, the 
purchase of bad quality would simply lead the consumer not to abstain 
from further purchase but to change supplier. In other words, it is 
assumed that the demand function is unchanged by the experience of 
bad quality. This implies that consumers might be able to judge the 
quality during consumption. Therefore, it remains uncertain whether 
consumers in general actually can distinguish the quality of plaice, but 
since the majority of plaice landed in Denmark are sold in processed 
forms it is assumed throughout this paper that consumers cannot 
distinguish. The ability of consumers to judge quality might be decisive 
for whether the introduction of a public labelling scheme is relevant. If 
they cannot distinguish the quality, the introduction of labelling solves a 
potential information problem, but if they have the ability to distinguish 
the quality, the scheme can be considered unnecessary. However, 
despite their possible ability to distinguish, consumers might be 
interested in the introduction of the scheme, since it implies that they 
can be perfectly certain on the quality. Such certainty might be 
important for consumers due to the utility of eating fish, but also as a 
signal of high food safety.  
 The implication of consumers being unable to judge quality is that an 
imperfect information problem arises. This situation has similarities 
with the problem discussed by Akerlof (1970) in the market for lemons. 
In this market the producers cheat the consumers by pretending that a 
good of low quality has high quality. Thereby, the producers increase 
their profit. In this paper an imperfect information approach similar to 
Akerlof (1970) is used. In the case without labelling it is assumed that 
an expected demand curve exist. This expected demand curve is 
calculated from the demand curves of different qualities using 
probabilities for the different quality levels. Now one, and only one, 
price is used to calculate the expected quantity of fish that is consumed. 
One price for fish exists because of imperfect information. A public 
labelling scheme meets this information problem and distributes the fish 
  
7-5 
of high quality to the consumers who prefer them. Furthermore, it can 
support the producers by allowing them to differentiate prices.  
 The issue is also interesting in relation to the choice between public 
and private labelling schemes in that a compulsory public labelling 
scheme is normally introduced for the benefits it brings to society. 
Contrary, it can be argued that a private labelling scheme is launched if 
it is profitable for the companies participating and the companies 
voluntarily joining the scheme. This type of labelling does not 
necessarily lead to the maximisation of total welfare. Instead, private 
labelling is meant to differentiate the market so as to differentiate the 
prices and transfer consumer surplus into producer surplus. Hence, if 
labelling shall be introduced according to a cost-benefit criteria, the 
welfare should necessarily include both consumer and producer 
surpluses and the gain to society must be higher than the costs 
associated with developing, monitoring and controlling the scheme. In 
the Nordic countries labelling schemes are most often introduced, 
monitored and controlled by the public.  
 In the economic literature, economics of information with regard to 
consumption have developed over several years, starting at least from 
Nelson (1970), who introduced “search costs“ attributable to the time 
and energy spend by the consumer to determine and obtain the products 
with the desired quality. Based on the Lancaster (1971) theory of 
characteristics, Nelson (1974) distinguish between search and 
experience characteristics of goods, where consumers can determine the 
properties, including quality, of a search characteristics before they buy 
the good, while the properties of experience characteristics are only 
appearing during consumption. Darni and Karni (1973) further 
introduce the credence characteristics, where consumers cannot 
determine the properties of the good at all, not even after they have 
consumed it. According to Caswell (1998), labelling of fish has the 
effect of transforming the experience and credence characteristics into 
search characteristics, thereby increasing welfare.  
 Another direction in the literature is the principal-agent approach, 
which is developed as a recent solution to the problems of imperfect 
information (Varian (1992)). This approach applies a solution of a 
tax/subsidy mechanism to correct the market failure that arises with 
imperfect information. An alternative to the principal-agent approach is 
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labelling in the situation where imperfect and asymmetric information 
exists in the consumer market. The producers know the quality of the 
fish products whereas the consumer is uninformed and the labelling 
solution to this asymmetry is studied in this paper.  
 A few studies also identify consumers of labelling empirically. 
Wessels et al. (1999) and Pickering et al. (2001) estimate consumer 
willingness to pay for seafood labelling using stated preference 
methods. By focusing on consumer willingness to pay the production 
side of the economy is ignored. This paper applies the revealed 
preference method of hedonic pricing to measure consumer benefit of 
the quality property contrary to Wessels et al. (1999) and Pickering et 
al. (2001). The authors are not aware of the existence of any articles 
identifying the total welfare of labelling of fish products including both 
consumer and producers surplus. Neither are the authors aware of 
articles modelling market reactions on the introduction of labelling 
which leads to the social optimum, nor of articles using co-integration in 
the estimation of the demand system as the basis for welfare analysis.  
 The paper is outlined as follows. In section 2 a theoretical model for 
calculating the economic welfare of a public labelling program is 
presented, while demand and cost functions are estimated in section 3. 
Section 4 presents the results of the cost-benefit analysis and section 5 
discuss´ the results and the implications of the findings.  
 
2. Theory 
In this section the theory behind calculating the economic value of fish 
quality is sketched. Within the theory of valuing the benefits of 
environmental goods two traditions, stated and revealed preferences, 
exist. Stated preference methods include contingent valuation (Mitchell 
and Carson (1981)) and the idea behind this method is to ask consumers 
to state their preferences for a non-market good using direct survey 
methods. Revealed preference methods include the travel cost method 
(McConnell (1985)) and the hedonic price method (Harrison and 
Rubenfeld (1978)). Travel cost methods are based on the fact that 
private resources are sacrificed in order to consume an environmental 
good. This is used to estimate a demand curve. The idea behind the 
hedonic method is that differences in the level of an environmental good 
are reflected in the price of a private good. In this paper, the hedonic 
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price method is used, because differences in the level of fish quality are 
assumed reflected in the price of fish. 
 In the introduction it was mentioned that the purpose of the paper 
was to evaluate whether a public labelling scheme of fish should be 
implemented. Therefore, a model for the market of fish with and 
without a public labelling scheme is necessary. First, a model for the 
fish market with a public labelling scheme is introduced. Assume that 
trade of fish takes place directly between consumers and fishermen and 
three qualities of fish, s1, s2 and s3, exist, where 1 express the highest 
quality and 3 the lowest quality. si for i =1,2 and 3 is assumed to be a 
discrete variable. With a public labelling scheme different prices for 
different qualities can exist. Therefore, three different demand functions 
are postulated: P1 =f1(q1, s1), P2 = f2(q2, s2) and P3 = f3(q3, s3) where Pi  
for i = 1, 2 and 3 is the price and qi for i = 1, 2 and 3 is the quantity2. 
For each quality of fish a cost function, Ci(qi) for i = 1,2 and 3, is also 
assumed to exist. The cost function measures the opportunity cost of 
catching fish. A regulatory authority (society) maximises the net benefit 
of the fishing activity. This net benefit can be defined as: 
 
∫ ∫∫ −−−++
2 31
0 0´ 332211333322221111
)()()(),(),(),(
q qq
o
qCqCqCdqsqfdqsqfdqsqfMax  (1) 
s.t.  
Kqqq ≤++ 321  (2) 
 
where K is a quota. (2) is a quota restriction expressing that the sum of 
catches of all qualities must not exceed the quota. 
 Assuming a binding quota restriction, the first-order conditions are: 
 
0MC)s,q(f 1111 =−− λ  (3) 
0MC)s,q(f 2222 =−− λ  (4) 
                                                                      
2 In the theoretical model, it is assumed that the price of one quality only depends 
on the consumed quantity of that quality grade. In reality, fish of various qualities 
are substituted and in the empirical model such substitution is included. However, 
the possibility of substitution between qualities does not change the theoretical 
argument and therefore this possibility is excluded, although cross-price effects 
can also easily be included in the theoretical model. 
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0MC)s,q(f 3333 =−− λ  (5) 
 
where MCi for i = 1,2 and 3 is the marginal cost and λ is a positive 
Lagrange multiplier included due to the quota restriction. Because 1 
express the highest quality and 3 the lowest quality a natural assumption 
is that MC1 > MC2 > MC3. Because λ is the same for all three qualities 
this implies that P1 > P2 > P3. 
 λ is the shadow price of the quota restriction and measures the loss in 
welfare of catching fish of one quality due to lost catch opportunities of 
other qualities. In this way λ captures the social cost of an externality, 
which can be labelled the quota externality. The quota externality arises 
because catches of fish of one quality implies a cost in terms of 
decreased catch possibilities of other qualities. When the quota is set in 
an economic optimal way the quota externality is exactly equal to what 
is commonly referred to as the stock externality (Clark (1991)). 
   
The social optimal solution is illustrated in Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1. The social optimal solution with labelling 
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Because λ is equal for all qualities, it is social optimal to select 
quantities such that P1 – MC1 = P2 – MC2 = P3 – MC3. Thus, the 
  
7-9 
implication is that the social optimum occurs where prices are equal to a 
common mark-up over marginal cost. The mark-up over marginal cost 
reflects the cost of the quota externality (stock externality). 
 The difference between the price and marginal cost must be equal to 
λ for all qualities. Therefore, q1*, q2* and q3* is the social optimal 
quantity of fish of quality 1, 2 and 3 and P1*, P2* and P3* is the optimal 
prices. The total consumer surplus for all three qualities is abP1* + 
cdP2* + efP3* while P1*bg0 + P2*dh0 + P3*fi0 is the total producer 
surplus. The total welfare, assuming that a labelling scheme induces 
optimal quantities, is the sum of producer and consumer surplus. 
However, there is no guarantee that the market will secure q1*, q2* and 
q3* and the total welfare calculated in Figure 1 is, therefore, an upper 
estimate of the welfare. A lower estimate must, therefore, also be 
established. In Table I the actual prices of various qualities, P1´, P2´and 
P3´, is reported. The quantities of different qualities, q1´, q2´and q3´, 
assuming actual prices may now be found from the equations P1´=f1(q1´, 
s1), P2´=f2(q2´, s2) and P3´= f3(q3´, s3)1. In addition, the marginal costs 
may be found by solving MC1´=MC1(q1´), MC2´= MC2´(q2´) and MC3´= 
MC3´(q3´). By using Pi´, qi´ and MCi´ for i =1, 2 and 3, consumer and 
producer surplus and, thereby, welfare, can be calculated assuming 
current prices. This can be considered as a lower estimate for the 
welfare achieved by a public labelling program, because an implicit 
assumption is that no market reaction occurs. 
 Now turn to the case without labelling. Consumers cannot distinguish 
between various qualities of fish and, therefore, one price exists in the 
market for fish. Assume that a probability, 3 and 2 1,i for i =π exist for 
consuming a fish of quality i. Now an expected market demand function 
can be defined as P = m(q), where P is the common price and q is the 
aggregated output. In addition, an industry cost function can be defined 
as C = C(q). Turn now to societies maximisation problem without 
labelling which can be written as: 
 
))q(Cdq)q(m(Max
q
0∫ −  (6) 
 
s.t.  
q < K (7) 
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 In the case of a binding quota restriction, it follows that: 
 
q* = K (8) 
 
(8) express that the quantity caught is equal to the quota. 
 The first order condition of the maximisation problem is: 
m(q) – MC – λ = 0 (9) 
 
λ is the positive shadow price for the quota restriction, not necessarily 
equal to λ in equations 3-5. λ expresses that fish caught by one 
fisherman has an opportunity cost in terms of lost fishing opportunities 
for other fishermen. In this instance, λ is again a measure of the quota 
externality. Because λ > 0, P > MC and for the society it is again 
optimal to select quantities such that the prices are larger than the 
marginal cost. The difference between price and marginal cost reflects 
the quota externality and, thereby, the stock externality if the quota is set 
in an economic optimal way. 
 
Figure 2. illustrates the solution. 
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In Figure 2 the optimal quantity is q* and this optimal quantity is equal 
to the quota. P* is the optimal price and the price is larger than the 
marginal cost reflecting the quota externality. The total producer surplus 
is P*fg0, while P*af is the consumers surplus. The sum of producer and 
consumer surplus is the total welfare. 
 As in the case of labelling the welfare sketched in Figure 2 is an 
upper bound for total welfare because optimal quantities are assumed. A 
lower bound is obtained by using the current average price, P´, in Table 
I. Now the quantities are found by the equation P´= m(q´) and the 
marginal costs by the equation MC´ = MC(q´). On basis of P´, q´ and 
MC´ a lower bound for consumer and producer surplus and, thereby, 
welfare can be calculated. 
 Irrespectively of whether current or optimal prices are used the net 
benefit of a public labelling program may be found. Let WUL be the 
economic welfare without labelling and WL the net benefit with 
labelling. Now NB = WL – WUL is the net benefit of a public labelling 
program. Assume, further, that a cost of PC of implementing a public 
labelling program is induced to society. If NB > PC the labelling 
program shall be implemented, while the program shall not be 
implemented if PC > NB. Such calculations will be performed in 
section 4 for plaice in Denmark 
 
3. Empirical estimations 
In this section, the demand and cost functions are identified for plaice 
traded in the Danish market. Before that, however, data is examined.  
 Data on plaice landings in Denmark were obtained from the Danish 
Directorate of Fisheries. The data are monthly, cover the period January 
1993 to December 1998 and includes both landings of domestic and 
foreign fishermen. The data are sorted into quality extra (E-quality), A-
quality, B-quality and not admitted, in accordance with the Council 
Regulation (1996) laying down the common marketing standards for 
certain fishery products. The quality differentiation is defined for 
freshness and includes the colour of the skin and skin mocus, the look of 
the eye, gills and peritoneum (in gutted fish), the smell of gills and 
abdominal cavities and the consistency of the flesh. 
 The data are available in volume, value and average price for 
different quality grades. The average prices are in fixed prices corrected 
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using the consumer price index. Data summary statistics are presented 
in Table I as yearly averages.  
 
Table I. Data summary statistics, yearly average, 1993-98 
 Quantity 
/tonnes 
Price 
/euro per kilo 
Plaice:   
Grade E 7,104 1.86 
Grade A 16,728 1.68 
Grade B 24 1.08 
Not admitted 2,172 0.40 
Total 26,028 1.62 
 
Table I shows that 92% of total landings in the 72 periods (months) are 
graded as E, A and B-fish. It, further, appears that two-third is graded as 
A-fish and that the average price increases with the level of quality as 
expected. The average price of the not admitted fish, however, shows 
huge fluctuations over time. The reason is that this grade is used as a 
residual where fish incorrectly graded are entered. Due to the presence 
of this situation, the not admitted fish are excluded from further 
analysis. Furthermore, the total landings of approximately 26,000 tonnes 
correspond to the quota, assuming perfect quota utilisation. Finally, it 
appears that the prices of E and A fish are relatively similar, while B-
fish are cheaper.  
 The methodology used to identify demand functions starts with the 
estimation of a simple average inverse linear demand function, where 
the inverse form is selected since in the case of fisheries it is, according 
to Wilen (2000), quantity that is predetermined at the market level due 
to the widespread use of quantity regulation. The linear form is selected 
since it might be globally decreasing and have a positive intercept, 
implying that it is possible to calculate the consumer surplus3. The 
average demand function of all sales in the situation with an informed 
market is selected as an approximation for the demand function in a 
hypothetical situation with a non-informed market.  
                                                                      
3 This is not the case in an Inverse Almost Ideal Demand system, since it is based 
on a second order approximation around the optimal point of the true preference 
structure (see Jensen, Nielsen and Roth (2003)). 
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 The regression equation for the demand function ( ) qqmP o 1γγ −==  is, 
however, only valid for stationary data series. A data series is stationary 
if it moves randomly around a constant mean over time and non-
stationary if it follows a trend. A non-stationary data series is integrated 
of degree one, i.e. I(1), if its first differences moves randomly around a 
constant mean over time. For an I(1) data series the Johansen co-
integration rank procedure must, therefore, be used. Hence, since all 
data were tested for the presence of unit roots using Augmented Dickey-
Fuller tests found to be I(1), co-integration must be used. A traditional 
vector auto regressive model in error correction form with the constant 
restricted to the co-integration space and the parameter estimates 
unrestricted is used following e.g. Jaffry, Pascoe and Robinson (1999).  
 Based on the estimated average demand function, individual demand 
functions can be identified, provided that the prices of the different 
quality grades are formed within the same market. This follows from the 
Composite Commodity Theorem of Lewbel (1996), which states that if 
two or more price series can be described by the same common factor, 
the relative prices remain fixed and prices will move together over time. 
Thus, a composite commodity can be constructed. It is, however, a 
“reverse” use, since in a situation where the theorem is in force, the 
average demand function is disaggregated into three individual demand 
functions. This is done knowing that the individual demand curves are 
parallel to the average demand curve, since a price change in one of the 
commodities affects the quantity of the commodity in the same direction 
and scale. Therefore, the individual demand curves are calculated given 
the knowledge that they are parallel to the average demand curve with 
the distance between them given by the difference in average prices.  
 It follows that it must be tested whether the prices of the different 
quality grades are formed within the same market. This is done using 
the Stigler (1969) definition of a market as “the area within which the 
price is determined, allowances being made for quality differences”. 
The basis is the traditional test of the Law of One Price (LOP) for I(1) 
data, where trending prices must move perfectly together over time in 
order to be formed within the same market. Asche, Bremnes and 
Wessells (1999) provide with their model the point of departure, with 
the only difference being that the present estimation is with a trend term 
restricted to the co-integration space. The reason is that the quality 
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which caused price differences are then also allowed to be non-
stationary. Provided that the co-integration test identifies one (and only 
one) integrating factor which is common to all the price series and that 
the test of the LOP shows that the LOP is in force, prices follow each 
other over time and, thus, the individual demand curves are parallel to 
the average demand curve.  
 The average demand function was estimated without misspecification 
problems for a model with 8 lags and eleven centred seasonal dummies 
included. The misspecification tests included autocorrelation, normality 
and autoregressive conditional heteroscedasticity tests and conclusions 
on the absence of misspecification problems are obtained at the 5% 
significance level. The result of the Johansen test is reported in Table II.  
 
Table II. Johansen test with average price and quantity included 
Model H0: rank=p Eigenvalues Trace test1 C95% 
Period = 93.01-98.12 P=0 0.18 19.87*** 19.99 
Lags = 8 p<=1 0.10 6.91 9.13 
11 seasonal dummies     
72 observations     
     
Note:  1. */*** = Significant at the 1 and 10 percent levels, according to critical 
values known from Johansen (1996). 
 
It appears that a rank of one is obtained at the 10% level as required, 
implying that the function can be exact identified. The average demand 
function for plaice landed in Denmark is identified as 
qp *0000011.08.15 −= .  
 Given that prices of the different quality grades of plaice are formed 
within the same market, the individual demand functions of the different 
quality grades can be identified. In order to ensure that the different 
quality grades are formed within the same market, co-integration tests 
and tests of the LOP must be performed. This was done for a model 
with 8 lags, with a trend restricted to the co-integration space and with 
eleven centred seasonal dummies included. Again, the model was 
estimated without misspecification problems. The results appear in 
Table III.  
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Table III. Multivariate Johansen test of the price series and test of the LOP 
Model H0: rank=p Eigenvalues Trace test1 C95% 
Period = 93.01-98.12 P=0 0.34 49.55* 42.20 
Lags = 8 p<=1 0.22 23.42*** 25.47 
11 seasonal dummies p<=2 0.11 7.42 12.39 
72 observations     
     
 
Table III shows that a rank of two was found on the 10% level between 
the price series for the three quality grades of plaice. The Likelihood 
Ratio test statistics is 7.14 and accepting a p-value of 3%, the test of the 
LOP was also accepted. This implies that the LOP is in force and prices 
of the different quality grades of plaice move together over time. Thus, 
prices are formed within the same perfectly integrated market and the 
individual demand functions can be identified. This is done knowing 
that the slopes are the same as the slope of the average demand function 
and with the differences in intercepts of the individual demand functions 
given by the differences between average prices. Thereby, the three 
individual demand functions are given by: 
 
EE qp *0000011.06.17 −=  (10) 
AA qp *0000011.02.16 −=  (11) 
BB qp *0000011.08.11 −=  (12) 
 
The estimated demand curves have, as expected, a very low elasticity.  
 In order to calculate the expected market demand curve, some 
probabilities for the various quality levels are necessary. Assume that 
the output shares are an estimate for these probabilities. In this case the 
expected demand function is given by the average demand function: 
 
qp *0000011.08.15 −=   (13) 
 
(13) has a very low elasticity. 
 The methodology used to identify the cost functions is based on that 
the costs reflect opportunity costs. This implies that the costs of an 
activity are the benefit loss of using the resources in an alternative way. 
However, assuming perfect competition in the economy the opportunity 
cost of fishing is exactly the costs associated with the fishing activity. 
This implies that the account statistics in Anon (1998) can be used to 
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calculate the economic costs associated with fishing plaice of various 
qualities in Denmark. However, because account statistics are only 
available for five years it is impossible to estimate a cost function using 
econometric methods. Therefore, a method in Jensen (2002) is applied 
to determine a cost function. The idea in this method is to calculate a 
cost parameter based on information on total costs and catches of each 
quality. 
 First, it is necessary to calculate economic costs from the account 
statistics. The idea is to take the total expenditures for all species 
harvested minus depreciations. Then, assuming that the skipper has an 
alternative employment opportunity equal to the wage rate for 
employment in the fishing sector, the cost of the skipper is added to the 
total costs. Taking the share of plaice of the total revenue and 
multiplying with the total cost of all species gives the total cost of 
plaice. Then, total cost of various qualities of plaice is found by 
multiplying the total cost of plaice by the share of the quality category 
of output. Now the following cost functions are assumed: 
 
2
EE eqTC =  (14)  
2
AA fqTC =  (15) 
2
BB gqTC =  (16) 
 
Calculation shows that e = 0.0000064, f = 0.0000018 and g = 
0.00000099 and the hypothesis that MCE > MCA >MCB is confirmed4. 
The parameter estimates show that marginal cost functions is inelastic. 
 The total cost function for all plaice for the case without labelling is 
correspondingly established, but now on the basis of aggregated costs 
and the aggregated catches of all plaice. This market cost function is 
assumed given by: 
 
2hqTC =  (17) 
 
Where h = 0.00000018. Again the marginal cost function is inelastic. 
                                                                      
4 The background data on the calculation of the parameters in (14)-(16) are 
available from the corresponding author on request. 
 
  
7-17 
4. The net benefit of a public labelling program 
The economic welfare associated with implementing a public labelling 
scheme is calculated in this section on the basis of the parameters 
estimated in section 3, using the models of section two5.  
 With regard to social optimal prices and quantities with labelling, it 
turns out that the actual price for grade E and A is too small. It would be 
more beneficial to society to supply less of grade E and A and, thereby, 
increase the price of these two grades. With regard to grade B the price 
is too high and the quantity supplied is too small. In the case without 
labelling the social optimal price is larger than the actual average price. 
In the case of labelling λ = 0.72 euro per kilo indicate that prices are 
considerably higher than the marginal costs, while λ = 0,44 euro per kilo 
without labelling. The values of λ in the case without labelling explain 
why the optimal price is larger than the actual price. 
 With respect to the lower bound (actual prices), the quantities 
calculated are larger than the actual quantities and equal to the quota.  
 The calculated welfare is reported in Table IV. 
 
Table IV. Social welfare, euro per year 
  Consumers 
surplus 
Producers  
surplus 
Total  
Welfare 
Welfare 
gain 
Upper bound      
 With labelling 359,000 275,000 634,000 301,000 
 Without labelling 206,000 127,000 333,000  
Lower bound      
 With labelling 264,000 240,000 504,000 263,000 
 Without labelling 150,000 91,000 241,000  
 
The welfare gain obtained by introducing a public labelling program is 
301,000 euro when optimal values are used and 263,000 euro when 
actual values are used. The difference between these numbers is not 
large and it is reasonable to assume that the real welfare gain lies 
between these numbers. Taking the lower bound as a point of departure, 
the distribution of the welfare gain is 114,000 euro to consumers and 
                                                                      
5 The equations for the social optimal quantities, prices and marginal costs as well 
as for the calculation of consumer and producer surpluses are derived on the based 
of the model in section two. These derivations are not reported, but available from 
the corresponding author on request. 
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149,000 euro to producers. Thus, even though both groups gain from the 
introduction of the public labelling scheme, the gain of producers are 
largest with a 165% increase compared to the producer surplus without 
labelling. The rise of consumer surplus compared to without labelling is 
75%. However, the total welfare gain only represent 0.6% gain on total 
turn-over of 42 million euro.   
 The results may be sensible to variations in the estimated parameters. 
Therefore, sensitivity analyses are performed. The slopes and the 
intercepts of the demand function for all the three quality grades as well 
as for the cost parameter are varied by +/- 20% in both the upper and 
lower bound. The results are not reported, but shows that when the 
intercepts of the demand functions are varied by +/- 20%, the welfare 
gains does not change with more than 6% in any of the cases. Varying 
the slope of the demand functions yields changes not larger than 3% and 
varying the cost parameter change the welfare gains by not more than 
12%. Hence, the total benefit remains approximately unchanged with 
varying parameters when a public labelling program is considered. The 
welfare gains are at minimum 263,000 euro. Instigating a public 
labelling scheme at a cost less than the welfare gain is hardly possible 
and this leads to the conclusion that such a program should not be 
implemented. The low welfare gain appears because the cost and 
demand functions are inelastic. 
 
5. Discussion 
In this paper it has been shown that a public labelling scheme for plaice 
in the retail market of Denmark yield a benefit to society at a minimum 
of 263,000 euro per year. If the cost of introducing, monitoring and 
controlling this scheme is less than this benefit, it was found that the 
scheme would be a net welfare gain to society. Furthermore, it was 
shown that both producers and consumers would gain. The gain in 
producer surplus causes a market reaction induced by price 
differentiation. The consumer surplus increase as the consumers who 
prefers high quality actually also obtains this quality. The gain of 
producers was, however, larger than for consumers. All results were 
robust to changes in the parameter estimates.  
 The minimum benefit of 263,000 euro of introducing a public 
labelling scheme represents more than a doubling of welfare compared 
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to the market situation without labelling. Compared to the gross 
turnover in the market of  42 million euro, however, the gain represents 
only 0.6%. Hence, even though the relative increase in welfare 
following the introduction of labelling is large, the absolute welfare both 
before and after the introduction of labelling as well as the welfare 
compared to gross turnover are small, due to inelastic supply and 
demand. The hypothesis of the paper is then confirmed. Therefore, 
despite that information on the costs of the introduction of the public 
labelling scheme is not available it is highly unlikely that a public 
labelling scheme can be set up at such low costs. This implies that a 
public labelling scheme according to economic arguments should not be 
set up.  
 The argument that some consumers, as opposed to the a priori 
assumption in the paper, might be able to distinguish quality, points in 
the same direction. The reason is that the introduction of a public 
labelling scheme might then be unnecessary for consumers. For 
producers, however, the option of price differentiation introduced with 
the labelling scheme will still result in the welfare gain. Therefore, the 
total welfare gain will be given only by the producer surplus and is 
therefore less than the gain in the case where consumers are assumed 
unable to judge quality. The consequence is again that a public labelling 
scheme, according to the cost-benefit argument, should not be set up.  
 The benefit of the 263,000 euro is, however, for at least three reasons 
a lower estimate of the true benefit. First, as explained in the theoretical 
section, the estimate is obtained by inserting actual prices in the demand 
function. Thereby, it is assumed that no market reaction to a public 
labelling scheme will occur. If a market reaction takes place welfare will 
increase. Second, behind the calculation of economic welfare is an 
implicit assumption that the market interactions between consumers and 
producers take place at the landing level. Thus, fish is directly 
transferred from the fisherman to the final consumer. However, the fish 
is traded though a supply-chain before the product reaches the final 
consumers and this supply chain also earns a producer and consumer 
surplus. Third, if a public labelling scheme is introduced for plaice it is 
most likely introduced for other species too. Thus, consumer and 
producer surplus is earned in the market for those species unless a fixed 
mark-up in the intermediate trade equal to costs prevail in the market. 
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However, with respect to the public cost of labelling there are 
economics of scope implying that this result does not preclude an 
economic rational labelling scheme for the total Danish fish market. 
 The hedonic price method is adopted in calculating the welfare gain. 
This method rests on an assumption that price differentials established 
in the market for plaice in Denmark at first-hand-sales reveals consumer 
preferences. These prices reflect a non-optimal market situation because 
consumers have imperfect information about the quality of fish. 
Furthermore, a very simple linear demand system is estimated. There 
are two reasons for this choice. First, in order to calculate welfare, 
demand curves with a globally negative slope and positive intercept 
must be required (Jensen, Nielsen and Roth (2003)). Second, the 
calculation of welfare in the case of labelling is complicated even with a 
simple linear demand system.  
 An implication of the theoretical analysis is that welfare optimal 
prices must be higher than marginal costs with a factor that captures the 
value of the quota externality (stock externality). The present market 
allocation of the quota on different quality grades differ from the 
optimal allocation between different quality grades. In the actual market 
fishermen maximises profit and the fishery is characterised by regulated 
open-access (Homans and Wilen (1997)) where average revenue is set 
equal to average cost on the margin. Above, it was mentioned that the 
optimal allocation should reflect the stock externality and that the 
difference between price and marginal cost is equal to the value of this 
externality.  
 The results have some practical implication. The structure in 
determining the quality of fish in the supply chain is that fishermen a 
priori catch fish of excellent quality. The quality of fish is preliminary 
determined by how the fish is treated by the fishermen after they are 
harvested. Therefore, it is reasonable to operate with a cost function for 
each quality grade and such a cost function is analysed in this paper. In 
the estimation section it is shown that fish of different qualities are 
traded on perfectly integrated markets. In other words, the fish is traded 
in a market, where prices move together over time. The implication of 
this is that the only difference between the different quality graded 
demand functions is the reservation price. On the producers side of the 
economy a high quality implies higher marginal costs and, thus, higher 
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price. Therefore, there is a trade-off between price, marginal costs and 
quality. Despite this trade-off total profit is higher for high quality 
because of higher willingness to pay. However, with labelling the 
producers will be willing to supply all quality grades of fish and will 
supply them until the marginal profit is equal for all quality grades. 
Even if a labelling scheme is introduced there are still market 
imperfections. Producers will still maximise profit and a stock 
externality remain. So despite the fact that labelling secures a welfare 
gain, it does not secure a welfare optimum. However, it is easy to secure 
a welfare optimal allocation of fish of different grades. A labelling 
scheme can be combined with an individual transferable quota system 
(ITQs). If the total quota is fixed and this total quota reflects the value 
of the stock externality this quota can be distributed to fishermen as 
ITQs. Trade among fishermen with ITQs will now occur until the 
marginal profit is equal between vessels and equal to the stock 
externality. In addition trade of ITQs among fishermen and the 
allocation of ITQs between grades within individual vessels will secure 
that the marginal profit is equal between grades. 
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CHAPTER 8 
 
Trade liberalisation, resource sustainability and welfare: The case of 
East Baltic cod 
 
Max Nielsen   
Submitted to Ecological Economics. 
 
Abstract.  
Recent research has warned that liberalising trade in capture fish 
products originating from inefficiently managed fisheries might cause 
over-exploitation, reduced fish stocks and thereby a reduced steady-state 
of welfare. This paper qualifies the warning in a case study of the East 
Baltic cod market by developing an age-structured bio-economic supply 
model combined with basic theory of trade between two countries. 
Welfare effects of trade liberalisation are identified taking fishing 
quotas, input limitations, mesh-size regulations and shared ownership of 
stocks into account. It is shown that even though liberalising trade in 
products supplied by such a fishery might cause steady-state welfare 
reductions in the supplier countries, these welfare reductions are small 
compared to the welfare gains from a hypothetical change to optimal 
management. Hence, the introduction of better fisheries management is 
much more important than trying to meet potential negative 
consequences of trade liberalisation, since even small improvements in 
fisheries management may offset the negative effects of trade 
liberalisation. The consequence is that the argument that warns against 
trade liberalisation in certain situations gains less validity, and 
conventional wisdom following from the Neo-classical theoretical 
tradition regains validity in several and probably most fish markets 
globally. 
 
Keywords: EU enlargement, trade liberalisation, fisheries management, 
shared stock, backward-bending supply, welfare.  
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1. Introduction 
The purpose of this paper is to identify the welfare effect of liberalising 
trade between two trading partners sharing ownership of a managed fish 
stock. Furthermore, the purpose is to construct an empirical model for 
welfare analysis of the enlargement of the European Union (EU) for the 
case of the East Baltic cod (Gadus Morhua) fishery. When trade 
between old and new EU countries is fully liberalised is total welfare 
increased or decreased? Who gains and who loses? Is it the consumers, 
the fishermen or the governments and are they in the new or the old 
member countries? Moreover, if the East Baltic Sea, which will be 
almost surrounded by EU countries, is used proactively by the new 
single management authority how will that affect welfare? Identifying 
the welfare effects allows an assessment of how the enlargement should 
be treated to ensure that all sectors in each country benefit fully. This is 
an especially pertinent issue, since the trade policy works as a tax, 
which constrains catches in exporter countries and subsidises the 
fisheries sector in the importer countries. Thus, the trade policy serves 
indirectly and unintentionally as a second best fisheries management 
tool.  
 The issue is important since a liberalisation of trade will cause 
overexploitation in exporter countries, if fisheries management is 
inefficient. The reason is that the price of the fish increases, causing an 
increment to the incentive to “race for fish” where the increased 
turnover following from the price increase is used for inefficient 
investment in fishing vessels. This limits the future catch potential. A 
consequence might be extinction of the fish stock. In importer countries 
the opposite effects result, since competition from foreign producers 
disappears, thereby reducing the pressure on the fish stock of the 
importer country. In the case of the cod stock in the East Baltic Sea, 
however, the issue is not that simple, since the stock is shared among 
new (exporting) EU member countries and old (importing). The shared 
stock is then affected in opposite directions by the different 
developments in the new and old member countries and the total effect 
on the stock and thereby on welfare is not a priori known. The effect 
depends on, for example, the management system in place and the 
market structure. If the effects in the exporter country offset those in the 
importer and fisheries management is inefficient, this requires action. 
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Thus the first hypothesis in this paper is that since the present 
management scheme is inefficiently used, the stock and welfare effect 
from trade liberalisation will be negative because the exporter country is 
a price-taker on the world market.  
 A welfare analysis is also interesting since with the enlargement of 
the EU the East Baltic Sea will be almost surrounded by EU countries. 
Thus, the EU Commission is the sole owner and manager of the stock. 
Hence, the potential for better fisheries management arises and if this 
potential is used and optimal management introduced, welfare gains will 
appear. The second hypothesis therefore is that such potential welfare 
gains will be large and will far exceed the size of the effects following 
from trade liberalisation. Even small improvements in fisheries 
management may offset possible negative effects of trade liberalisation.  
 In the economic literature, many authors have considered the issue of 
why trade arises. The history of general trade theory starts with Ricardo 
(1821) and Smith (1937) explaining the presence of international trade 
by the international division of labour and with specialisation resulting 
from differences in technology. The Hechcher-Ohlin model followed, 
which explains the appearance of international trade by differences not 
in technology but in factor endowments. It is demonstrated that a global 
social optimum can only be reached in the case of free trade. 
Furthermore, small countries also face a situation where the social 
optimum can only be reached with free trade, whereas large countries 
can affect their terms-of-trade and thereby reach a social optimum only 
in the presence of restrictive trade policies, provided there is no 
retaliation from other countries.  The theory of trade in renewable 
resources develops in a general equilibrium framework from 
Chichilnisky (1993), via Brander and Taylor (1997ab, 1998) to 
Hannesson (2000) and Emami and Johnston (2000). Brander and Taylor 
show in three seminal papers that advantages with free trade in 
renewable resources, which are not managed optimally, exist only under 
certain conditions and for certain types of country. The reason is that 
overexploitation might follow from the opening of trade.  
 A parallel development in bio-economic supply modelling appears 
with Schulz (1996, 1997), based on the backward-bending supply curve 
introduced by Copes (1970). Furthermore, quantitative supply models of 
fish stocks are introduced by Frost and Michelsen (2001) and Bjorndal 
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and Nostbakken (2002). These articles, however, identify harvest and 
stock effects, but not those on welfare.  
In the literature, the welfare effects of trade liberalisation are generally 
found to be case specific and dependent on a country's status as importer 
or exporter, the fisheries management system, the state of the fish 
stocks, and the size of the country in the world market. In this case study 
of the East Baltic cod fishery the general equilibrium theory of Brander 
and Taylor (1997a) predicts that the small exporter country with an 
overexploited open access fish stock would lose welfare from trade 
liberalisation. The large importer country would remain unaffected, 
since the price in that country is unchanged. This may, however, not 
necessarily be the result, since both input and output management exist, 
minimum mesh-sizes are compulsory and the stock is shared between 
countries. These factors are not taken into account in Brander and 
Taylor (1997a) and their inclusion may change the results. The presence 
of management will change the results as the supply curve become 
vertical in the relevant range, given by the quota. The presence of 
compulsory mesh-size regulation will affect the results, in particular for 
longer-lived fish species, since if fishing on younger age groups is 
avoided the tendency for the supply curve to bend backward is very 
small. There, the problem of overexploitation is less severe and the risk 
of extinction of the stock small. Hence, overexploitation becomes an 
economic more than a stock problem. The existence of shared 
ownership might affect the results through negative externalities, If 
management is inappropriate. Hence, the third hypothesis of this paper 
is that the welfare effects of liberalising fish trade are small in cases 
where the fish stocks are overexploited and subject to quotas, input 
limitations and compulsory mesh-size regulation. Since several fisheries 
globally are subject to these measures and since the majority of fish 
stocks globally are exploited at or above the maximum sustainable yield 
(FAO 2001), this finding may be of relevance in the majority of the 
world's fisheries.  
 In this paper the welfare effects of trade liberalisation for different 
sectors in the economy are thus identified in a case study of the East 
Baltic cod fishery using an age-structured bio-economic model 
combined with basic theory of trade between two countries. The welfare 
concepts of Copes (1972) are used. The model further departs from 
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regulated open access and analyses the welfare effects of two countries, 
following an exogenous price increase in only one of the countries 
sharing ownership of the stock.  The author is not aware of any former 
articles identifying quantitatively the welfare effects of liberalising fish 
trade, which take any of these factors into account. 
 
2. Methodology 
In this section a model capable of identifying welfare effects of trade 
liberalisation empirically for a small exporter country sharing ownership 
of a fish stock with an importer country is developed under alternative 
fisheries management schemes. The model appears in a partial 
equilibrium setup by combining a bio-economic supply model with 
traditional trade theory. 
 Following Clark (1990), the standard age-structured bio-economic 
model of Beverton and Holt (1957) of a fish population is applied. This 
model is used instead of the Schaefer (1954) model, since it allows 
different fishing mortalities for year classes. This makes it possible to 
take the wide use of technical fish stock conservation measures, such as 
minimum mesh-sizes, into account. The recruitment R, which is the 
number of fish entering the fishery, is assumed constant over time and 
the number of fish dead at time t is assumed given by (1). 
 
 ( )NFM
dt
dN
+−= , N(0)=R (1) 
 
where M is the natural mortality and F is the fishing mortality. The 
weight of one fish w(t) at the age t  is given by the von Bertalanffy 
weight function w(t)=a(1-be-vt)3, where a, b and v are positive constants. 
The total biomass Bt of one year class is then identified as Bt=N(t)w(t). 
Based on Clark (1990), it is assumed that all year classes are in 
equilibrium, are identical and that the natural mortality is constant over 
time.  
 On this basis and following Hilborn and Walters (1992) a discrete 
bio-economic model, which is applied to the empirical identification of 
supply curves, is developed1. The biomass and the landings H of year 
class t, both measured in weight, are functions of the fishing mortality 
level L1.  
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where B0,t=R and i relates to age classes. The fishing mortality level L is 
assumed to be a function of fishing effort E.  
where z is a measure of the differences in the catch efficiency between 
fishermen. (4) is introduced to take into account that the last fisherman 
joining the fishery is less efficient than the first. Thus, the catch 
efficiency decreases with fishing effort. It is further assumed that the 
total cost C is a linear function of the fishing mortality level L.  
 
 C =c*E, c>0 (5) 
 
where c is the parameter of the cost function and the fishing effort and 
fishing mortality levels are proportional. Market equilibrium is 
determined where the price is equal to the average cost, which is the 
usual equilibrium condition in fisheries. 
 H
CP =  (6) 
This equilibrium rule is for an open access fishery in which the long-run 
profit of fishermen by definition is zero and yield per recruit equals total 
costs. Fishing mortality is assumed at an initial level of one. This 
normalisation relates policy changes in the fishery to the basic 
equilibrium and is achieved by fixing the parameter c of the total cost 
curves1.  
 In this model the yield per recruit and the supply curves are alike, 
since the total costs are linearly increasing in L. If only large mesh-sizes 
are allowed, the yield per recruit curve and hence the supply curve 
retains a positive gradient. If, alternatively mesh-sizes are small the two 
curves are backward bending and if they are very small, the curves will 
approach zero. With medium mesh-sizes, however, the two curves 
approach a positive value. For illustration, the shapes of the curves for 
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the east Baltic cod stock in open access are shown in Figure 8.1, for the 
values and parameters presented in the case study in the next section. 
 
FIGURE 8.1 Curve shapes.   
Yield per recruit Y/R
Fishing mortality FFMSY
YMSY/R
TC
I. Yield per recruit and total cost curves 
Price P
PMSY
QMSY Quantity Q
 
II. Open access supply curve 
 
It appears that with the existing compulsory mesh-sizes, designed to 
catch two-year-old fish and older, the curves become backward bending. 
The turning point is known as the Maximum Sustainable Yield (MSY). 
Fishing at an effort level greater than that associated with the MSY is 
characterised as biological overexploitation. If the mesh-sizes are 
sufficiently large (for this case designed to catch only fish of an age of 7 
years and older) both curves will show a positive gradient in the relevant 
range. In contrast to a curve derived from a Schaefer function, it will 
therefore not converge against zero with increasing price. The reason is, 
that the present age-structured model assumes unchanged recruitment. 
This implies that it is impossible to extinguish the fish stock.  
The supply function for an optimally managed fish stock is the 
marginal cost function, since the management system can be used 
actively to prevent overexploitation and to minimise costs. It can be 
shown that the Maximum Economic Yield (MEY) is reached at a level 
below MSY and that the marginal cost function is monotonously 
increasing, just as a supply function for a conventional good1.  
The supply functions for stocks managed between MEY and open 
access equilibria, such as regulated open and restricted access1 are 
identical, since the only difference appears between the costs of fishing 
when the quota is taken. Such supply curves are identical to the one 
shown in Figure 8.1 for all levels of the price p until a certain value 
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above MSY, where input and output management is reached. Thereafter, 
the fixed quota determines supply.  
The inverse demand function of a fish product can be deduced as the 
aggregate of what single consumers are willing to pay. Assuming a 
Cobb-Douglas utility function, the inverse demand function is given by 
(7).  
 
 ( ) ( )qap ln*ln 1 ε+=  (7) 
 
where p is the price consumers are willing to pay, q the quantity 
demanded, ε the price flexibility and a1 the intercept. The double-
logarithmic form of the demand curve corresponds to constant price 
flexibilities. 
Based on the supply and demand functions and following Copes 
(1972) welfare measures of a capture fish stock are defined in Figure 
8.2.  
 
FIGURE 8.2 Welfare measures of renewable resources. 
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  II. Optimal economic management 
 
The equilibrium between demand and supply in open access (the 
bionomic equilibrium) is where the supply (average cost) and demand 
curves intersect, at E in Figure 8.2.I, and even though the resource rent 
is zero, the existence of the fishery still results in positive economic 
benefits. This benefit consists of the consumer surplus (shown as the 
shaded triangle in Figure 8.2.I) and the producer surplus (the shaded 
rectangle). The consumer surplus is traditionally defined as the 
difference between the amount consumers are willing to pay and the 
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amount they actually pay. For conventional goods (that is, those without 
externalities in production), producer surplus is defined as the difference 
between the minimum amount for which a producer is willing to sell 
and the amount for which he actually sells. Following Copes (1972), 
however, distinction is made for a fishery between resource rent and 
producer surplus; the first representing the factor rent of the resource 
and the latter representing other factor rents (such as of capital, labour 
and skill).  
The condition for the existence of a positive producer surplus in an 
open access fishery is that fishing vessels are heterogeneous, implying 
that vessels vary in their economic performance. Hence, only the 
“better” vessels contribute to the producer surplus. Using this 
understanding of the producer surplus, an average social cost (ASC) 
curve is obtained by subtracting the average producer surplus from the 
average cost curve. The curve is shown in Figure 8.2.I and measures the 
average opportunity cost per unit of output for labour and capital. The 
ASC curve is always lower than the AC curve and for fishing mortalities 
above MSY the two curves approach each other. This implies that the 
producer surplus approaches zero. The form of the social cost (SC) 
function in (8) is chosen to reflect these ideas:  
 
 
E
D
c
E
ESC
+
=
2
, ( )Yc
YED
−
=
1
2
 (8) 
 
where Y represents the initial share of total (private) costs that the 
remuneration of capital and labour enjoy. 
The economic optimum in the presence of management at MEY is 
shown where the supply (now the marginal cost) and demand curves 
intersect at M in Figure 8.2.II. At the optimum, the consumer and 
producer surpluses have the same definition as in the open access 
situation. To these welfare components, however, is added the resource 
rent, the area between the average and marginal cost curves in Figure 
8.2.II, again following Copes (1972).  
Under regulated open and restricted access, the supply curves become 
vertical when the price, p, exceeds a given level. Under regulated open 
access the producer surplus appears as the product of the quota and the 
difference between the prices given by the average cost and the average 
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social cost curves. Thus, the producer surpluses in regulated open access 
and in pure open access, at the quantity of output given by the quota, are 
equal. The reason is that the shape of the average social cost curve will 
be similar to that of the average cost curve, which is backward bending 
until the quota is reached and vertical thereafter. Under regulated 
restricted access the producer surplus appears as the product of the 
quota and the difference between the equilibrium price and the price 
given by the average social cost curve. The producer surplus under 
regulated restricted access is always larger than under both pure open 
and regulated open access, since in these situations other input factors 
than the resource, for example, capital and labour, are used inefficiently.  
Based on the supply curves developed above, the supply curves of two 
countries sharing ownership of a fish stock can now be deduced under 
open access. Assuming that the price changes only in Country 2, the 
supply curve may be identified in three steps. First, the initial supply 
curve in Country 1 is identified, given the initial allocation of fishing 
between countries. Then, the supply curve in Country 2 is identified 
assuming that changes in fishing mortalities only appear in Country 2. 
Finally, the terminal supply curve of Country 1 is found given the 
terminal allocation of fishing after the changes in Country 2.  
 On this basis, the open access supply curve in Country 1 is 
seen as a parallel inward shift of the supply curve in Figure 8.1.II 
according to that country’s share of the total catch. The open access 
supply curve of Country 2 may be found starting from the initial 
equilibrium point on the total supply curve, which gives the initial price 
and quantity. The fishing mortality in that country is now changed 
upwards and downwards and the new total fishing mortality as well as 
the new total catch found. Country 2's share of the total catch is 
proportionate to its share of the new total fishing mortality. The 
corresponding price is the average cost of producing that quantity in 
Country 2. Assuming that the stock is exploited at fishing mortalities 
sufficiently above the MSY and that changes in fishing mortalities only 
appear in that country, the supply curve can be shown to be rising in the 
relevant range. Finally, the terminal supply curve in Country 1 is 
identified as a shift of the initial supply curve, determined by the 
changed share of the total fishing mortality. The three curves are shown 
in Figure 8.3.  
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FIGURE 8.3 Open access supply curves of two countries sharing ownership of 
a fish stock.  
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I. Country one 
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AC
II. Country two 
 
In the diagram on the left the initial (dotted) and terminal (solid) open 
access supply curves appear for a situation where the fishing mortality is 
increased in Country 2. In the right diagram, the open access supply 
curve for Country 2 appears. The supply curves with optimal 
management are not shown, since it is known that these will always 
have an upward gradient. The supply curves in regulated open and 
restricted access will in Country 1 be as discussed above. In Country 2 
the supply curve in such situations is upward-sloping  until the quota 
level , and then vertical.  
 Since the analysis now includes more than one country, the model 
must be disaggregated further. The biological values remain unchanged, 
but the economic values and the parameters must be identified for each 
country. Thus, 1== ∑ kTotal LL , where Lk is the contribution of Country k to 
the total fishing mortality level LTotal, normalised to one. Furthermore, 
the cost parameter c is given by ∑= kTotal cc , with ck representing the 
contribution of Country k. The relative values of ck are determined by 
each country’s share of the total costs, kλ with 1== ∑ kTotal λλ . This 
structure allows different cost levels among countries. Finally, ε and Y 
are permitted to vary by country. This implies that demand and social 
costs (such as wages) can differ.  
 Based on the supply curves identified, the welfare effects of a price 
increase in Country 2, for example, caused by a trade liberalisation for 
that country in its export to Country 1, may be studied. The bonds that 
tie the two countries together are the externality from Country 2 borne 
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by Country 1 originating from increased fishing and Country 2's role as 
an exporter to Country 1. Assuming that Country 2 is unable to 
influence the price in Country 1, since the terms of trade effect is 
assumed neglected, the effect is that the price in Country 2 will increase 
by exactly the level caused by the trade liberalisation; that is, the tariff 
rate removed. In Country 1 there is no price effect, but in the open 
access case the domestic fishery is reduced, due to the negative stock 
effect. Furthermore, imports from Country 2 are increased and since the 
price is unchanged it is implicitly assumed that the gap is filled by 
increased domestic production from other sources than the fishery 
analysed. This suggests that the fishery analysed contributes only 
marginally to the total supply of the homogenous fish product in 
Country 1. In the presence of management neither the price nor the 
stock is affected. In that case the only thing that happens is that imports 
from Country 2 together with increased domestic production from other 
sources replaces domestic production.  
 The welfare effects of trade liberalisation in Country 2, the small 
exporter country, are sketched in Figure 8.4 for the alternative 
management systems, assuming that input management is introduced at 
the time the catches reach the level determined by the quota.  
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FIGURE 8.4 Welfare effects of trade liberalisation in the small exporter 
country 
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III. Regulated restricted access 
 
The trade liberalisation is introduced in the Figure as removal of a tariff 
t, thereby increasing the price from PT (with the tariff) to the “world” 
market price PW. Under all three alternative management systems, the 
removal of the tariff causes a price rise in the exporter country, 
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increases exports (shown by the horizontal bracket marking the 
difference between supply and demand in equilibrium) and reduces the 
consumer surplus (area a). In open access the change in the producer 
surplus is indeterminate (since area a+b+e might or might not be larger 
than d). In regulated open access it is zero (since it is given by the 
producer surplus in open access at the given level of quantity implying 
that area c+d=a+b+c). In regulated restricted access it is positive (area 
a+b>0). Since the resource rent under these management systems is 
either zero or by definition included in the producer surplus, the total 
welfare effect is indeterminate in open access (b+e–d), negative in 
regulated open access (–a) and positive in regulated restricted access 
(b). These results are as expected, except under regulated open access. 
The reason for the welfare loss under that management regime is that 
the price rise causes increased but completely inefficient investment, 
since its cost exactly outweighs the increased turnover. Owing to the 
presence of a quota, it is not possible to increase catches. In open access, 
the country will increase its share of the total fishing effort, giving rise 
to increased catches in that country, provided that the negative stock 
effect is not engaged. In regulated restricted access, the increased price 
implies rising profits, producer surplus and welfare.  
 The welfare effects under open access in Country 2, the large 
importer country, are shown in Figure 8.5. 
 
FIGURE 8.5 Welfare effects of trade liberalisation in the large importer 
country with an open access shared stock. 
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Welfare is affected through the negative externality which appears from 
the increased use of the shared stock by the other country and through 
the disappearance of the tariff revenue on imports. The removal of the 
tariff shifts the supply curve inwards, due to the negative externality. 
This causes the tariff revenue (area d) to disappear and imports to 
increase. Assuming that the remuneration of capital and labour obtains a 
fixed share of turnover, the producer surplus falls (from area b+c to b). 
The consumer surplus remains unchanged (area a) and hence the total 
welfare effect is negative. In the presence of management (both initially 
and terminally) the only welfare effect is that the tariff revenue 
disappears. Neither a price change nor a stock effect exists, since the 
country possesses an unchanged share of the catch. Thus, no matter 
which management system is present the welfare effect in the large 
importer country is negative.  
The case where a hypothetical change from regulated open access to 
optimal management of a shared stock is introduced is sketched in 
Figure 8.6 for the exporter and importer countries.  
 
FIGURE 8.6 Welfare effects of a hypothetical shift in fisheries management 
from regulated open access to optimal management. 
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It is assumed that the change of management system is implemented 
without the trade liberalisation and that the fishery supplies only a 
fraction of an integrated world market (corresponding to constant price). 
Furthermore, since the stock is shared and each country assumed to 
obtain a fixed share, the supply curves under regulated open access in 
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the two countries are alike. The curves follow the backward bending 
average cost curve until a certain price above MSY and are then 
vertical. Thus, for country one the curve remains unchanged, but for 
Country 2 the curve changes from an upward gradient. The reason is 
that given constant prices, only proportional changes can happen in 
catches from the two countries. In optimal management the marginal 
cost curve represents the supply curve and it appears that at the 
unchanged price (PW in the importer country and PT in the exporter), 
supply in both countries increases. Thus, exports from the exporter 
country increase. In the importer country imports decrease, since the 
country becomes more self-sufficient. At the unchanged price the effect 
is oversupply in both countries, implying that Country 2 must export 
also to other countries. The consumer surplus obtained from such 
exports to elsewhere are not included in the analysis.  
 It appears from Figure 8.6.I that the welfare change in the exporter 
country is given by the indeterminate change in producer surplus (d-b) 
and the new resource rent (b+c+e). Comparing the sum of the new 
resource rent and the terminal producer surplus with the initial producer 
surplus does, however, result in an unambiguous gain (c+d+e). Since the 
domestic consumer surplus remains unchanged, the total welfare effect 
is, as expected, positive.  
 The welfare effects in the importer country appear in Figure 8.6.II. 
The situation is the same as for the exporter country, since the change in 
producer surplus is indeterminate (d-b) and the new resource rent 
appears (b+c+e). Comparing these also gives a gain (c+d+e). The tariff 
revenue in the importer country is, however, reduced (from f+g to f, that 
is, by g). This implies that since the consumer surplus is unchanged, the 
total welfare effect is always positive.  
 
3. Case study of the East Baltic cod fishery 
In this section the model is applied to a case study of the east Baltic cod 
fishery. The fishery takes place in the Baltic Sea east of the island of 
Bornholm. Several countries are active in the fishery with the EU 
(mainly Sweden and Denmark) and Poland being the largest. The total 
catch was 91,000 tonnes in 2001, representing a landing value of 
approximately €115 million. The EU catch is used for domestic 
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consumption, while the Polish is mainly exported as frozen fillets to the 
EU.  
 The case study is based on assumptions of biological values, 
economic values and parameters. The biological values are available 
from the International Council for Exploration of the Sea (ICES) and the 
economic values from various sources, as shown in Table 8.1.  
 
TABLE 8.1 Assumed values and parameters. 
Year classes  
 
 
 
Total Unit 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8+
 Values1:   
EX Export (from Poland to 
EU) 
15,000 Tonnes   
t0 Trade weighted tariffs 8.3 %   
PEU Price – EU 1.41 €/kg.   
PPoland Price – Poland 1.10 €/kg.   
VEU Factor remuneration 
share – EU 
50 %   
VPoland Factor remuneration 
share – Poland 
35 %   
R Recruitment 217 Million   
M Natural mortality 0.2   
t Cohorts and years 20   
F Fishing mortality 0 0 0.06 0.19 0.89 1.05 1.27 1.29 1.21
N Initial population Million 217 178 146 122 63 22 4 1 0
W Weight per individual kg. 0.12 0.24 0.49 0.63 0.89 1.28 2.10 3.37 5.98
    
 Parameters:   
LTotal Fishing mort. level – 
Total 
1.00   
LEU Fishing mort. level – EU 0.43   
LPoland Fishing mort. level – 
Poland 
0.35   
λ Total Cost share – Total 1.00   
λ EU Cost share – EU 0.49   
λ Poland Cost share – Poland 0.35   
z Diff. in catch efficiency 0.68   
εEU Price flexibility – EU -0.23   
εPoland Price flexibility – Poland -0.16       
Note:1. Biological values represent an average of 1997-2001 and economic 
values are from 2001.  
Source:  Biological values known from ICES (2003ab), tariffs from OECD 
(2003), trade and landing prices from Eurostat (2003ab) and account 
statistics from Danish Research Institute of Food Economics (2002).  
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Exports of cod from Poland to the EU are taken from the Eurostat 
foreign trade statistics and the average trade-weighted tariff is calculated 
on the basis of OECD figures (OECD 2003). Prices are derived from 
landings statistics, and the share of total costs formed by the 
remuneration of capital and labour are derived from data held by the 
Danish Research Institute of Food Economics (2002).  
 Recruitment to the fish stock is assumed constant over time and 
includes 217 million individuals annually. This is also the size of the 
initial population for year class zero, which falls subsequently. The 
fishing mortality is given for twenty different year classes. It increases 
with age until year 6, after which it remains stable. This implies that the 
population almost entirely consists of fish younger than 8 years of age. 
The fishing mortality for fish until year 2 is zero owing to the presence 
of mesh-size regulation (minimum 130 mm1). For year classes 2-6 the 
fishing mortality increases gradually, since the selectivity is not knife-
edge. The fishing mortality level is distributed across the countries on 
the basis of the countries' shares of the total catch. The total catch is 
distributed among countries by fixed shares of the total quota1.  
 The initial distribution of costs is identified on the basis of their share 
of the total catch, corrected for differences in labour costs. The 
parameter for differences in the catch efficiency of fishermen is 
approximated from efficiency scores estimated with data envelopment 
analysis, according to Lindebo et al (2002). Since no such analysis is 
performed for the East Baltic cod fishery, the parameter is approximated 
on the basis of a survey of the cod fishery in the North Sea. The price 
flexibilities are chosen on the basis of studies summarised in Nielsen 
(1999).  
 Based on these, only the parameter, c, of the cost function is missing. 
The reason is, that it is determined endogenously by claiming that yield 
per recruit is equal to total costs per recruit with the initial fishing 
mortality level of unity.  
 Knowing that Polish exports to the EU amount to less than 2% of the 
consumption of cod products in the EU (Norwegian and Icelandic 
exports are the largest supply sources), the assumption that Poland 
cannot affect the “world” market price may realistically be well 
accounted for. This implies that terms of trade effects are absent and 
that products from other sources can be substituted for EU imports from 
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Poland. On this basis, the welfare effect of EU enlargement on the East 
Baltic cod market is analysed. This is done in the model with three 
countries included, but focusing on Poland and the EU, since Poland 
exports to the EU. It is assumed that the only policy that changes is that 
all tariffs disappear. This implies that the price of Polish exports to the 
EU will increase with the average trade-weighted tariff of 8.3%. 
Further, assuming that the increased export price pulls the Polish 
domestic price up by the same amount, the price difference between 
Poland and the EU will be reduced by 8.3%.  
 Welfare effects are identified for different sectors in each country. In 
Poland consumers obtain the consumer surplus and fishermen the 
producer surplus. A potential resource rent can be allocated to either the 
fishermen or the government, depending on how management is 
introduced. In the EU, consumer countries of cod obtain the consumer 
surplus. These include Germany and France. Fishermen in Sweden and 
Denmark obtain the producer surplus. The potential resource rent is 
obtained by either these fishermen or by the government in the two 
countries. Again, it is a decision to be made by the management 
authority. Finally, the European Union body obtains the tariff revenue.  
 The base year is 2001, in which the gradual tariff reduction had not 
started yet, and welfare effects are identified in the short run in 2004 and 
in the long run in 2021. 2004 is chosen since it is the first year without 
tariffs and 2021 since it offers a situation in which the system has 
moved to a new equilibrium. 
 Since it was shown in section two that welfare effects of liberalising 
trade in a capture fish product depends on the management system in 
place, a welfare analysis of EU enlargement on East Baltic cod trade 
must begin with a brief critical review of the present management 
system. A system is used where all the countries surrounding the Baltic 
Sea decide once a year on the total allowable catch (TAC) in the 
International Baltic Sea Fisheries Commission. Subsequently, this TAC 
is allocated to the single countries with a share, which has been fixed for 
the last five years. Simultaneously, some of the countries use input 
management, such as capacity limitations. Therefore, the management 
systems can neither be characterised as optimal management nor pure 
open access. The management systems might rather be characterised as 
regulated open or restricted access. However, ICES (2003b) has 
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questioned the effectiveness of the management system, since it has 
assessed unreported catches at an average 11% above TAC over the 
years 1997-2001. This is in particular the case in years where the TAC 
is close to being 100% utilised. Furthermore, while the level of the 
spawning stock biomass has been outside safe biological limits in recent 
years, TACs have been fixed at levels above ICES recommendations. 
Thus, the management system has not been applied in a way that 
secures sustainability. Therefore, even though regulated restricted 
access exists, it might be more realistic to analyse welfare in an open 
access situation. Hence, welfare analysis is performed assuming the 
presence of different management systems.  
 On this basis the welfare effects of a landing price increase on 8.3% 
in Poland are studied under the following management scenarios: 
 
1. Regulated open access. 
2. Regulated restricted access. 
3. Open access. 
 
Furthermore, a fourth scenario is studied where the management is 
changed from regulated open access to optimal management, without 
liberalising trade. Scenario 1 and 2 are studied assuming that they secure 
the current level of catches, but under two alternative assumptions on 
the input management. Scenario 3 takes the incentive of increased prices 
to increase illegal catches into account and scenario 4 analyses the 
hypothetical situation where the current management system is replaced 
by an optimal management system, for example, individual transferable 
quotas, by the EU.  
 The model is solved for different prices and the open access supply 
curve for Poland becomes upward-sloping. For the EU, the supply curve 
remains backward bending. The long- and short-run welfare effects are 
identified, for the four scenarios, in Table 8.2.   
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TABLE 8.2 Welfare effects from cod from the East Baltic Sea of the EU 
enlargement and from a hypothetical change from regulated open access to 
optimal management, Million Euro1.  
Scenarios 
1. Regulated open 
access 
2. Regulated 
restricted access 
3. Open access 4 Hypothetical 
change to opt. 
man. 
 
Short-run Long-run Short-run Long-run Short-run Long-run Short-run Long-
run
   
Poland   
Consumer surplus -0.9 -1.0 -0.9 -1.0 -0.9 -1.0 0 0
Producer surplus 0 0 +2.7 +2.9 +0.3 +0.4 -3.0 -7.5 
Resource rent2 . . . . 0 0 +20.2 +40.0
Total -0.9 -1.0 +1.8 +1.9 -0.6 -0.6 +17.2 +32.5
   
The EU   
Consumer surplus 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Producer surplus 0 0 0 0 -0.7 -0.7 -12.6 -20.1
Resource rent2 . . . . 0 0 +31.8 +64.0
Tariff revenue -1.4 -1.4 -1.4 -1.4 -1.4 -1.4 -0.4 -1.5
Total -1.4 -1.4 -1.4 -1.4 -2.1 -2.1 +18.8 +42.4
   
Notes:  
1. The initial landing values in the EU and Poland are 49.8 and 29.9 million euro, 
respectively.  
2. The resource rent is not necessarily zero in the missing (.) cases, but, if present, 
included in the  
  producer surplus. 
 
If regulated open access is maintained both Poland and the EU lose from 
the tariff removal following the EU enlargement. In the EU the tariff 
revenue from imports of cod from Poland disappears and in Poland the 
consumer surplus falls because the price increase drives exports up 
causing fewer consumption opportunities in Poland. Under regulated 
restricted access the same effects result, except that a further positive 
producer surplus appears in Poland. This is because the price increase is 
converted into pure profit whereas in regulated open access the price 
increase is wholly wasted in inefficient investment in extra factor inputs.  
 It might, however, neither be reasonable to characterise the 
management system as regulated open access nor regulated restricted 
access. The reason is that some, but not all, inputs are subject to 
limitations. The use of fishing vessels is e.g. constrained by investment 
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limitations. The input management is, however, not fully efficient, since 
other inputs including labour are not limited. Thus, the management 
system falls in between the two, implying that the effects of the trade 
liberalisation will also be in between. With total losses and gains not 
larger than €1.9 million under any of the management systems, the 
welfare effects are rather small, not exceeding 7% of the total landings 
value. 
 The characterisation of the management system as either regulated 
open access or regulated restricted access implicitly assumes that the 
increased incentive to fish illegally, in the case where prices increase, 
has no impact.  If it did, the management system can be characterised 
instead as absent, that is, as open access. In open access Polish 
consumers still lose, but now the fishermen gain. The reason is, that the 
price increase will raise activity in their fishery and hence their catch, 
since the Polish fishermen obtain a larger share of the total stock. In the 
EU the disappearance of the tariff revenue remains, but now a loss of 
producer surplus is also seen. This is due to the negative externality 
from increased Polish fishing. Even when the potential for increased 
illegal fishing is taken into account, the total loss remains, however, 
negligible. 
 The welfare effects are identified in the three situations in the long-
run where a new equilibrium after 20 years is assumed to have been 
reach following the trade liberalisation. The welfare effect in 2004 is 
also identified and it appears that 90% of the effect has already been felt 
after the three years.  
 In the hypothetical situation where a new single fishery manager 
takes advantage of the situation whereby the Baltic Sea, with the EU 
enlargement, is almost surrounded by EU countries1 and introduces 
optimal management, both the EU and Poland gain. Given that regulated 
open access initially exists, the increase compared to current value of 
landings is 85% and 109% respectively. This gain appears in the form of 
resource rent, which goes to either the fishermen or the government. 
The gain from the resource rent is, however, counter-balanced by a 
decline in tariff revenue in the EU, due to the decrease in imports. A fall 
in the producer surplus is also observed in both countries, but 
interpreting producer surplus and resource rent as one, it becomes clear 
that this can be offset by a reallocation of welfare. Thus, the change in 
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management regime increases the welfare of all sectors and is Pareto-
improving. Moreover, the gain is a conservative estimate, since the 
consumer surplus appearing between new trade partners is not included 
in the analysis. In this hypothetical situation it is further clear that it 
takes several years to change to optimal management, since only half of 
the full effect is obtained after the three years.  
 
4. Discussion 
In this paper the welfare effects of the EU enlargement in 2004 have 
been identified for different sectors in different countries that are active 
on the market for East Baltic cod products, using an age-structured bio-
economic model combined with basic trade theory. One effect is the 
relaxation of trade barriers, since all tariffs disappear. Another potential 
effect is that the Baltic Sea, with the enlargement, will be almost 
entirely surrounded by EU countries, implying that only a single 
fisheries manager will remain, creating the potential for the introduction 
of better fisheries management.  
 Assuming the presence of regulated open or restricted access to the 
fishery, it was as expected found that the welfare effect of trade 
liberalisation was small for all sectors in all countries. The explanation 
is that fisheries management in the form of quotas, input limitations and 
mesh-size regulations are taken into account. Even assuming open 
access, the welfare effects remain small. It was, however, against 
expectations, found that the producer surplus in Poland under open 
access increased (by €0.4 million), although the fall in the consumer 
surplus was large enough to maintain the total welfare reduction. But a 
sufficiently large price increase would have caused an increase in the 
total welfare. Such a result would have contradicted Brander and Taylor 
(1997a), who found that the small exporter country of a renewable 
resource always loses from trade liberalisation. The present result 
follows from the more realistic inclusion of mesh-size regulations and 
shared ownership. Whether the results remain valid also for other 
fisheries depend on whether the supply curves of the small exporter 
countries continue to be increasing. This may or may not be the case, 
dependent of e.g. the share the fishermen from such countries possess of 
the total catches. If improved fisheries management results from the 
enlargement, welfare gains would as expected be large and exceed the 
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welfare effects following from trade liberalisations. In the case of east 
Baltic cod the welfare effect of the hypothetical change to optimal 
management is approximately twenty times larger than the effect of 
trade liberalisation. 
The implications of these findings are two-fold, covering trade 
modelling and policy issues. The implications for trade modelling 
suggests that conclusions obtained without taking quotas, input 
management and mesh-sizes into account might not be valid. Neither 
the sign nor the size of the welfare effect might be as predicted by the 
Brander and Taylor theoretical approach. Welfare effects might in 
several and probably most fisheries be very small, as shown for the East 
Baltic cod stock. The direction of the welfare effects based on the age-
structured approach used in this paper confirm the direction of the 
welfare effects following from for example, Brander and Taylor 
(1997ab, 1998) only under certain and in several cases unrealistic 
assumptions. The Brander and Taylor (1997ab, 1998) result does not 
hold for overexploited fish stocks with realistic mesh-sizes, since the 
supply curve will be approximately vertical. Thus, the neo-classical 
theory regains its position in the explanation of why trade in fish arises. 
Furthermore, in trade modelling it must be taken into account that the 
ownership of several fish stocks, including the East Baltic cod, is shared 
among countries. If this is not accounted for, stock externalities are 
ignored and welfare effects identified might be of the wrong direction.  
 The partial equilibrium approach applied consists of a supply model 
based on an age-structured bio-economic model combined with basic 
trade theory. This approach rests on an assumption of constant 
recruitment. This assumption has been made because, although 
recruitment fluctuates from year to year, biologists have not been able to 
identify a unique relationship between spawning stock size and 
recruitment (as explained in the Nordic Council of Ministers (2000)). 
Changed recruitment will, however, affect welfare. Furthermore, the 
results rest on the assumption that cod is traded directly between 
fishermen and final consumers, since prices at first-hand sales are the 
price that consumers pay. This implies that fishermen earn the producer 
surplus, while the final consumers earn the consumer surplus. In reality, 
a whole supply chain is present and welfare is earned at each market 
level. Therefore, for example the option of relocation of welfare-
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creating processing of fish following trade liberalisation, is ignored. 
Hence, the welfare calculated should be interpreted with due caution 
and only as the lower estimate.  
The policy implication of the finding, that the welfare effects of trade 
liberalisation are small compared to the welfare gains from a 
hypothetical change to optimal management, indicates that the new sole 
fishery manager in the area should aim at introducing better fisheries 
management. This is much more important than trying to meet potential 
negative consequences of trade liberalisation, since even small 
improvements in fisheries management may offset the negative effects 
of trade liberalisation. The welfare effects of reducing non-tariff 
measures, such as quantitative restrictions, anti-dumping duties and 
price controls, could also be included in the analysis, since they can be 
shown to be equivalent to a tariff. This was not done, but the finding of 
relative inelastic supply predicts that the effects of the reduction of these 
measures may also be small.  
 The finding of small welfare effects of fish trade liberalisation in the 
present case follows from the inclusion of constant recruitment and age 
groups as well as fisheries management in the analysis and because the 
stock was exploited at a fishing mortality level approaching a vertical 
supply curve. Since these conditions are realistic for several and 
probably most global fish stocks the present result might also hold for 
these fisheries. This implies, that the conclusion of Brander and Taylor 
(1998) that “while we are convinced that none of our results is sufficient 
reason to abandon ongoing trade liberalisation around the world, we are 
equally convinced that trade liberalisation is a two-edged sword for a 
country with a comparative advantage in renewable resources and weak 
property rights in these sectors” should be modified for fish trade. Along 
the same line, the conclusion of Emami and Johnston (2000) that for 
example, “the World Trade Organisation should not always insist on 
free trade, rather they must pay careful attention to the particular 
relationships between trade conditions and natural resource policies 
among trading nations” should also be modified for fish trade. The 
reason is that even though the conclusions are not directly wrong, they 
can be seen to be less valid, since the most commonly used fisheries 
management systems globally are regulated open and restricted access. 
Most fisheries are subject to mesh-size regulations and most fish stocks 
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globally are overexploited (FAO 2001). Hence, the argument that warns 
against trade liberalisation in certain situations maybe held less valid 
and conventional wisdom following from the neo-classical theoretical 
tradition is strengthened  in several and probably most fisheries 
globally. Brander and Taylor (1997ab, 1998) and Emami and Johnston 
(2000) are not sufficient reason to abandon the ongoing trade 
liberalisation.  
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